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Abstract 
Porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome (PRRS) is a viral disease of pigs, which 
affects all production stages and has severe economic consequences for the swine 
industry. The virus is primarily spread between farms through direct and indirect 
contacts. A limited number of studies have been carried out to understand the between-
farm transmission dynamics of the virus. The objectives of this thesis were to explore 
the contact structures among swine farms in Canada and to use these contact structures 
to better understand the pattern and dynamics of between-farm spread of PRRS virus 
among Canadian swine herds.  
Four different studies were designed and implemented to achieve these objectives. The 
first study used network analysis tools to analyse pig movement data which revealed 
characteristics of contact patterns between swine herds and suggested a hierarchical 
structure within the Canadian swine industry, where pigs typically move in a 
unidirectional manner from one production stage to another. The median in-degree and 
out-degree for farms in this study was 1 and ranged between 0-26 and 0-10 respectively 
for the overall network. The degree distributions demonstrated characteristics of a 
power-law distribution, suggesting the presence of scale-free structure while the size of 
clustering coefficient suggested presence of small-world structure in the swine 
movement network. Additionally, high levels of truck sharing between farms were noted 
in this study, with a typical truck, during the study period, being shared among four 
different farms. The second and third studies simulated the between farm spread of the 
PRRS based on the movement of pigs and the sharing of trucks among swine farms, 
using the North American Animal Disease Spread Model and the network-based models 
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respectively. These studies provided a means to assess the relative importance of direct 
and indirect contact via truck sharing on between farm spread of PRRS virus. By 
including the transmission by trucks in the model, the median number of infected farms 
increased by 18% and the median epidemic size increased by 44% in the spatial model. 
Furthermore, with the addition of trucks in the model, the hierarchical structure of the 
industry was significantly altered and multidirectional disease spread was observed. On 
the other hand, the network-based models assessed the impact of scale-free, small-world 
and random network structures on the between farm spread of PRRS virus and 
demonstrated the influence these network structures can have on the spread of the virus. 
The spread on scale-free networks resulted in the smallest stochastic die-out percentage 
with highest epidemic sizes compared to spread on small-world or random networks. 
Similarly, the incorporation of transmission by trucks in the model had the highest 
impact on small-world and random networks, where the epidemic size doubled, 
compared to scale-free networks, where it increased by 20-29%. Given the importance 
of transmission of the virus via truck (e.g. indirect contacts) identified in the previous 
studies, the last chapter aims at (i) quantifying the likelihood that a pig transport truck 
shared among farms could remain contaminated with PRRS virus at the end of Day 1 
and to (ii) evaluate the efficacy of commonly used cleaning and disinfection protocols in 
eliminating the virus from these trucks. The results of this study suggested, when no 
cleaning and disinfection protocol is applied, that it is moderately likely that the truck 
could become contaminated and remain infected with the PRRS virus (mean probability 
ranged between 0.338-0.352, when the truck was shared between two farms), and that 
this risk marginally increased with an increase in the number of farms the truck was 
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shared among. This final study also suggested that once contaminated, most of the 
contaminated trucks would likely remain infected for more than one day. 
The studies presented in this thesis have not only provided a clearer insight into the 
pattern of contacts between farms, and the impact these contacts can have on PRRS 
virus spread, but have also highlighted the importance of including data on the sharing 
of trucks among farms, since trucks will tend to connect farms which would otherwise 
share no connection. Moreover, the studies in this thesis have reinforced the importance 
of the proper cleaning and disinfection of trucks between successive shipments, as the 
findings presented here suggest that with an increasing level of truck sharing between 
farms, shared trucks are likely to remain contaminated with the virus and sharing of 
trucks significantly increased the risk of between farm spread of PRRS virus. Not only 
do the shared trucks have a high probability of becoming contaminated with the virus, 
but once contaminated, they are likely to remain infected for a comparatively long 
period particularly in the absence of adequate disinfection. It should be noted that the 
pig movement data used in this study was not very recent and consisted of movements 
reported for only four months time period. Additionally, the described models could not 
be validated due to unavailability of data is another noteworthy limitation of the studies 
described in this thesis.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
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1.1 PRRS Virus 
Porcine Reproductive and Respiratory Syndrome (PRRS) is a contagious viral disease 
affecting all production stages of swine and is considered as one of the most prevalent 
disease of swine in the world (Lunney et al., 2010). PRRS has the highest economic 
impact on the swine industry, accounting for an annual loss of $560 million to US swine 
industry (Neumann et al., 2005) and $130 million to Canadian swine industry (Mussell, 
2010). Some of the characteristics of PRRS include: late-term abortions, still-births, 
mummified foetuses and weak piglets in breeding herds, an increased mortality rate in 
piglets and respiratory disease, poor growth performance and mortality in growing pigs 
(Nodelijk, 2002). 
PRRS virus is a small, enveloped, single stranded positive-sense RNA virus, which 
belongs to the order Nidovirales and family Arteriviridae (Murtaugh et al., 1995). The 
divergent evolution of the virus on two continents was also reflected genetically, as 
viruses from the two continents had only around 55-70% nucleotide similarity, and led 
to further classification of the virus into two distinct genotypes: Type I, as the European 
genotype and Type II, as the North American genotype (Wensvoort et al., 1992; 
Murtaugh et al., 1998). Genetic diversity among the strains of the virus relating to the 
same genotype is another concern for the control of the virus, as the virus mutates and or 
recombines continuously (Chang et al., 2002). It is estimated that the nucleotide 
substitution rate for PRRS virus ranges between 4.7 to 9.8X 10
-2
/site/year, which is the 
highest substitution rate calculated for any RNA virus (Jenkins et al., 2002; Hanada et 
al., 2005). 
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As PRRS virus is an enveloped virus, its survival outside the host is affected by ambient 
temperature, relative humidity and pH (Zimmerman et al., 2012). The virus can remain 
infective in the environment for around a week at 21
0
C, however the infectivity of the 
virus is shortened to around a day at 37
0
C and to around 20 minutes at 56
0
C. However, 
the virus remains stable for long durations at lower temperatures, remaining stable for 
around a month at 4
0
C and for four months or even longer, at temperatures lower than -
20
0
C (Benfield et al., 1992).  
The primary target cells for PRRS virus are the cells of monocyte / macrophage lineage. 
The virus replicates in specific subsets of differentiated macrophages in lungs, lymphoid 
tissues and placenta (Van Breedam et al., 2010). Viremia in some pigs starts as early as 
12 hours, and in all pigs by 24 hours post exposure. Experimental studies have shown 
that animals start shedding the virus after 2 days post infection (Chand et al., 2012; Le 
Potier and Rose, 2012). Highest viral titre is evident during 7-14 days post inoculation 
(DPI) in serum, lung and lymph nodes. After reaching the peak viral titre, the acute 
phase of viremia may subside by 28 DPI and most pigs may not be viremic beyond 28 
days. However, following the initial clearance of viremia, the infected animals may still 
harbour the virus in lymphoid tissues for extended periods of time exhibiting persistent 
infection with the virus. Viremia may periodically re-appear with replication of the virus 
in lymph nodes (Allende et al., 2000; Boddicker et al., 2012) and virus has been 
detected by virus isolation for several months (up to 132-157 DPI) after inoculation 
(Wills et al., 1997a; Horter et al., 2002; Rowland et al., 2003). 
The PRRS virus is present in serum and in many tissues as well as secretions and 
excretions of the infected animals. PRRS virus has been isolated from nasal secretions, 
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oral fluids, semen, milk, urine and feces of infected animals (Wills et al., 1997c; Bierk et 
al., 2001). Infected animals may shed virus in saliva for up to 42 DPI, in nasal secretions 
up to 38 DPI, in urine up to 28 DPI and in feces up to 35 DPI (Prieto and Castro, 2000).  
Several routes of exposure leading to infection to PRRS virus have been outlined for 
susceptible pigs: intranasal, intramuscular, oral, intrauterine and vaginal. Within a herd, 
PRRS is primarily transmitted via close contact between susceptible and infectious pigs, 
mainly through nose-to nose contact or by contact with urine and feces of infected 
animal (Albina, 1997). Transplacental transmission to foetuses during mid to late 
gestation and transmission of the virus from infected sows to suckling piglets have also 
been documented (Zimmerman et al., 2012). Transmission via artificial insemination, 
when using virus contaminated semen is also well established (Yaeger et al., 1993). In 
addition, several husbandry practices like tail docking, tattooing and inoculations may 
also lead to transmission of the virus, when contaminated tools or needles are used 
(Otake et al., 2002b; Zimmerman et al., 2012). 
The well agreed upon mechanisms for between farm transmission of PRRS virus are via 
the introduction of infected animals, through the introduction of infected semen and via 
aerosols (Yaeger et al., 1993; Mousing et al., 1997; Weigel et al., 2000; Mortensen et 
al., 2002; Dee et al., 2010; Otake et al., 2010). In addition, vehicles used for the 
transportation of pigs, and associated fomites (boots, coveralls, bedding materials etc.), 
has been implicated for spread of the virus over long geographical distances. This was 
demonstrated in a series of transmission experiments using contaminated vehicles and 
fomites (Dee et al., 2002a; Otake et al., 2002c; Dee et al., 2004b; Holtkamp et al., 2010), 
where the vehicles itself can act as a mechanical carrier of the virus or susceptible 
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animals can get infected when transported in a contaminated vehicle. Spread of PRRS 
virus to PRRS virus free distant herds, via transportation, have also been reported from 
the USA (Torremorell et al., 2004).  
Local transmission or area spread of PRRS virus is accepted, as a mechanism for 
between farm spread of the virus, by most of the studies. However the distance over 
which the virus can spread from the initial source farm is inconsistent among studies. 
Proximity to infected herds is one of the risk factors for PRRS virus infection, and the 
risk of a naive herd becoming infected with the virus increases with the density of PRRS 
virus positive herds in the neighbourhood and the risk decreases with increasing 
geographical distance between herds (Mortensen et al., 2002; Zimmerman et al., 2012). 
Area spread of the virus by aerosols within 150 metres has been reported from an 
experimental study (Otake et al., 2002a). Le Potier and colleagues reported that 45% of 
herds suspected to have acquired infection via aerosol were located within 0.5 km of the 
initial source herd and only 2% of the herds were 1 km away from the initial herd. (Le 
Potier et al., 1997). The dependence on geographical distance for airborne transmission 
of the virus may be related to the strain of the virus. As one study with PRRS virus 
strain 1-8-4 had believed to spread up to 9.1 km, while strains 1-8-2 and 1-26-2 could 
not be detected beyond 2 km (Otake et al., 2010). Weather conditions may also play role 
in spread of the virus via aerosol, including factors such as temperature, relative 
humidity, wind velocity and direction and precipitation (Dee et al., 2010). Some other 
work has been published describing the genetic similarity of PRRS virus from infected 
farms, which were not in close geographical proximity (Goldberg et al., 2000; Mondaca-
Fernández et al., 2006; Lambert et al., 2012a). These works suggested a potential long-
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distance spread of the virus due to the movement of infected pigs and other forms of 
indirect contact between distant farms. Similarly, one study from USA reported that 
17% of the infected herds were suspected to have introduced the PRRS virus via 
contaminated transport (Torremorell et al., 2004). 
Some of the well-recognized risk factors for infection of farms with PRRS virus are the 
size of the herd, the practice of replacing animals from unknown sources, increase in the 
number of times replacement animals are introduced to the farm, absence of quarantine 
for replacement animals, and density of farms or proximity to other farms (Albina, 
1997; Le Potier et al., 1997; Mousing et al., 1997; Mortensen et al., 2002; Holtkamp et 
al., 2010).  
Several strategies for effective prevention, control and elimination of PRRS virus has 
been published. These strategies include: (i) measures that can limit the introduction of 
new pathogens to the farm, such as application of high external biosecurity standards, 
(ii) measures that can control ongoing infection on the farm, such as McRebel piglet 
management, gilt acclimatization, and vaccination and (iii) measures for elimination of 
the virus from the farm, such as herd closure, depopulation/repopulation and rollover 
(McCaw, 2000; Dee et al., 2004c; Corzo et al., 2010). 
External biosecurity measures that potentially can limit the introduction of PRRS virus 
into a herd rely on the following practices: introduction of animals from trusted sources 
or from PRRS free herds, application of quarantine of 30 days for incoming animals, use 
of clean and disinfected equipment, regular cleaning and disinfection of transportation 
vehicles used for shipment of pigs, application of Danish entry system for people, 
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proper handling of dead stock and control of other potential mechanical vectors, as well 
as filtration of incoming air (Dee et al., 2004c; Dee et al., 2005a; Lambert and Dallaire, 
2009; Pitkin et al., 2009). 
Elimination of PRRS virus from contaminated trucks requires rigorous cleaning and 
disinfection. Several standard protocols have been developed for cleaning and 
disinfection of transport vehicles used for shipment of pigs to effectively get rid of the 
PRRS virus (Dee et al., 2004a; Dee et al., 2004b; Dee et al., 2004c; Dee et al., 2005a; 
Dee et al., 2005b). However, field studies have shown that nearly one third of such 
vehicles are not properly cleaned and disinfected between successive shipments 
(Lambert et al., 2012b), partly due to the high cost associated with effective cleaning 
and disinfection, therefore increasing the likelihood for spread of the PRRS virus via 
transportation trucks. 
Breeding farms with a target to eliminate the virus from the premises had little success 
and had recurrent recirculation of the virus if they did not continually incorporated 
McRebel management practices (Polson et al., 2010). The McRebel concept stands for 
―Management Changes to Reduce Exposure to Bacteria to Eliminate Losses‖. 
Incorporation of this practice in disease control protocol includes measures such as 
limiting cross-fostering to a minimum, eliminating poor performing non-responsive 
pigs, changing needles between litters or pens and taking extra care of the smallest pigs 
(Corzo et al., 2010).  
Gilt acclimatization is a practice to induce immunity in replacement gilts by exposing 
them to a circulating strain of virus before they are replaced as breeding stock (Batista et 
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al., 2002). Gilts are exposed to circulating virus either by inoculating serum or tissue 
scrapings from viremic nursery pigs, or to expose them to viremic nursery pigs and 
allow the virus to transmit via contact.  
Inactivated, as well as modified live virus vaccines, have been commercially available 
and used in breeding animals, replacement pigs and grower pigs for the control of PRRS 
virus (Corzo et al., 2010). However, the high heterogeneity in the genetic makeup of 
PRRS virus isolates is likely the main hindrance towards effective control of the virus 
by use of commercial vaccines, as the induced immunity to one strain of virus is not 
always cross protective or is only partially protective to a different strain, even if the 
viruses belong to the same genotype (Meng, 2000; Mateu and Diaz, 2008; Kimman et 
al., 2009).  
Eliminating PRRS virus from an infected herd via test and removal has also been 
documented (Corzo et al., 2010). It is based on serological test for PRRS virus 
antibodies or detection of viral RNA in the serum and if one of these tests is positive, the 
animal is immediately culled from the herd. The disadvantage of this method is the cost 
of testing and the cost of removal of a productive animal. In addition, the test accuracy 
may be critical as false positive animals may be removed while false negatives may still 
be present in the herd (Dee et al., 2001; Dee, 2004). The tests commonly applied for are 
ELISA using commercial test kits (Idexx-ELISA) to detect the viral antibody, which is 
claimed to have very high specificty (Nodelijk, 2002) and Reverse-transcription 
polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR)  to detect PRRS virus RNA in tissue, serum and 
several bodily secretions and excretions, which has very high sensitivity. 
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The whole herd depopulation and repopulation method is based on removal of all 
breeding and/or growing pigs from the farm, cleaning and disinfecting the facilities, 
allowing certain down time before restocking the farm with PRRS virus negative pigs. 
This method is highly effective in eliminating the virus from the facilities, but a whole 
herd repopulation is very expensive. However, one important advantage of this method 
is that other pathogens will simultaneously be eliminated from the herd (Corzo et al., 
2010). 
Herd Closure and rollover is one of the most widely used methods for eliminating the 
PRRS virus from breeding herds and has been reported as the least expensive method 
for the elimination of the virus (Corzo et al., 2010). This method consists of avoiding 
introduction of replacement gilts into the herd for at least six months accompanied with 
removal of seropositive animals from the herd (Torremorell et al., 2003). Success of 
herd closure is enhanced if all the breeding animals in the herd are acclimatized at the 
same time, with the circulating strain of the virus, before herd closure is initiated.  
To avoid reinfection from neighbouring farms, after elimination or control of a disease, 
a regional integrated approach of all the farms and disease control managers in the 
geographical region is required (Corzo et al., 2010). Recently, Sweden has reported 
successful elimination of PRRS virus through a coordinated cooperation between the 
swine industry, veterinarians and government authorities. Similar approaches to control 
the virus from a geographical region have been initiated in several countries. In North 
America, swine farms in several geographical regions are voluntarily participating  in 
Area Regional Control and Elimination (ARC&E) project (Corzo et al., 2010). The 
impact of such projects on regional control of PRRS virus is still to be evaluated. 
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1.2 Overview of modelling methods applied to understand the between-farm 
spread of PRRS virus 
1.2.1 Network Analysis 
The trade of live animals, which requires movement of animals between premises, is a 
key economic activity in many livestock industries. However, such movement of 
animals can also be instrumental in the long distance spread of infectious agents, as was 
evident during the 2001 Foot and Mouth disease outbreak in the United Kingdom (Fèvre 
et al., 2006; Ortiz-Pelaez et al., 2006). Movement of animals, which brings susceptible 
animals into direct or indirect contact with infectious agents, is one of the major 
pathways for the introduction and spread of infectious agents between premises (Bigras-
Poulin et al., 2007). 
Besides movement of infected animals between farms, studies have shown that vehicles 
used in the shipment of animals between farms may also influence the indirect or 
mechanical spread of infectious agents such as FMD or PRRS viruses (Dee et al., 
2002b; Alexandersen et al., 2003; Dee et al., 2004b). The first published study 
discussing the specific risks modern transportation of livestock can have on disease 
spread dates back to 1970, in which four key components that can augment the potential 
of infectious disease spread were identified: transport vehicles, infectious animals, travel 
route and travel time (Hansen Jr, 1970). Trucks used in the shipment of animals can 
become contaminated when shipping infected animals which increases the risk of spread 
of infectious disease to naive farms upon subsequent use of such trucks (Bigras-Poulin 
et al., 2007; Smith et al., 2012), particularly if trucks are not cleaned between successive 
uses or are poorly cleaned (Bottoms et al., 2012a; Lambert et al., 2012b). Sharing of 
trucks between farms for shipment of animals may connect farms that are not connected 
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through direct animal movement. Recent studies from Denmark, France and the UK 
have demonstrated high levels of truck sharing between swine farms in the shipment of 
pigs (Bigras-Poulin et al., 2007; Rautureau et al., 2012a; Smith et al., 2012). 
Commercial swine production in North America has undergone a massive 
transformation towards intensive multi-site production systems, in which various age 
groups of pigs are grown at different geographical locations. This in turn requires large 
numbers of growing pigs and breeding animals to be moved from one site of production 
to another on a regular basis. The major benefit of this production system is an increase 
in efficiency with specialization of production, while at the same time the health status 
of many swine herds has improved dramatically due to improved biosecurity and the 
effective implementation of all-in-all-out (AIAO) policies (Harris, 2008; Key and 
McBride, 2010). However, with the increase in the number of movements between 
farms, connectivity between farms increases posing an increased threat in terms of the 
spread of infectious diseases.  
Network analysis (NA) is based on graph theory and offers an analytical framework to 
explore the pairwise contact structures, as well as the patterns and implications of these 
contact structures between entities in a population (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). The 
increase in availability of animal movement data has seen an increased use of NA tools 
in veterinary epidemiology to unravel the relationships among farms, markets and 
dealers in the livestock industry. 
Two review papers (Dubé et al., 2009; Martínez-López et al., 2009) provide an excellent 
summary of the concepts of NA in the context of their use in the study of animal 
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movements. A number of published studies have also described, in detail, the contact 
patterns that exist among farms for specific livestock industries in different geographical 
locations (Bigras-Poulin et al., 2006; Bigras-Poulin et al., 2007; Natale et al., 2009; 
Lockhart et al., 2010; Volkova et al., 2010; Nöremark et al., 2011a; Rautureau et al., 
2011; Rautureau et al., 2012b; Smith et al., 2012; Büttner et al., 2013a; Büttner et al., 
2013c; Dorjee et al., 2013).  
Most studies broadly characterise these animal movement networks as having two 
distinct topological structures: those being small-world and scale-free network 
characteristics (Webb, 2005; Bigras-Poulin et al., 2006; Kiss et al., 2006b; Bigras-Poulin 
et al., 2007; Lockhart et al., 2010; Dubé et al., 2011a; Rautureau et al., 2011, 2012a; 
Büttner et al., 2013b; Dorjee et al., 2013). The small-world and scale-free topologies are 
also evident in many  other real world networks, such as for the World Wide Web, for 
the network of electricity grids, or for citation networks for academic papers (Amaral et 
al., 2000; Barabási et al., 2000). The small-world networks tend to have relatively high 
clustering coefficients and shorter average path length than would be the case for a 
random network of the same size (Watts and Strogatz, 1998; Watts, 2003). Small-world 
networks have sub-groups or clustering of individuals, in which the probability that two 
nodes of the network will be connected increases if they have some common connection 
and these clusters/sub-groups are further connected with other nodes of the network by 
some long-range connection. Hence, in small-world networks, even though individuals 
in the network may not be directly connected, they can be reached in fewer steps via 
these long-range connections. In a scale-free network, many individuals in the network 
have few connections and a few individuals have a relatively large number of 
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connections, such that the distribution representing the number of connections between 
individuals is right-skewed with a long tail and follows a power-law distribution 
(Barabási and Albert, 1999).  
Knowledge of the network structure connecting farms can provide insights on probable 
patterns of infectious disease spread in the population under study, and can also be 
helpful in effectively managing surveillance and disease control programs (Kiss et al., 
2006b; Martínez-López et al., 2009; Dubé et al., 2011b; Nöremark et al., 2011b). In 
scale-free networks, farms with a large number of connections will tend to act as ―hubs‖. 
Once these hubs become infected the disease can spread rapidly to other farms in the 
network. However, the spread gradually slows as the farms connected to the hubs 
become infected (Shirley and Rushton, 2005a; Ortiz-Pelaez et al., 2006; Dubé et al., 
2009). Similarly, for targeted surveillance or efficient disease control, strategically 
targeting farms with a higher number of connections (i.e. hubs) may yield better 
outcomes than simply selecting random farms of the population (Martínez-López et al., 
2009; Nöremark et al., 2011b). On the other hand, disease spread may be comparatively 
slow in a small-world network, but it can potentially spread to topologically distant 
farms in the network and the infection may persist longer in this type of network when 
compared to scale-free or random networks. However, the comparative size of any 
epidemic in a small scale network is likely to be smaller than would typically be the case 
for random or scale-free networks (Rahmandad and Sterman, 2008; Lockhart et al., 
2010). 
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1.2.2 Simulation modelling approaches for infectious diseases 
Recently, computer simulation models have been widely used to explore the pattern and 
dynamics of infectious disease spread and these models have provided important 
insights on the spread of diseases, such as severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) 
(Lipsitch et al., 2003; Lloyd-Smith et al., 2003; Gumel et al., 2004) and the foot-and-
mouth disease (FMD) outbreak of 2001 in the United Kingdom. Simulation models 
allow us to explore thousands of artificially designed experiments and ‗what if' 
scenarios pertaining to several disease outbreak scenarios. Due to economical, logistical 
and welfare concerns, similar experiments could not be conducted under real world 
conditions (Keeling and Rohani, 2008; Vynnycky and White, 2010). Disease spread 
models are designed to represent real world situations in a simplified mode and through 
these in silico experiments, modellers can explain the behaviour of a complex biological 
system. Similarly, simulation models are useful in determining the impact of key 
parameters on the dynamics of disease spread as well as the efficacy of different 
intervention strategies in controlling disease spread or to support informed policy 
decisions (Morris et al., 2001; Riley et al., 2003; Taylor and Gate, 2003; Kiss et al., 
2006a; Francis et al., 2010).  
Several types of models, ranging from simple deterministic differential equation models, 
also known as system dynamics or compartmental models (Mills et al., 2004; Arino et 
al., 2008; Brauer, 2008) to more complex, stochastic, individual or agent based models 
(Rahmandad and Sterman, 2008; Carpenter and Sattenspiel, 2009; Dürr et al., 2013; 
Patyk et al., 2013) have been used to study infectious diseases in human and animal 
populations. Some agent based models explicitly incorporate contact network structure 
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among the individuals in the population (Eames and Keeling, 2002; Ayyalasomayajula 
et al., 2008b; Chao et al., 2010; Rahmandad et al., 2011) while some others assign a 
random contact based on the relative geographical distance among the individuals 
(Garner et al., 2011; Taylor et al., 2011; Dürr et al., 2013; Patyk et al., 2013). For the 
models that incorporate network structure, the direct contact between individuals of the 
population is limited to only those individuals that are connected as per the construction 
rules of the specified network structure (Eames and Keeling, 2002; Ayyalasomayajula et 
al., 2008b; Chao et al., 2010; Rahmandad et al., 2011). On the other hand, for models 
such as NAADSM, each individual, farm has a discrete spatial location; however no 
contact network structure is imposed, and so farms within a contact group is allowed to 
contact any other farm randomly. These type of models are called "spatially-explicit" 
models throughout this thesis. Additionally, for spatially-explicit models, disease spread 
among individuals is also influenced by spatial distance between individuals (Harvey et 
al., 2007). 
Most traditional system dynamics models consider the population at risk as the number 
of units existing in each state at a given time and use differential equations to estimate 
the transition of populations from one state to another (Rahmandad and Sterman, 2008); 
most of these models fail to account for the chance nature of epidemic spread 
(randomness/ stochasticity) as well as heterogeneity in contact patterns that exist among 
individuals within a population (Dangerfield et al., 2009). Agent based models (ABM), 
on the other hand, not only allow flexibility to incorporate individual-level attributes 
such as age, sex, production type, or farm size, as well as spatial locations of the 
individuals, but can also account for randomness to select parameter values or to select 
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individuals in the model. Moreover, individuals in the population can be traced 
throughout the simulation in terms of their infection status and a record of the contacts 
for each individual can be maintained. This allows for a more complete evaluation of 
targeted surveillance and intervention strategies. However, the added benefits of the 
ABMs come at a price, not least of which being that they are more computationally 
intensive and therefore time consuming. In addition, the increased granularity of the 
model requires more detailed individual-level data, which is often sparse and can make 
it difficult to parameterize such models; while the added randomness can create 
difficulties in performing sensitivity analysis and ascertaining the impact of various 
parameters on model outcomes (Brauer, 2008; Gojovic et al., 2009). 
A number of software platforms have been developed to implement models that can 
assess the spread and control of highly contagious animal diseases; including AusSpread 
(Garner and Beckett, 2005) InterSpread Plus (Stevenson et al., 2013b) and the North 
American Animal Disease Spread Model, NAADSM (Harvey et al., 2007). 
The NAADSM is an agent based, farm-level, stochastic, spatially explicit, state-
transition modelling platform that allows for the simulation of infectious disease spread 
in populations via direct contact (through movement of infected animals), indirect 
contact (through the movement of people, fomites or sharing of equipment), aerosol and 
local area spread. The epidemiological unit of interest within NAADSM is the herd or 
farm, which is a group of animals, managed together at a single geographic location, and 
these are defined by their actual physical location in a geographical region. It is flexible, 
as the users can define the probable contact groups in which disease can spread (e.g. 
between sow and nursery farms or nursery and finishing farms) and allows for user-
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established disease parameters to define model behaviour. Each unit is initially assigned 
attribute data which include a unique unit ID; the type of farm (e.g. dairy, beef, swine, 
etc.); farm size; location of the farm (longitude and latitude of the farm); and disease 
transition state. Disease spread between farms is influenced by rates of direct and 
indirect contact, relative locations, and distances between farms. An infected farm 
progresses from one disease state to another over time. The model can predict the total 
number of infected premises without any intervention applied, or can also evaluate the 
impact of a number of different disease intervention strategies, such as: quarantine; 
movement control; vaccination; depopulation and zoning on the spread of the disease 
(Harvey et al., 2007). This platform was originally developed to simulate the spread and 
control of contagious animal diseases (e.g. FMD) between farms of the same or different 
species and production types. Recently, NAADSM has been used to explore the 
dynamics of spread of other infectious agents such as the highly pathogenic Avian 
Influenza in poultry, the spread of influenza between human and swine populations, and 
to evaluate eradication strategies for pseudo rabies (Ketusing et al., 2012; Patyk et al., 
2013; Dorjee et al., 2014). 
Network- based models, where either a theoretical network structure or empirical 
network structures between individuals in the population are explicitly incorporated into 
the ABM, have recently been extensively used as these models can impart additional 
realism in terms of contacts between individuals (Riley et al., 2003; Eubank, 2005; 
Shirley and Rushton, 2005b; Kao et al., 2006; Kiss et al., 2006a; Kiss et al., 2006b; 
Rahmandad and Sterman, 2008; Vernon and Keeling, 2009). For several infectious 
diseases, including PRRS, the pathogen is spread mainly by direct or indirect contact 
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between individuals. Thus, disease is spread by a network of contacts (via movement of 
infectious animals) such that the probability of spread of infection is limited to a finite 
set of susceptible contacts in contrast to the assumption of mass-action models in which 
every susceptible individual in the population has a certain probability of becoming 
infected (Keeling, 2005). As individuals have contacts only with a finite set of other 
individuals in the population, network-based models with scale-free or small-world 
networks more closely mimic the system modelled compared to models with contacts 
randomly assigned between individuals. The increase in use of these recent modelling 
approaches is facilitated by the advancement in high-performance computing resources, 
availability of advanced modelling software, as well as an increase in the availability of 
data required to parameterize these models (Morris et al., 2001; Rahmandad and 
Sterman, 2008; Vernon and Keeling, 2009; Stevenson et al., 2013b). 
1.2.3 Bayesian approach for probabilistic risk assessment 
Probabilistic risk assessment is widely applied to many domains in science, technology 
and medicine including: aerospace, military, nuclear energy, chemical processing, 
human and animal health (Bedford and Cooke, 2001). In veterinary epidemiology, this 
approach has been used to assess the entry of pathogens through trade and importation 
of animals or animal products, as well as to assess the microbiological risk through the 
consumption of contaminated food products (Notermans and Mead, 1996; Zepeda et al., 
2001). However these methods are equally applicable to other disease-related decision 
making areas, such as in surveillance or disease control programs (MacDiarmid and 
Pharo, 2003). 
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Probabilistic risk assessment models can be implemented using one of two distinct 
stochastic modelling techniques: Monte Carlo simulation or Bayesian inference. Monte 
Carlo simulation is intuitive, relatively easy to implement, can simulate complex 
systems with all kinds of probability distributions and with correlated parameters, and 
because of this is widely used and accepted. However it is unidirectional as information 
cannot be propagated from downstream component of the model, and the model is not 
interactive as the data and parameters of the model are not interlinked or as the 
parameters estimated from the data for one node of the model does not influence the 
parameters estimate for other nodes of the model, which were estimated from separate 
data sources. These models are also difficult to update as new information becomes 
available and do not allow for backwards reasoning (Smid et al., 2010). 
On the other hand, the Bayesian approach allows for the incorporation of uncertainties, 
as well as information from different sources in the model; for example, knowledge 
from experts can be incorporated as priors in the model (Czado and Brechmann, 2014). 
Some additional advantages of using Bayesian approach include: the parameters of the 
model interact as knowledge from one part of the model migrates to other parts of the 
model, parameters in the model can be continuously updated as new information 
becomes available, model validation is comparatively easier as it allows for ‗backward‘ 
reasoning,  and a graphical interface simplifies model presentation to non-experts (Smid 
et al., 2010; Greiner et al., 2013). In addition, it allows the assumption of conditional 
dependence between nodes required in classical risk assessment to be relaxed, thus 
permitting the estimation of joint distributions at nodes that are conditionally 
independent through the use of Bayesian belief networks (Albert et al., 2008). Bayesian 
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networks are a graphical representation of a model with a set of statistical variables that 
define the model and their probabilistic dependencies. The network is usually 
represented using a directed acyclic graph in which nodes represent the variables and the 
relationships between variables are represented by directed arcs. The absence of an arc 
between any two nodes indicates absence of dependency between these variables. Any 
relationship in the network is expressed in terms of probabilities that describes the 
strength of the relationship between the variables represented in the qualitative 
component of the model (Nielsen and Jensen, 2009). A Bayesian network uses Bayes' 
rule (Grether, 1980) to estimate the posterior distributions across nodes based on a set of 
given prior knowledge about the variables together with the observed data. 
Several studies have utilized the Bayesian approach to assess the risk for exposure to 
contaminated food with microbes or to assess the risk of food-borne illness (Hald et al., 
2004; Delignette-Muller et al., 2006; Albert et al., 2008). Delignette-Muller and 
colleagues have evaluated the risk of exposure to Listeria monocytogenes in cold 
smoked salmon, where they describe the effect of time and temperature on bacterial 
growth, by taking into account the variability between strains of Listeria and between 
several salmon products (Delignette-Muller et al., 2006). Additionally, this study has 
also discussed the usefulness of the Bayesian approach in estimating and updating 
posterior probabilities through Bayesian inference by taking into account information 
available from expert knowledge and experimental data (Delignette-Muller et al., 2006). 
Similarly, Albert et al. (2008) assessed the risk of Campylobacter infection in humans, 
due to consumption of chicken meat, and discussed how the Bayesian approach can first 
be utilized to theoretically represent complex systems and then demonstrated its ability 
 21 
 
to efficiently spread any new information throughout the Bayesian network. They 
incorporated information from ‗downstream‘ components of the model, which then 
propagate throughout the network and allow for back-calculation of posterior 
probabilities associated with unobserved nodes (Albert et al., 2008). Additionally, this 
study has suggested that Bayesian approaches can be used for the prediction or 
evaluation of associated risks for a set of different behaviours, such as home 
consumption of chicken (Albert et al., 2008). Moreover, another study (Hald et al., 
2004) has quantified the contribution of each of the major animal-food sources to human 
salmonellosis and this study included prior information for several parameters, such as  
that accounted for the presumed but unmeasured differences with respect to serotypes 
and food sources related to human salmonellosis. The same study demonstrated that the 
estimates of the model parameters could be improved over time by continuously 
updating the model as new information becomes available from observational studies. It 
was also demonstrated that risk estimates can be obtained for very specific ―what if‖ 
scenarios and models (Hald et al., 2004). As such, the incorporation of Bayesian Belief 
Networks into the risk assessment process can become a powerful tool for risk 
managers.  
1.3 Thesis Objectives 
In Canada, there are a limited number of studies describing direct and indirect contact 
patterns between swine farms. Similarly, the impacts of direct contact (via movement of 
infected pigs) and indirect contact associated with the movement of animals (via sharing 
of trucks between farms) on between-farm spread of PRRS virus has not been evaluated 
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for Canadian swine herds. Swine producers and industry experts in Canada are 
concerned that the sharing of trucks may be influencing between-farm spread of PRRS 
virus (http://www.opic.on.ca/biosecurity-resources/transportation). In a separate study in 
the USA, it was suspected that 17% of infected herds had introduced the PRRS virus via 
contaminated transport (Torremorell et al., 2004). However, there have been no studies 
that have quantitatively assessed the risk of PRRS virus contamination as a result of 
truck sharing. 
Thus, the main research questions of interest in this dissertation were: (i) What type of 
contact pattern exists between swine farms in Canada? (ii) What is the role of 
transportation trucks in connecting farms that do not share shipment of animals? (iii) 
What is the likely impact of these direct (movement of animals) and indirect contacts 
(sharing of trucks between farms) on between-farm spread of PRRS virus? And (iv) how 
likely are these trucks to become contaminated with the PRRS virus and to remain 
infected thereafter? 
The research presented in this dissertation utilized data collected for a pilot pig 
traceability project in four regions of Canada from July 1 to November 3, 2004. The 
data consisted of information on between-farm movement of pigs in these regions. The 
second chapter of this dissertation provides an analysis of swine movement between 
farms and describes the characteristics of the contact network of swine farms in these 
four regions of Canada. In the third and fourth chapters, the contact rates between farms 
derived from the first chapter and from the swine movement data were used along with 
some other PRRS virus related parameters (from published literature or experts' 
judgement) to simulate the between farm spread of PRRS virus in Canadian swine 
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herds. The third chapter included spatial location of swine farms without imposing 
network structure for contacts between farms, while the fourth chapter evaluated the 
impact of perceived contact network structure among swine farms on spread of PRRS 
virus. In the final substantive chapter, data are incorporated from different sources 
(swine movement data, published studies and experts' judgement) to quantify the 
likelihood that shipment trucks will be contaminated with PRRS virus. 
The specific objectives of this research are addressed within the main chapters of the 
thesis as follows: 
1. To describe farm-to-farm contact patterns in swine movement and the sharing of 
trucks between swine farms, in four Canadian regions. In addition to describing these 
patterns using Network Analysis tools, various contact parameters were obtained for use 
in network-based simulation models applied to infectious disease spread in Canadian 
swine populations. (Chapter 2) 
2. To develop a model to simulate the between-farm spread of PRRS virus in Ontario 
swine farms via direct (animal movement) and indirect (sharing of trucks between 
farms) contacts using the NAADSM framework, and to describe and compare the 
patterns of outbreak under a range of scenarios. (Chapter 3) 
3. To develop a network-based simulation model for the between-farm spread of PRRS 
virus that could be used to assess the impact of various network structures on between-
farm transmission of PRRS virus. (Chapter 4) 
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4. To quantify the likelihood that a truck used for the shipment of pigs would be infected 
with PRRS virus, and to evaluate the efficacy of cleaning and washing protocols in 
eliminating the virus from these trucks, using a Bayesian risk analysis approach. 
(Chapter 5)  
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2.1 Abstract 
Direct and indirect contacts among animal holdings are important in the spread of 
infectious diseases. The objectives of this study were to describe networks of pig 
movements and the sharing of trucks used for those movements between swine farms in 
four Canadian regions using network analysis tools and to obtain contact parameters for 
infectious disease spread simulation models. Four months of swine movement data from 
a pilot pig traceability program were used. Two types of networks were created using 
three time scales (weekly, monthly and the full study period): one-mode networks of 
farm to farm direct contact representing animal shipments and two-mode networks 
representing the sharing of trucks between farms. Contact patterns among farms were 
described by estimating a range of relevant network measures. The overall network 
neglecting the four regions consisted of 145 farms, which were connected by 261 
distinct links. A total of 184 trucks was used to transport 2043 shipments of pigs during 
the study period. The median in- and out-degree for the overall one-mode network was 1 
and ranged from 0-26 and 0-10, respectively. The overall one-mode network had 
heterogeneous degree distribution, a high clustering coefficient and shorter average path 
length than would be expected for randomly generated networks of similar size. On 
average, one truck was shared by four farms in the overall network, or by three farms 
when considered the monthly and weekly networks. Degree distribution of the two-
mode overall network demonstrated characteristics of power-law distribution. For more 
than 50% of shipments on any given day, the same truck was used for at least one other 
shipment. Findings from this study are in agreement with previous work, which 
suggested that swine movement networks exhibit small-world and scale-free topologies. 
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Furthermore, trucks used for the shipment of pigs can play an important role in 
connecting otherwise unconnected farms and may increase the spread of disease.  
Keywords: swine, movement, network analysis, two-mode network, infectious diseases 
2.2 Introduction 
The movement and trade of live animals constitute major economic activities within the 
livestock sector. However, movements, where susceptible animals are brought into 
direct or indirect contact with infectious agents, pose a significant risk for spreading 
disease between farms. The movement of animals can be pivotal in spreading infectious 
agents to distant geographical locations, as was noted during the 2001 Foot and Mouth 
disease outbreak in the UK (Fèvre et al., 2006; Ortiz-Pelaez et al., 2006). Movement of 
animals  is one of the major pathways for introduction and spread of infectious agents 
between livestock premises. Therefore understanding contact structures and trade 
patterns within livestock industries can assist epidemiologists in unravelling the 
potential impact of animal movement on disease spread (Bigras-Poulin et al., 2007). 
In addition to the risk of transmission of diseases via the movement of infected animals, 
vehicles used in animal transportation can also be involved in the indirect or mechanical 
spread of infectious agents such as FMD or PRRS viruses (Dee et al., 2002b; 
Alexandersen et al., 2003; Dee et al., 2004b). The sharing of trucks between farms for 
the shipment of pigs may increase the risk of infectious disease spread (Bigras-Poulin et 
al., 2007; Smith et al., 2012), due to poor cleaning and disinfection of trucks (Bottoms et 
al., 2012a; Lambert et al., 2012b). Investigation of the level of truck sharing among 
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farms is thus important in understanding linkage and potential disease spread between 
otherwise unconnected farms. 
Network Analysis (NA) provides an analytical framework to study pair-wise 
relationships as well as the patterns and implications of these relationships among 
entities (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). Advances in network theory and computing 
power together with increased availability of animal movement data have provided new 
opportunities to explore contact structures within the livestock industry, including 
among farms, markets and dealers. In recent years NA has increasingly been used in 
veterinary epidemiology. Two reviews (Dubé et al., 2009; Martínez-López et al., 2009) 
have summarized the concepts of NA in the context of exploring networks of animal 
movements. A number of studies have been published which describe the contact 
patterns among farms for specific livestock industries in different countries (Bigras-
Poulin et al., 2006; Bigras-Poulin et al., 2007; Natale et al., 2009; Lockhart et al., 2010; 
Volkova et al., 2010; Nöremark et al., 2011a; Rautureau et al., 2011; Rautureau et al., 
2012b; Smith et al., 2012).  
In Canada, there are limited studies describing network characteristics and contact 
pattern of swine herds . One study collected survey information about movement of 
swine and semen in Canada (Christensen et al., 2008). This study reported three types of 
farms: farms that had no movement at all (17%), farms with limited (<3) incoming 
movement but frequent outgoing movement (57%), and farms with frequent incoming 
and outgoing movement (26%) of animals during the 42 day study period. One recent 
study has used the network analysis approach to characterize movement of pigs between 
251 swine farms of South-western Ontario and have demonstrated heterogeneity in 
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contact between production types, with nursery farms being central in the network 
(Dorjee et al., 2013). 
In animal movement networks, farms are represented as nodes and the movement of 
animals between two farms is represented by a single link and the contact patterns 
among farms are evaluated using one-mode networks. In some instances, it is useful to 
evaluate the relationship between two distinct sets of entities (e.g. farms and trucks) and 
two-mode networks are used for this purpose (Borgatti and Everett, 1997). Previous 
studies related to the livestock sector have used two-mode networks to describe the 
relationship between farms and auction markets (Robinson and Christley, 2007), 
equipment and personnel sharing between cattle farms (Brennan et al., 2008), and truck 
sharing in the movement of pigs between French farms (Rautureau et al., 2012b) . 
In addition to better understand the dynamics of infectious disease spread through the 
movement of animals, NA provides valuable information for the development of disease 
spread parameters in models to evaluate surveillance and disease control strategies. 
Failure to account for contact patterns among animal holdings in simulation models of 
disease spread will result in unrealistic model outcomes (Keeling and Eames, 2005b; 
Dubé et al., 2011b). In designing targeted surveillance programs for diseases associated 
with animal movements, herds selected based on their network parameters can enhance 
the sensitivity of the surveillance program (Dubé et al., 2011b; Frössling et al., 2012). 
Similarly, understanding network structures can guide the selection and improved 
targeting of control strategies to limit disease spread (Christley et al., 2005). 
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The objectives of this study were to describe farm to farm contact patterns of swine 
movement and the sharing of trucks used for those movements between swine farms in 
four Canadian regions using NA tools, as well as to obtain contact parameters for 
network-based simulation models for infectious disease spread in swine populations.  
2.3 Materials and Methods 
2.3.1 Swine movement data 
Four months of swine movement data were obtained from a pilot pig traceability project 
conducted in four regions of Canada from July 1
st
 to November 3
rd
, 2004. Regional pork 
boards selected the farms in each region that voluntarily agreed to participate in the 
study. The dataset included identification codes of shipping and receiving farms, date of 
shipment, number of animals shipped, production type, region and a unique identifier 
for the truck used in each shipment. A shipment was defined as movement of one or 
more pigs on the same day from a source to a destination farm. Each truck used for the 
shipment of pigs had a unique identifier and were used for single or multiple shipments 
during the study period. In case of multiple shipments by the same truck, it could be 
shared between different farms on the same day or on different days, or it could be pigs 
from multiple farms going to the same destination on the same day where pigs from 
different source farms shared the space during a particular shipment.  
Descriptive summaries of the swine movement data, for the three time-scales considered 
in the study: overall (for the entire study period), monthly and weekly and for the four 
production types were computed in Stata Statistical Software: Release 12 (StataCorp. 
2011. College Station, TX, USA). The swine farms involved in this study comprised of 
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one of the four production types: farrowing farms that produced piglets which were 
delivered to nursery farms after weaning (at around 3 weeks of age), farrow to finish 
farms which produced marketable fattening pigs, nursery farms where pigs were reared 
after they were weaned but before fattening stage (approximately 3-10 weeks) and 
grower/finishing farms were mixture of farms rearing pigs either above 10 weeks to 
market age or after weaning till market age. 
2.3.2 Network Analysis 
One-mode and two-mode networks were constructed at the three different time scales: 
an overall network (for the entire study period), monthly (n=4) and weekly (n=18). 
There were 157 farms in the database that reported movement of pigs during the study 
period. Out of 157 farms, 12 farms were isolated, which either shipped animals to or 
received from farms outside the four study regions; these farms were not included in 
generation of one-mode networks. First, a series of farm to farm, directed, binary 
networks (one-mode) were generated to investigate the contact patterns between farms. 
In these networks, each unique farm was represented as a node and all the movements 
between two farms were consolidated as a single link. Then, to investigate the 
relationship between farms that shared trucks for the shipment of pigs, a farm to truck 
network (two-mode) was generated. In these two-mode networks (Borgatti and Everett, 
1997), farms and trucks represented two sets of nodes and the sharing of trucks by farms 
was represented by links. For two-mode networks, the 12 isolated farms not included in 
the one-mode network were also included as the trucks they used for shipments were 
shared with other farms in the network. All network generation and analyses were 
performed using Ucinet (Version 6.414, Analytic Technologies, Harvard) . 
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The following network measures were computed for each network: size (number of 
nodes and links), degree (in and out-degree), density, fragmentation, average path 
length, and diameter. For the one-mode networks, the clustering coefficient and the 
reciprocity of links between nodes were also estimated. Two additional network 
measures, specific to one-mode networks, infection chain (in and outgoing) and 
components (strong and weak), were also computed and were used to compare the 
potential epidemic size of these networks. A description of network measures and other 
terminology relevant to this paper is presented in Table 2.1. 
For the overall one-mode network the distributions of in-degree and out-degree, as well 
as ingoing and outgoing infection chains, were computed for each region and production 
type. ANOVA permutation tests, which do not rely on the  assumption of independence 
of observation and random sampling (Borgatti et al., 2002),were performed to compare 
the distributions of in-degree, out-degree, ingoing and outgoing infection chains among 
production types in addition to the four regions . Correlation analyses were carried out 
using the Quadratic Assignment Procedure (QAP) to test whether farms had a higher 
degree of contact with farms of the same production type or within the same region. For 
QAP, first an attribute network based on the production type or region of the farms 
involved in an animal movement was generated and then its association with the overall 
one-mode network was tested with 10,000 permutations. QAP calculates Jaccard 
coefficient as a measure for similarity between two network matrices. Similarly, to 
assess whether ties between farms were associated with similarity in farm level network 
characteristics (in-degree, out-degree, number of trucks used by a farm) the Moran's I 
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autocorrelation coefficient was computed. Moran‘s I ranges from -1 to 1, with positive 
values representing positive autocorrelation. 
To assess the presence of scale-free topology in the networks, a power-law distribution 
defined as p(x) ~ x
α
, was fitted to the observed  in-degree and out-degree distributions of 
the monthly and overall one-mode networks and for degree (truck) distribution in the 
two-mode network. Degree distribution of weekly networks was not evaluated for 
presence of scale free topologies, as very few connections existed at that time scale. It is 
often difficult to estimate parameters for a power-law distribution, as in most cases only 
the tail of the observed distribution follows this distribution (Dubé et al., 2009). We 
used a maximum-likelihood estimator to estimate scaling parameter (alpha) and degree 
value (x) based on xmin (threshold value) and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) goodness-
of-fit statistic to test power-law fit of the data as described by (Clauset et al., 2009). This 
analysis was conducted using the VGAM package (version 0.9-1 http://cran.r-
project.org/web/packages/VGAM/index.html) in the R software platform with plfit.R, 
ConfidenceIntervals.R and GoodnessOf-Fit.R source code available at 
(http://tuvalu.santafe.edu/~aaronc/powerlaws/). Similarly, to ascertain small-world 
topology, 100 random networks with a similar number of nodes and links based on 
random graph theory (Erdős and Rényi, 1960) were generated using Ucinet (Version 
6.414, Analytic Technologies, Harvard). Average clustering coefficients and average 
path lengths for the randomly generated networks were compared with each of the 
respective observed networks. A network was considered small-world, if the clustering 
coefficients were larger and the average path length was shorter than in the random 
networks of equivalent size.  
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Infection chain, components, out-degree (binary) based on a single link between two 
farms, and out-degree (valued) based on frequency of shipments between two farms 
which did not consolidated multiple shipments between pair of farms into a single link, 
were compared and evaluated for all three time scales to predict the potential size of an 
epidemic. Infection chains capture the number of links formed by animal movement 
between farms in the network and are defined by rules which are based on directionality 
of contact and time sequence of movement (Dubé et al., 2011a). These were extracted 
using the EpiContactTrace package (version 0.7.1 http://cran.r-
project.org/web/packages/EpiContactTrace/index.html) available for the R software 
platform (R core team, 2012). The 95th percentile from the distribution of out-degree 
and outgoing infection chains and the sizes of the largest components, as well as giant 
strong component (GSC), were used to estimate the lower bound, while maximum 
values from the distribution of out-degree and outgoing infection chains as well as giant 
weak component (GWC) were used to estimate the upper bound of the potential 
epidemic size.  
2.4 Results 
2.4.1 Summary of swine movement 
 A summary of swine movement data from the four Canadian regions is presented in 
Table 2.2. The number of pigs moved on each day is shown in Figure 2.1. Weekly 
cycles of pig movement corresponding to weekdays can be noted. The number and 
percentage of animals moved and the number of incoming and outgoing shipments for 
each production type are presented in Table 2.3. The number and percentage of 
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shipments according to their origin and destination for each production type is presented 
in Table 2.4. Grower/finishing farms received the largest proportion of shipments 
(59.4%) with 45.8% of total animals received, followed by nursery farms (39.8% of 
shipments and 53.4% animals). Similarly, farrowing farms shipped the largest 
proportion of shipments and animals (35.6% and 39.5%), followed by grower/finishing 
farms (32% shipments and 26.2% animals) most of which were to farms of the same 
production type.  
Out of 184 trucks used for the shipment of pigs, 29% of trucks were used in only a 
single shipment during the entire study period, while 25% of the trucks were used for 13 
or more shipments. For more than 50% of the shipments on any particular day, the same 
truck was used for at least one other shipment and for approximately 10% of shipments 
the same truck shipped five or more shipments on a single day. When the same truck 
was used for two or more shipments on the same day, in 80% of the cases the truck 
carried multiple shipments, from different farms, at the same time.  
2.4.2 One-mode networks 
The one-mode overall network (Figure 2.2a) had 145 farms connected by 261 links. On 
the other hand, the monthly networks included 41-94% of all farms and around 27-89% 
of the number of links that existed in the overall network. As expected weekly networks 
involved a lower proportion of farms (1-60%) connected by only 0.4-33% of the total 
links present in the overall network. Summaries of these networks are presented in Table 
2.5. The average number of connections per farm was 1.8 in the overall network and 
approximately one in the monthly and weekly networks. The number of farms with zero 
in-degree and zero out-degree in the overall network were 55 and 31, respectively. 
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Weekly networks presented a higher density (5%) as compared to monthly (0.5%) and 
overall networks (1.2%). The network showed a high degree of fragmentation at any 
time scale, indicating a high proportion of unreachable pairs of farms in the network. 
The fragmentation of the monthly and weekly networks was also evident from the 
number and size of their weak components. While the overall network had four weak 
components, the monthly and weekly networks presented 72 and eight weak 
components, respectively. The size of the largest weak component of each of these 
networks comprised 48%, 47% and 40% of the total farms in the respective networks.  
The clustering coefficients of overall and monthly networks were larger than that of 
randomly generated networks (0.009 and 0.001 respectively) with similar number of 
nodes and links. However, clustering coefficients of weekly networks were of similar 
magnitude to that of randomly generated networks. Similarly, average path length of 
observed networks for all three time scales (1.8, 1.44 and 1.22) were shorter than that of 
randomly generated networks (6.75, 2 and 3.9 for overall, monthly and weekly 
networks). 
There was not a single reciprocal link (Reciprocity=0) between farms in any of the one-
mode networks, indicating that all of the shipments between farms were unidirectional. 
At all three time scales, any given pair of farms in the network was approximately two 
links apart and therefore could be reached through one intermediary farm. The longest 
path to reach any pair of farms (diameter) in the observed networks varied between 2 
and 5 (Table 2.5). The size of the largest strong component for the overall, monthly and 
weekly networks was one, suggesting the absence of any subgroups of farms or any 
GSC within the networks. 
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The tails of the in-degree and out-degree distributions appeared linear on a log–log scale 
(Figures 2.3a/2.3b) with power-law exponent alpha values of 2.54 (95% CI 1.88-2.98) 
and 2.68 (95% CI 1.86-2.90), respectively, for farms with the highest in-degree (xmin >4) 
and out-degree (xmin >2) values. The KS test suggested that the power-law was a 
suitable distribution for both the in-degree and out-degree (p>= 0.68 and 0.22 
respectively). Similarly, total degree (without considering directionality of movement) 
distribution also appeared linear on a log–log scale (Figure 2.3c) and had a power-law 
scaling exponent alpha value of 2.3 (95% CI 1.80-2.44) for farms with degree of more 
than four connections (xmin>4) and the KS test indicated this to be a plausible power-law 
distribution (p >= 0.17).  
Based on permutation-based ANOVA tests, the distributions of in-degree, out-degree, 
ingoing and outgoing infection chains (Figure 2.4) were significantly different among 
production types (p<0.002), but not among regions (p>0.44). Nursery farms had higher 
in-degree and out-degree than other production types. They also had relatively large 
ingoing and outgoing infection chains. The in-degree and out-degree for nursery farms 
ranged from 1-7 (median: 3) and 0-6 (median: 2) respectively. Farrowing and farrow to 
finish farms had the lowest in-degree and ingoing infection chain values. Farrowing and 
farrow to finish farms had the highest outgoing infection chain and grower/finishing 
farms had highest ingoing infection chain. Farms in regions A and D (regions are not 
specified due to a confidentiality agreement) had higher in-degree and out-degree than 
farms in region B and D and farms in region A, B and D had higher in and outgoing 
infection chain than farms in region C, which corresponded to the fact that regions A 
and D had many nursery farms. However, none of these measures were significantly 
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different among the four regions. QAP analysis demonstrated that farms of the same 
production type were less likely to be linked with each other (Jaccard 
Coefficient=0.005, p>0.95), while farms within the same region were highly likely to be 
linked (Jaccard coefficient=0.67, p<0.0001). Similarly, farms tended to be connected 
with farms with similar out-degree (Moran's I=0.366, p<0.0001) but not with similar in-
degree (Moran's I=0.08, p>=0.06). Links between farms were also associated with 
similarity in the number of trucks used by a farm (Moran's I=0.43, p<0.0001). 
2.4.3 Two-mode network 
 The two-mode overall network (Figure 2.2b) contained 157 farms and 184 trucks. 
Similarly, the monthly and weekly networks involved 61% and 48% of farms and 47% 
and 27% of trucks respectively (Table 2.6). A farm used approximately five different 
trucks for shipments during the study period, while a truck was shared by approximately 
four farms. The overall two-mode network was less fragmented, compared to the one-
mode network, indicating that including trucks in the network created additional paths 
and increased connectivity. The tail of degree distribution (for trucks) appeared linear on 
a log–log scale (Figure 2.3d) with a power-law exponent alpha value of 2.3 (95% CI 
1.8-2.5), for trucks that were shared by more than three farms (xmin>3) and had a p=0.15 
for the KS test, suggesting that the degree distribution of trucks followed a power-law 
distribution. 
2.4.4 Comparison of potential epidemic size 
A comparison among four network measures (out-degree (binary and valued), outgoing 
infection chain and component size) to estimate the lower (LB) and upper (UB) bound 
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of the potential epidemic size in one-mode networks at three different time scales is 
presented in Table 2.7. The components provided three times larger estimates than 
outgoing infection chain and approximately five to six times larger estimates than out-
degree (binary) for UB of epidemic size in all three types of networks, however, 
estimates of component for lower bound were smallest of the three measures. The out-
degree (binary) provided the smallest estimates for UB in all three networks, while out-
degree (valued) provided larger estimates in terms of both UB and LB of epidemic size 
than outgoing infection chain. 
2.5 Discussion 
This study describes detailed contact structures among swine herds in Canada and 
explored the extent of truck sharing between farms. The swine industry in the regions 
studied was dynamically linked by animal movements; however the sharing of trucks 
also appears to be a significant source of inter farm connectivity. We studied the 
relationship between farms and farms that share trucks, by generating one-mode and 
two-mode networks at three different time scales. 
 This study included farms that voluntarily participated in the pilot traceability program 
and does not represent a random sample of farms in the four regions. The farms included 
in the study represented 5.6% of total swine farms in the four regions and ranged 
between 4-17% across the four regions (Statistics Canada, 2007). As the swine 
movement data used in this study were collected in 2004, there may have been some 
changes in frequency of shipments between farms. However, the pattern of swine 
movement and the topologies of the networks associated with swine movement are 
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likely to have remained largely unchanged particularly in terms of network topologies. 
This hypothesis is based on findings from studies of swine movement from Ontario, 
Canada (Dorjee et al., 2013) and from other European countries (Bigras-Poulin et al., 
2007; Rautureau et al., 2012a; Büttner et al., 2013b) which suggests that swine 
movement networks in general demonstrate small-world and scale-free topologies. 
Network topologies has important implications in infectious disease spread and most 
network based disease simulation models utilize these network structures to simulate 
disease spread (Rahmandad and Sterman, 2008). Additionally, as other swine movement 
network studies have also suggested similar network measures as reported in this study, 
which is reflective of vertically integrated structure of the swine industry and trading 
relationship among swine operators which is much preferential and permanent (Dorjee 
et al., 2013{Smith, 2012 #64}{Nöremark, 2011 #74}), the farm level network measures (in-
degree and out-degree) may still represent as reasonable estimates. However, due to 
voluntary participation of farms in the study, some bias in network level measures 
(fragmentation, density, clustering coefficient etc) may exist. Furthermore, this study 
included shipment activities of farms for only four months duration, thus any seasonal 
influence on the contact pattern between farms may not have been captured. Given the 
short duration of the study, voluntarily participation of the farms in the study and data 
assessed was not very current, generalizing and extrapolating some findings from this 
study will require some caution.  
Ultimately, this study has highlighted the importance and necessity of recording 
movement data. Future studies in Canada with longer term movement data will provide 
additional insights on probable infectious disease spread via the movement of pigs and 
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will be able to identify any seasonal influences on such movements. Regulations in 
several European countries require reporting of animal movements and similar 
arrangements in Canada would not only aid in trace-back and trace-forward, but would 
also provide a rich database that could be explored to unravel a range of epidemiological 
questions. 
The characteristics of the swine movement networks in these four regions of Canada 
were remarkably different from a network describing dairy cattle movement in Ontario 
(Dubé et al., 2011a). The swine movement networks were less fragmented, with larger 
clustering coefficients and degree values, but also with shorter path lengths. Moreover, a 
GSC was not observed in the swine movement networks, in contrast to the presence of a 
GSC, incorporating large subset of farms, reported in the network of dairy cattle (Dubé 
et al., 2011a). These differences reflects typical hierarchical production system of swine 
industry in which pigs at different stages of growth are raised in specific production 
facilities and movements of pigs between these facilities are unidirectional. However, 
some of the network measures (density, fragmentation and diameter) obtained in this 
study were similar to those described for a swine movement network in Southwestern 
Ontario, where both networks demonstrated similar topologies (Dorjee et al., 2013). It 
should be noted that the present study described movement of pigs in regions of Canada 
that excluded Ontario. Similarly, swine movement networks from other countries 
displayed comparable characteristics to those found here in terms of: degree distribution 
in a UK network (Smith et al., 2012); degree and infection chain distribution, density, 
and fragmentation in a Swedish network (Nöremark et al., 2011a); average path length 
in a French network (Rautureau et al., 2012b); and average path length and size of GSC 
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for the monthly network in a pork chain network in Northern Germany (Büttner et al., 
2013c).  
Several published animal movement networks (Lockhart et al., 2010; Dubé et al., 2011a; 
Rautureau et al., 2012b; Smith et al., 2012), present two basic patterns of connectivity, 
known as small world and scale-free topologies. Small world networks have higher local 
clustering than is the case for a random graph of the same size and are also connected 
with distant nodes by shorter paths (Watts and Strogatz, 1998). The overall and monthly 
(one-mode) networks in this study were characterized as having small-world topologies. 
However, the weekly networks topologies were similar to those found in random 
networks. 
In scale-free networks, the frequency of contacts between nodes follows a power-law 
distribution, where many of the nodes have few connections while a few nodes have 
many connections (Barabási and Albert, 1999). It should be noted that small-world and 
scale-free topologies are not mutually exclusive and a network can exhibit both 
properties (Wang and Chen, 2003). In this study, the overall and monthly (one-mode) 
networks and the overall (two-mode) network were characterized as having scale-free 
topologies, as the in-degree and out-degree distributions of the one-mode networks and 
degree (truck) of the two-mode network fitted a power-law distribution, suggesting 
heterogeneity in the number of incoming and outgoing contacts for farms and in the 
sharing of trucks by farms.  
Small-world and scale-free networks present two characteristically distinct topologies, 
when viewed from the perspective of disease spread and targeting surveillance and 
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control measures. In small-world networks, disease spread can occur quickly within 
clusters and can also reach distant farms in the network by crossing a few links, however 
the size of the epidemic in a small-world network tends to be smaller when compared to 
a random network (Christley et al., 2005). Due to the presence of hubs in scale-free 
networks, epidemics can spread faster than in random networks of similar size, but the 
spread of infection will gradually slow down once the primary (farms directly connected 
to hubs ) and secondary contacts (farms not directly connected to hubs but connected to 
primary contacts)become infected (Kiss et al., 2006b; Kiss et al., 2006a). In terms of 
targeting control measures, scale-free networks are strong enough to withstand random 
attacks but are highly sensitive to targeted attacks (Nair and Vidal, 2011). Heterogeneity 
in degree distribution and the scale-free structure of a network indicates the presence of 
hubs (premises with high out-degree) and authority (premises with high in-degree). 
Hubs are central in disease spread and can be targeted to quickly reduce disease spread 
by applying control measures such as quarantine; similarly authorities can be central for 
targeting disease surveillance activities (Shirley and Rushton, 2005b; Martínez-López et 
al., 2009).   
The high in- and out-degree as well as ingoing and outgoing infection chains associated 
with nursery farms represent their central position in receiving and spreading infection 
and suggest nursery farms could be potential target for disease surveillance as well as 
for applying control measures. The low in-degree and ingoing infection chain values 
associated with farrowing and farrow to finish farms indicate less vulnerability to 
acquiring infection from other farms via movement of animals. However, these farms 
had the highest risk of spreading an infection to other farms , as they have relatively 
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high out-degree and the highest outgoing infection chain values and targeting control 
measures at these farms could increase the efficiency of control program. 
Grower/finishing farms were likely to be the most vulnerable in terms of contracting an 
infection, based on their high in-degree and highest ingoing infection chain values. 
These findings are consistent  with findings from other similar studies (Rautureau et al., 
2012a; Büttner et al., 2013b; Dorjee et al., 2013) and can be explained by considering 
hierarchical structure of swine industry and unidirectional flow of pigs from one 
production type to other, where farrowing and farrow to finish farms are at the 
production end with  high out-degree and outgoing infection chain values and finishing 
farms are at the receiving end with high in-degree and ingoing infection chain values 
(Büttner et al., 2013b). 
Almost two thirds of the trucks used for shipment of pigs were shared between more 
than two farms. On any particular day, the same truck was shared between more than 
one farm in 50% of shipments, while on average each truck was shared by four different 
farms over the entire study period. Additionally, trucks increased the connectivity of 
farms in the swine movement network and decreased the number of links required to 
traverse the network from one farm to another. This could facilitate the spread of 
infectious agents to farms which would not be in direct contact otherwise. The truck 
itself can be considered as an epidemiological unit when it is contaminated.  
Sharing of trucks potentially increases the risk of transmission of infectious agents in a 
number of ways: when animals from different farms share transport during shipment, or 
when animals from different farms are transported separately but in successive 
shipments, or through contamination of farm premises by infected fomites (Bigras-
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Poulin et al., 2007). The role of shipment trucks in spreading PRRS virus to susceptible 
pigs has been documented (Dee et al., 2004b). Infected trucks may spread the disease 
unless they are cleaned and disinfected. Therefore, application of appropriate cleaning 
and disinfection protocols for shipment vehicles, as well as biosecurity measures at the 
farm gate may be crucial in limiting the spread of diseases via shared trucks (Dee et al., 
2004a). However, a recent study in Canada reported that less than one third of trucks 
used for the shipment of pigs are cleaned and disinfected between successive shipments 
(Lambert et al., 2012b) suggesting that regular cleaning and disinfection of shipment 
vehicles is not an usual practice. This may have serious implications in facilitating the 
spread of disease in networks such as those described in this study. 
Understanding the characteristics of swine movement networks in Canada, combined 
with knowledge of indirect contacts between swine farms via the sharing of trucks may 
be useful to producers when evaluating existing biosecurity plans, to professional 
organizations in developing biosecurity guidelines, and to policy makers in developing 
control strategies for emerging diseases.  
The outgoing infection chain measure is likely the best estimator of potential epidemic 
size in networks for all time scales, rather than out-degree or size of the largest 
components. Similar predictions were reported from a study of swine movement 
network in Northern Germany (Büttner et al., 2013c). The fact that the infection chain 
represents the directed path of animal movement across farms by taking the actual time 
sequence of movements into account (Dubé et al., 2008) increases the reliability of this 
measure in predicting epidemic size. Our findings suggest that the introduction of a 
pathogen of short incubation period into the network could infect up to six farms (in the 
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weekly network) and if the infection remained undetected for four months then up to 20 
farms could become infected (14% of the total farms in the network).  
The out-degree (binary) tended to predict smaller potential epidemic size; this is not 
surprising, as out-degree only accounts for immediate contacts and does not consider 
any subsequent contact beyond primary contact. However, out-degree (valued), which is 
based on the frequency of outgoing shipments from a farm and does not consolidate 
multiple shipments to the same farm into a single link, estimated larger epidemic sizes 
than did the outgoing infection chain. This finding suggests that using frequency of 
shipments to estimate contact rates between farms, as an input parameter for disease 
spread models, will eventually predict larger epidemic sizes.  
Similarly, GSC and GWC predicted the smaller, lower bound and larger upper bound of 
potential epidemic size when compared to estimates based on the infection chain. 
Neither GSC nor GWC account for the time sequence of shipments, nor does the GWC 
account for direction of movements. The potential epidemic size estimated in this study 
was based on direct contact between farms (movement of animals) and did not consider 
any other routes of transmission, such as indirect contacts (sharing of trucks, personnel, 
equipments etc.), transmission by vectors or aerosol spread. Additionally, the 
biosecurity level of the farms was not considered as well, which could strongly 
influence the estimated potential epidemic size. 
This study provided some of the contact parameters required to simulate the spread of 
infectious diseases between swine farms. First, it identified the network structure as 
small-world and scale-free. This information can be used in defining the network and 
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the associated topology. Second, contact frequency and out-degree between different 
pairs of production types can be used to define the contact rates between farms in 
simulation models. In addition,  the degree distribution of trucks can be used to 
parameterize indirect contacts by truck sharing in network based models.  
2.6. Conclusion 
This study has provided novel insights into the contact pattern among swine herds in 
four Canadian regions. As expected, the swine movement networks described 
demonstrate a production system with a hierarchical structure and heterogeneities in 
contact levels between farms. The findings also indicated that many farms that would 
otherwise not be linked were connected indirectly via the sharing of trucks used for pig 
shipments. Understanding the structure of swine movement networks should assist in 
providing advice on targeted surveillance as well as in the control of infectious diseases 
such as PRRS. This knowledge should also encourage the proper cleaning and 
disinfection of shipment vehicles between successive shipments, which will decrease the 
number of potentially infective contacts between farms. Finally, contact parameters 
from this swine movement network can be used to represent heterogeneity in contacts 
between farms in simulation studies of infectious disease spread in Canadian swine 
populations. 
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Table 2.1 Description of network analysis terminology as used in the context of animal movement 
networks  
(Based on material discussed in: Borgatti and Everett, 1997; Watts and Strogatz, 1998; Dubé et al., 2009; 
Opsahl and Panzarasa, 2009) 
Term Definition 
Node 
Arc 
The unit of interest (farms) in the network 
A directed link between two farms 
Binary network When multiple links (shipments in this study) between two specific farms 
are considered as a single link (occurred / did-not-occur) 
Valued network When frequency or value of links between two specific farms are taken into 
account 
One-mode network 
Two-mode network 
A network with one set of nodes (farm to farm network) 
A network with two distinct sets of nodes (farm to truck, farm to market 
networks) 
Density Proportion of actual links present in the network over all possible links  
Degree (one-mode) 
In-degree 
Out-degree 
 
Number of farms from which each farm receives animals  
Number of farms to which each farm sends animals 
Degree (two-mode) 
Degree (farm) 
Degree (truck) 
 
Number of trucks used by that farm for shipments 
Number of farms sharing that truck for shipment 
Strong component 
 
Weak component 
Maximally connected subgroup of a network where all farms are directly 
linked 
Maximally connected subgroup of a network without considering 
directionality of the links 
Clustering Coefficient (one-
mode) 
The proportion of closed triplets (formed by 3 farms connected by 3 
undirected links) to total number of open (formed by 3 farms connected by 2 
undirected links) and closed triplets in the network 
Average Path Length The average number of links along the shortest or geodesic paths between 
all possible pairs of nodes 
Diameter Longest path between any pair of farms in the network 
Fragmentation Proportion of pair of farms that are unreachable in the network 
Reciprocity Proportion of reciprocated links in the network 
Ingoing Infection Chain Number of direct and indirect incoming contacts to a farm through other 
farms by incorporating sequence of contacts 
Outgoing Infection Chain Number of direct and indirect outgoing contacts from a farm through other 
farms by incorporating sequence of contacts 
Small-world Network A network with high clustering and short path length compared to a 
randomly generated network with same number of nodes and links. 
Scale-free network A network with heterogeneity in degree distribution, where degree 
distribution fits a power-law distribution (many farms have few connections 
and a few farms have many connections) 
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Table 2.2 Summary of swine movement data in four Canadian regions from July to November 2004 
Description Overall value 
 
Monthly Shipment 
 
Mean (Min-Max) 
Weekly shipment 
 
Mean (Min-Max)  
Number of Farms 157 99 (73-122) 67 (8-95) 
Number of Shipments 2043 511 (307-727) 72 (6-113) 
Number of trucks used for 
shipments 
Average number of 
shipments/truck (Range) 
184 
 
11 (1-163) 
85 (54-113) 
 
6 (5-7) 
44 (3-65) 
 
1.6 (1.45-2) 
Mean Shipment Size (Range) 130.5 (1-700) 125.2 (111-143) 78.2 (54.6-160.7) 
Average number of shipments/ 
farm (Range) 
14.7 (1-48) 6.1 (4.8-7.3) 1.5 (1.2-1.7) 
Days of activity  106 (July 1- 
Nov 3, 2004) 
26.5 (24-28) 5.9 (4-7) 
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Table 2.3 Number of swine shipments and number of pigs moved by production type in four 
Canadian regions from July to November of 2004 
Farm Type No. of 
farms (%) 
Incoming shipment Outgoing shipment 
Shipments Animals (%) Shipments Animals (%) 
Grower/finishing 78 (49.7) 934 59,108 (45.8) 503 56,387 (28.6) 
Farrowing 32 (20.4) 12 1,104 (0.8) 559 85,008(43.1) 
Farrow to finish 11 (7) 0 0 273 41,348 (21.0) 
Nursery  36 (22.9) 626 68,801(53.4) 237 14,288 (7.3) 
Total 157 1572 129,013 1572 197031 
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Table 2.4 Total number of swine shipments by production type of source and destination farms, in 
four Canadian regions from July to November of 2004 
Source farm 
Destination farm 
Grower/finishing Farrowing Farrow to 
finish 
Nursery  Total (%) 
Grower/finishing 477 - - 26 503 (32.0) 
Farrowing 35 12 - 512 559 (35.6) 
Farrow to finish 204 - - 69 273 (17.4) 
Nursery  218 - - 19 237 (15.1) 
Total (%) 934 (59.4) 12 (0.8) - 626 (39.8) 1572 
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Table 2.5 Descriptive network measures for one-mode binary networks (overall, monthly and 
weekly) of swine movement in four Canadian regions from July to November of 2004 
 
Network Measures  
Overall 
Network  
Monthly Networks Weekly Networks 
Mean (Range)  Mean (Range)  
Size  145 92 (59-137) 52 (2-87)  
Links 261 131 (71-232)  50 (1-86)  
Average Degree  
Median In-degree (range) 
Median Out-degree (range) 
1.8 
1(0-26) 
1(0-10) 
1.36 (1.20-1.70)  
0.5 (0-24) 
1 (0-8) 
0.90(0.50-1.10)  
0 (0-17) 
0 (0-5) 
Density  0.012 0.005 (0.003-0.009)  0.050 (0.01-0.500)  
Clustering Coefficient  0.06 0.03 (0.02-0.05)  0.02 (0.00-0.04)  
Av. Path Length  1.80 1.44 (1.38-1.57)  1.22 (1.02-1.57)  
Diameter  5 3.25 (3-4)  2.5 (2-3)  
Fragmentation 0.98 0.99 (0.98 - 0.99) 0.96 (087-0.99) 
Reciprocity  0 0  0  
Weak Component  
4 
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72 (26-105) 
43 (28-69) 
 
8 (5-15) 
21 (10-31)  
  Number  
  Largest Size  
Strong Component  
145 
 1  
 
92 (59-137)  
 1 (1-1)  
 
57 (2-87) 
 1 (1-1)  
 Number 
 Largest Size  
Outgoing Infection Chain  
3 (0-20)  
 
1.86 (0-17) 
 
1.30 (0-6)   Mean/ Range  
Ingoing Infection Chain 
  Mean/ Range  
3 (0-40) 1.86 (0-34) 1.30 (0-23) 
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Table 2.6 Descriptive network measures for the two-mode networks (overall, monthly and weekly) 
of swine movement in four Canadian regions from July to November of 2004 
Network Measures Overall Network Monthly Network 
Mean (Range) 
Weekly Networks 
Mean (Range) 
Size 
 Farms 
 Trucks 
 
157 
184 
 
 96 (73-114) 
86 (55-114) 
 
 
75 (33-97) 
49 (19-67) 
Links 717 273 (174-368) 137 (49-183) 
Average Degree (Range) 
 Farms 
 Trucks 
 
4.56 (1-39) 
3.90 (2-22) 
 
2.76 (2.22-3.30) 
3.1 (2.70-3.50) 
 
1.79 (1.48-1.88) 
2.76 (2.38-3.10) 
Density 0.025 0.012 (0.007-0.014) 0.004 (0.002-0.006) 
Average Path Length 4.31 4.45 (4.0-5.0) 3.31 (1.45-4.1) 
Diameter 12 12 (9-14) 9 (2-13) 
Fragmentation 0.55 0.88 (0.81-0.95) 0.94 (0.89-0.98) 
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Table 2.7 Number of nodes (farms) determined by the lower and upper bounds of four network 
measures obtained from the swine movement information from four Canadian regions from July to 
November of 2004. 
Network measures  Overall Network Monthly Networks Weekly Networks 
LB UB LB UB LB UB 
Out-degree (binary)
a 
5 10 5 8 4 5 
Out-degree (valued)
a 
32 52 10 16 5 8 
Outgoing infection chain
a 
12 20 8 17 4 6 
Component
b 
1 69 1 43 1 21 
a
LB and UB are 95th percentile and maximum value from the distribution 
b
LB and UB are sizes of the largest strong and weak components, respectively. 
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Figure 2.1 Daily movement of pigs from 1 July 2004 to 3 November 2004 in four Canadian regions with lowess smothing (bandwidth 
0.8) by region (a), and production type (b). 
 69 
 
 
Figure 2.2 (a) One-mode network diagram of pig movements in four Canadian regions (N=145) Node color indicates regions (Red: A, 
Blue B, Green: C, and Pink: D) and node shape indicates farm type (circle: grower/finishing, square: farrowing, up triangle: farrow to 
finish, and box: nursery). The largest circles represent farms with largest outgoing infection chain values. (b) Two-mode network map 
of pig movements in four Canadian regions from July 1
st
 to November 3
rd
 of 2004, N1 (Farms=157, represented by red circles) and N2 
(Trucks=184, represented by blue squares). The size of each node is proportional to the degree centrality of that entity. 
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Figure 2.3 (a-c) Distribution of in-degree, out-degree and total degree of farms in the 
one-mode overall network and (d) degree of truck in the two-mode network of swine 
movements in four Canadian regions from 1 July to 3 November 2004.  
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Figure 2.4 Distribution of in-degree, out-degree, ingoing and outgoing infection chain of 
farms in the one-mode overall network of swine movements in four Canadian regions 
from 1 July 3 November 2004, by  region (a), and by production type (b).  
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Chapter 3  Simulation of between-farm transmission of porcine reproductive and 
respiratory syndrome virus in Ontario, Canada using the North American Animal 
Disease Spread Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The contents of this chapter are published as, Thakur K, Hurnik D, Poljak Z, Revie C, 
Sanchez J. (2015), Simulation of between farm transmission of porcine reproductive and 
respiratory syndrome virus in Ontario, Canada using North American Animal Disease 
Spread Model. Preventive Veterinary Medicine, DOI: 10.1016/j.prevetmed.2015.01.006
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3.1 Abstract 
Porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome (PRRS), a viral disease of swine, has 
major economic impacts on the swine industry. The North American Animal Disease 
Spread Model (NAADSM) is a spatial, stochastic, farm level state-transition modeling 
framework originally developed to simulate highly contagious and foreign livestock 
diseases. The objectives of this study were to develop a model to simulate between-farm 
spread of a homologous strain of PRRS virus in Ontario swine farms via direct (animal 
movement) and indirect (sharing of trucks between farms) contacts using the NAADSM 
and to compare the patterns and extent of outbreak under different simulated conditions. 
A total of 2552 swine farms in Ontario province were allocated to each census division 
of Ontario and geo-locations of the farms were randomly generated within the 
agriculture land of each Census Division. Contact rates among different production 
types were obtained using pig movement information from four regions in Canada. A 
total of 24 scenarios were developed involving various direct (movement of infected 
animals) and indirect (pig transportation trucks) contact parameters in combination with 
alternating the production type of the farm in which the infection was seeded. Outbreaks 
were simulated for one year with 1000 replications. The median number of farms 
infected, proportion of farms with multiple outbreaks and time to reach the peak 
epidemic were used to compare the size, progression and extent of outbreaks. Scenarios 
involving spread only by direct contact between farms resulted in outbreaks where the 
median percentage of infected farms ranged from 31.5 to 37% of all farms. In scenarios 
with both direct and indirect contact, the median percentage of infected farms increased 
to a range from 41.6 to 48.6%. Furthermore, scenarios with both direct and indirect 
contact resulted in a 44% increase in median epidemic size when compared to the direct 
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contact scenarios. Incorporation of both animal movements and the sharing of trucks 
within the model indicated that the effect of direct and indirect contact may be nonlinear 
on outbreak progression. The increase of 44% in epidemic size when indirect contact, 
via sharing of trucks, was incorporated into the model highlights the importance of 
proper biosecurity measures in preventing transmission of the PRRS virus. Simulation 
of between-farm spread of the PRRS virus in swine farms has highlighted the relative 
importance of direct and indirect contact and provides important insights regarding the 
possible patterns and extent of spread of the PRRS virus in a completely susceptible 
population with herd demographics similar to those found in Ontario, Canada.  
3.2. Introduction 
Porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome (PRRS) is an important viral disease of 
swine and has major economic impacts on the swine industry (Neumann et al., 2005). 
PRRS affects all production stages and is characterised by late-term abortions, still-
births, mummified foetuses and weak piglets in breeding herds; and an increased 
mortality rate in piglets and respiratory disease, poor growth performance and mortality 
in growing pigs (Nodelijk, 2002). The causative agent for PRRS is an enveloped, 
spherical, single stranded, positive-sense RNA virus of the family Arteriviridae 
(Murtaugh et al., 1995). Genetic studies of the virus indicate significant antigenic and 
molecular variability, suggesting two distinct genotypes: Type I (European genotype) 
and Type II (North American genotype). Wide genotypic variation within each genotype 
is another notable characteristic of this virus (Murtaugh et al., 1998).  
The virus is present in serum and excreted in several bodily secretions, which include 
semen, colostrum, urine, feces and oral fluids of infected animals (Wills et al., 1997c; 
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Bierk et al., 2001). Survival of the PRRS virus in the environment is affected by ambient 
temperature and pH. The virus can survive for long periods (four months) at 
temperatures below -20
0
C; however, at higher temperatures viability of the virus 
decreases. It can remain infective for around one month at 4
0
C, six days at 21
0
C, one 
day at 37
0
C, and for only 20 minutes at 56
0
C (Benfield et al., 1992).  
Several mechanisms for transmission of the virus between farms have been outlined; the 
most important and widely agreed upon mechanisms are via the movement of infected 
animals between different farms / stages of swine production, and through the 
introduction of infected semen (Yaeger et al., 1993; Mortensen et al., 2002). Vehicles 
used for the transportation of pigs and associated fomites (boots, coveralls, bedding 
materials etc) can also spread the infection over long geographical distances, as has been 
demonstrated in a number of transmission experiments using contaminated vehicles and 
fomites (Dee et al., 2002a; Otake et al., 2002c; Dee et al., 2004b; Holtkamp et al., 2010). 
Local transmission by aerosols within 150 metres has also been reported from an 
experimental study (Otake et al., 2002a).  
Simulation models which explore artificially designed experiments have become an 
important tool for epidemiologists to simulate the spread of a range of infectious 
diseases of livestock (Kao, 2002; Kobayashi et al., 2007; Evans et al., 2010). Such 
‗experiments‘ would not normally be possible in real world conditions, due to cost, time 
and/or animal welfare considerations. Disease spread models are intended to mimic real 
world situations and can be useful in explaining the behaviour of complex biological 
systems; identifying the key factors influencing a system, predicting the effect of 
interventions on disease outcomes and providing a means to inform policy decisions 
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(Taylor and Gate, 2003). NAADSM (North American Animal Disease Spread Model) is 
a spatial, stochastic, farm level state-transition modeling framework originally 
developed to simulate the between-farm spread of highly contagious and foreign 
livestock diseases (Harvey et al., 2007). It allows for user-established parameters to 
define model behaviour in terms of disease progression, has flexibility to simulate 
disease spread by direct contact through the movement of animals, indirect contact via 
personnel or fomites, airborne dissemination and local spread. In NAADSM the 
individual population units (farms) are defined by their actual physical location within a 
geographical region. The disease spread between individual farms in NAADSM is 
influenced by rates of direct and indirect contact, relative locations and distances 
between farms; all of which are driven by stochastic processes based on distributions 
and relational functions specified by the user. Once a farm has become infected it 
follows a natural, predictable cycle over time, transiting from one to another disease 
state (Harvey et al., 2007). One key advantage of this approach is that by including 
randomness, the chance nature of epidemic spread is accounted for, while by 
incorporating the contact structure between farms a higher degree of realism can be 
achieved in the model (Dangerfield et al., 2009).  
A single study, so far, has been published which attempt to evaluate the between-farm 
transmission dynamics of PRRS virus and outline the extent of disease spread in a 
geographical region. Neumann et al. (2007) evaluated the risk of introduction of the 
PRRS virus into New Zealand through the importation of raw pig meat and predicted the 
extent of any subsequent spread of the virus within the swine industry in New Zealand. 
Additionally, truck sharing between farms for shipment of pigs has been considered to 
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be one of the major pathways for between-farm spread of PRRS virus by Canadian 
producers (http://www.opic.on.ca/biosecurity-resources/transportation) and experts in 
the swine industry. Recent studies have demonstrated high levels of truck sharing 
between farms for the shipment of pigs (Bottoms et al., 2012b; Thakur et al., 2014) and 
have documented that only around one third of such trucks are properly cleaned and 
disinfected between successive shipments (Lambert et al., 2012b). However, the likely 
impact of truck sharing on the spread of PRRS virus has not been explored in previous 
studies. So, this study attempted to describe the likely spread of PRRS virus due to 
movement of pigs between farms and indirect contact associated with such movement. 
The objectives of this study were to develop a model to simulate the between-farm 
spread of PRRS virus in Ontario swine farms via direct (animal movement) and indirect 
(sharing of trucks between farms) contacts using the NAADSM framework and to 
describe and compare the patterns of outbreak under a range of scenarios.  
3.3. Materials and Methods  
3.3.1 Study population 
As NAADSM simulates the spread of a pathogen between farms, it requires the 
geographical location of each farm together with its characteristics (herd size and 
production type). For reasons of confidentiality, the actual geographical coordinates of 
swine farms in Ontario and other farm attributes were not available. We therefore 
generated hypothetical geographical locations to represent swine farms in Ontario. Data 
on the total number of swine farms in Ontario and on numbers of swine farms in each 
Census Division (CD) of Ontario province were downloaded from Statistics Canada 
website (Farm and Farm Operator Data, 2011). Using the Agricultural and Ontario 
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shape files, a range of random points corresponding to the number of farms in each 
census division of Ontario were generated using QGIS (Quantum GIS development 
Team 2012. QGIS version number 1.8.0); the longitude and latitude of these points were 
extracted and used as farm locations in NAADSM. The randomly generated farm 
locations were constrained to be within agricultural parcels and were at least 500 meter 
apart from one another. According to the 2011 agriculture census report, Ontario had a 
total of 2556 swine farms; however, our study included only 2552 swine farms as four 
of the randomly generated farms were located in census divisions that had no 
agricultural land. The density of swine farms in each census division of Ontario, and the 
spatial distribution of modelled farms by production type, is shown in Figures 3.1 a and 
b, respectively. To evaluate the effect of artificial geolocations of farms on simulated 
outcomes, three different sets of farm locations were created on which PRRS virus 
spread was simulated for comparison. 
These 2552 farms were randomly assigned to one of six production types: farrowing, 
nurseryA, finishingA, farrow-to-finish, nurseryC and finishingC (Table 3.1); the random 
assignment of production types was reasonable as, based on experts' judgement, farms 
of a particular production type are not spatially clustered in Ontario. The proportion 
distributed to each of the broad production types was based on a previous pig 
traceability study (Thakur et al., 2014) or based on experts‘ judgement, in the case of 
farrow-to-finish farms. In addition, 60% of nursery and finishing farms were classified 
as having adopted the practice of all-in-all-out (AIAO, farm types given the suffix ―A‖) 
with the remaining 40% adopted the continuous flow (CF, farm types with suffix ―C‖) 
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approach. This division was based on experts‘ judgement regarding the average 
distribution of farms practicing AIAO versus CF practices in Ontario.  
In NAADSM, herd size has two implications on disease progression. First, the size of 
source farms may influence infectiousness of the herd, as conceptually larger farms 
could have more infectious animals expelling the virus and then increasing the 
probability of disease transmission. However, we considered the whole farm to be 
infectious once a single animal on the farm was infected and the transmission 
probability was independent of herd size. Second, NAADSM assigns higher probability 
of receiving a contact for larger farms within the same distance distribution than for 
smaller farms. However, in a vertically integrated commercial system, such as swine 
production in Ontario, the probability of contact between farms due to movements of 
pigs is less likely to be associated with the herd size of a recipient farm. For farms 
within the same distance, in NAADSM, larger farms are more likely to receive the 
contact which in our model should be a random process given that all the farms within 
the contact group are equally likely to have contact with other farms in that contact 
group, irrespective of farm size. Therefore, to avoid any influence of farm size in 
assigning the contacts, as NAADSM prefers sending shipments to larger farms, the 
following assumptions were made. Each swine farm was assigned 500 pigs per farm and 
it remained fixed for the entire duration of simulation.  
3.3.2 Model Structure 
To determine the pattern and extent of spread of PRRS virus from infected to 
susceptible farms in Ontario, Canada, a spatially explicit, stochastic, farm-level state-
transition computer simulation was developed using NAADSM (NAADSM 
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Development Team 2011. NAADSM version number 4.0). One farm was randomly 
chosen to be seeded with an infection and the same farm initiated infection in 
subsequent iterations. The rest of the farms were susceptible at the beginning of the 
simulation and after being infected they either remained infectious (for farrowing, 
farrow-to-finish, nurseryC and finishingC farms) until the end of the simulation or 
became susceptible, following the SIS state transition approach (for nurseryA and 
finishingA farms). Change in state of any nurseryA and finishingA farm on any time-
step during the model run was determined stochastically based on random sampling 
from the infectious duration distributions specified in the model.  
3.3.3 Model Outcomes 
The spread of PRRS virus in the population was initiated by setting an index farm as 
being infected. Each scenario was simulated on a weekly time scale for up to 52 weeks 
and was replicated for 1000 iterations (representing 1000 independent in-silico 
outbreaks). Median final epidemic size, median number of total farms infected, and time 
to peak epidemic were computed for each scenario. Final epidemic size was defined as 
the total number of outbreaks at the end of each iteration, irrespective of whether a farm 
remained infectious at the end of the simulation period and also counted multiple 
outbreaks in the same farm. Since pigs in nurseryA and finishingA farms stay for a 
shorter duration compared with animals from continuous flow farms, such farms could 
have multiple outbreaks over the duration of the simulation. It was for this reason that it 
was important to capture the final epidemic size in addition to the number of infected 
farms, so that multiple outbreaks on the same farm would count towards an increase in 
overall epidemic size. For median number of farms infected, farms that had multiple 
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infections were counted only once; while for median epidemic size, farms with multiple 
outbreaks were counted multiple times. Additionally, we extracted the percentage of 
farms of each production type with and without any infection and the percentage of 
nurseryA and finishingA farms that had experienced multiple outbreaks during each 
simulation. The time to peak epidemic was defined as the number of weeks taken to 
reach the epidemic peak, where epidemic peak was defined as the maximum number of 
infected farms in any one time unit across the simulation. 
3.3.4 Assumptions  
Though PRRS virus is currently circulating in swine farms in Ontario, in this study we 
assumed that all farms in this study were free of PRRS at the beginning of the 
simulation and this can be a case when a new strain of virus is introduced where there is 
no immunity to the new strain. We further assumed that a homologous strain of PRRS 
virus was seeded for initiation of the outbreak and the virus did not mutate during the 
course of the simulation. When a single animal on a farm became infected the entire 
farm was considered infectious. Furthermore, we assumed that in any outgoing shipment 
from an infectious farm at least one infected animal would be present in the shipment 
which is equivalent to having a probability of 1 for transmission of the virus when a 
shipment occurs from an infected farm. Every farm had the same probability to contact 
other farms given the distance between source and recipient farms and the pre-defined 
production type combinations. Lastly, for indirect contact we used the sharing of the 
same transportation vehicles between farms for shipment of incoming or outgoing 
animals. However, when two farms already had direct contact, the sharing of trucks 
implicit in such a contact was not counted again as part of the indirect contact. 
  
82 
 
Additionally, we did not consider any other forms of indirect contact, such as the 
movement of personnel or the sharing of equipment. As we wished to evaluate the 
impact of a worst case scenario with respect to the cleaning of trucks on spread of the 
virus, we assumed that trucks used for shipment of animals were "dirty trucks", as 
would be the case if the trucks were not properly cleaned and disinfected between 
successive shipments. For indirect contact, the transmission probability was assumed to 
be very low (0.1), compared to the direct contact transmission probability (1). 
3.3.5 Parameters 
Many parameters relating to PRRS virus transmission were extracted from the published 
literature (Lager et al., 1997; Neumann et al., 2007; Evans et al., 2010). To simulate 
spread by direct and indirect contact, contact parameters were derived from swine 
movement data collected as part of a pilot study in four Canadian regions (Thakur et al., 
2014). Two co-authors of this manuscript (DH, a Professor of swine health 
management, and ZP, an Associate Professor of Veterinary Epidemiology whose 
research has a focus on swine disease), have extensive expertise in swine production and 
management across Canada and provided inputs to establish the model structure. They 
also provided estimates for a number of parameters (infectious duration and direct 
contact rate for nurseryA and finishingA farms, distance distribution for recipient units 
and proportion of AIAO and continuous flow farms) that were not available in the 
published literature and could not be estimated from the pilot study data. Direct contact 
was defined as the movement of at least one pig from one farm to another. Indirect 
contact in this model specifically included contacts between farms that occurred as a 
result of sharing of the same transport vehicles (e.g. shipment of animals) within the 
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period of one week (one time-step of the model). This time period was chosen, as the 
virus remains infective for around a week at 21
0
C. 
NAADSM requires three parameters to simulate a contact: the mean contact rate 
(expected number of contacts per week); the transmission probability associated with 
that contact; and the geographical distance distribution associated with contact between 
any two farms (Harvey et al., 2007). For between-farm transmission of the PRRS virus 
by direct contact, we used a fixed transmission probability (i.e. 1), as was used in a 
model of this disease in New Zealand (Neumann et al., 2007). For probability of 
transmission via indirect contact, we assigned a lower value (0.1), which was based on 
our assumptions; and we evaluated the impact of this assumption on modelled outcomes 
by carrying out a sensitivity analysis across a range of transmission probabilities. PRRS 
virus persists for an extended period of time in the tissues of infected animals (Nodelijk 
et al., 2000). In addition, PRRS virus infected farms (farrowing, farrow-to-finish, 
nurseryC and finishingC) can remain infectious for long periods of time (Nodelijk et al., 
2003) as new susceptible animals are continuously replaced throughout the production 
period. Therefore, we assumed an infectious period of one year for these farms, 
following the SI (Susceptible-Infectious) state transition approach (Keeling and Rohani, 
2008), as reported by Neumann et al., (2007). On the other hand, nurseryA and 
finishingA farms were assumed to adopt an AIAO production system, so these farms 
followed the SIS (Susceptible-Infectious -Susceptible) state transition approach (Keeling 
and Rohani, 2008) and the infectious period for these farms was tied to their production 
cycle. With the turnout of each batch of pigs these farms are assumed to get rid of any 
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infection, by allowing a downtime period of two weeks between successive batches for 
proper cleaning and disinfection procedures.  
The mean contact rate, as required by NAADSM, was used as the parameter of a 
Poisson distribution. This mean was estimated for both direct and indirect contacts as 
follows: we first generated a valued contact matrix of frequency of contact among each 
of the production types using the swine movement data. Subsequently, the relative 
frequency of contact from each source production type was calculated for each of 
recipient production farm types for direct contact based on swine movement (Appendix, 
Table S1) and relative frequency of sharing among production types for indirect contact 
based on truck sharing (Appendix, Table S2) information. Then the contact rates 
assigned to a production type were adjusted by multiplying the relative frequency by the 
maximum out-degree for that production type (Appendix, Table S3), where maximum 
out-degree is the maximum number of unique outgoing contacts an individual or group 
has in the population (Dubé et al., 2008). This approach of using the maximum out-
degree between farms is thought to lead to a more realistic epidemic size, as opposed to 
using either the total number of shipments or average out-degree, which will tend to 
overestimate or underestimate the epidemic size respectively (Dubé et al., 2008). 
Indirect contact rates (Appendix, Table S4) from the truck sharing contact matrix were 
based on the maximum number of farms sharing a single truck within one week. The 
swine movement database used for this study did not have information for either 
continuous flow nursery farms or finishing farms. Direct contact rates for these 
production types were estimated based on expert judgement, which suggested that 
nurseryC and finishingC farm types receive one shipment per week from farrowing and 
  
85 
 
nurseryC farms respectively. Therefore, these values were used as the mean contact rate 
for nurseryC and finishingC production types. In addition, we assumed that the truck 
sharing patterns associated with these farms would be similar to those seen in nurseryA 
and finishingA farms.  
Mean direct and indirect contact rates per week for each group are presented in Table 
3.2. Disease transmission by direct contact was simulated in only those combinations of 
production types for which movement between the pairs was reported in the pilot swine 
movement study. Movement of pigs to farrowing and farrow-to-finish sites were not 
included in this study as some of these farms are closed farms and some farms typically 
receive animals from genetic or breeding farms but not from any of the production types 
considered in this study. However, transmission between farrowing and nurseryC as 
well as between nurseryC and finishingC were simulated, with contact rates being 
estimated as discussed earlier. For indirect contact, all combinations of production types 
were linked except for the case of farrow-to-finish with farrow-to-finish, as no truck 
sharing among these farm types was recorded in the swine movement data. There was 
no available information to parameterize the distance associated with pig movements 
between any two farms in Ontario, so the modelled distance distribution was based on 
experts' judgement using a BetaPERT distribution (Vose, 2008), with minimum, most 
likely and maximum distances of 0.5, 50 and 500 km. The minimum distance between 
farms corresponded to the minimum distance in the artificially generated random farm 
location data and the most likely coincided with the most likely distance distribution for 
most of the farms in the pilot swine movement study. In NAADSM, the contact between 
farms is influenced by geographical distance between two farms, however, the experts' 
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suggested that contact between farms is not limited by geographical distance, so a 
maximum of 500 km was chosen for the BetaPERT distribution. The same distance 
distributions were used for both direct and indirect contacts (Table 3.1), as indirect 
contact (truck sharing) between farms was also associated with pig movement. 
3.3.6 Scenario Analysis 
Two sets of scenarios (Set A and Set B: described below) were constructed. For each set 
of scenarios the transmission of PRRS virus by direct contact only or by both direct and 
indirect contacts was considered and simulated. Based on the production type of the 
initially infected farm, six scenarios for transmission by direct contact only (DC 
scenarios 1-6) and for transmission by both direct and indirect contact (D&IC scenarios 
7-12) were created; resulting in a total of 12 scenarios for each set. The detailed 
combination of disease spread parameters, initially infected production type and 
duration of simulation is outlined in Table 3.3.  
Set A scenarios 
In these scenarios, we used the distribution of different production types within the 
swine industry as enumerated in Table 3.1 and which approximately matches the 
distribution of production types in Ontario, Canada in the recent past. 
Set B Scenarios 
Swine production in North America has undergone massive structural changes in terms 
of specialization to specific stages of production. These changes have led to the 
replacement of traditional farrow-to-finish type farms with a more vertically integrated 
production system and with increasing trends towards multisite production; changes 
driven by the need to increase efficiency and decrease production costs in an 
  
87 
 
increasingly competitive sector (Key and McBride, 2010). It is believed that this trend 
towards specialized pig production will continue and we wanted to evaluate the impact 
of these expected structural changes on the likely future spread of PRRS virus within 
swine production. Experts‘ judgement suggested that the proportion of farrow-to-finish 
farms in Ontario will decrease to around 30% (from 40% currently) of total farms in 
next five years. For Set B scenarios we randomly reassigned the 2552 farms into six 
production types where the proportion of farrow-to-finish farms was kept close to 30% 
(755 farms) and the proportions for the rest of the farm types were increased 
proportionately (farrowing: 350, nurseryA: 273, finishingA: 597, nurseryC: 182 and 
finishingC: 395 farms each). The remaining disease transmission parameters, mean rates 
of direct and indirect contact, and distance distributions between recipient units were 
identical to those used in Set A scenarios. 
3.3.7 Sensitivity Analysis 
Sensitivity analyses were performed for certain DC and D&IC scenarios in Set A. 
Scenarios in which epidemics were seeded in farrowing farms (Scenarios 1 and 7) were 
selected for sensitivity analysis, as they represented the worst-case scenario. We reduced 
the direct contact transmission probability from the baseline model (i.e. 1.0) to 0.75, 0.5 
and 0.25 respectively. Similarly, to evaluate our assumption regarding indirect contact 
transmission probability, four sets of models with modified indirect transmission 
probabilities (0.03, 0.05, 0.25 and 0.5) were compared to the baseline model (0.1). To 
assess the impact of the assumed distance distribution between recipient units, eight 
models were run which modified the most-likely and maximum distances to the ranges 
of values (30, 40, 60, 70 km) and (300, 400, 600, 700 km) respectively. In all cases the 
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outputs were compared based on the proportionate change in median epidemic size 
relative to the baseline models. 
3.4 Results 
The distribution of overall epidemic sizes for each of the Set A scenarios are presented 
in Figure 3.2. The distribution of epidemic sizes for each of the six production types 
under each of the Set A scenarios are presented in Figure 3.3. Some quantitative 
differences were noted between the outputs from the Set A and Set B scenarios. 
However, there were limited differences between the distribution of epidemic sizes for 
the two sets and the quantitative differences observed were mainly due to variations in 
the distribution of the proportions of farms (see Appendix, Figures S1 and S2). 
Additionally, similar percentages of farms of each farm type were found to be infected 
for both Set A and B scenarios under corresponding DC and D&IC scenarios. As set B 
scenarios had similar patterns of outbreak, corresponding findings from these scenarios 
are presented in Appendix (Tables S5-S6) and only findings from Set A scenarios are 
discussed here in detail.  
Overall, it was evident that simulations in which the infection was initiated in a 
farrowing farm resulted in much larger epidemic sizes for the DC scenarios (Figure 3a). 
For the D&IC scenarios (Figure 3b), infection initiated in farrowing farms still tended to 
infect a larger number of farms but the distribution of epidemic sizes (median and 95th 
percentile) were wider and the overlap between farrowing and other types of farms was 
large compared to narrower distributions in the DC scenarios with little overlap between 
farrowing and other types of farms. Additionally, outbreaks initiated from these farms 
infected a larger proportion of farms of other production types and for D&IC scenario 
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had impact on disease status of most of the production types, representing farrowing 
farms as "super-spreaders". Since epidemics initiated from farrowing farms constituted 
worst case scenarios, only descriptive results for these scenarios are presented, while 
descriptive results for rest of the scenarios are included in the Appendix. Descriptive 
statistics for median epidemic sizes (total and for each production type) and for number 
of infected farms (median and 95th percentile) and the median number of weeks 
required to reach the peak epidemic, for each of the DC and D&IC scenarios originating 
from farrowing farms are summarised in Table 3.4 (and in Appendix, Table S5 for 
additional Set A scenarios and Table S7 for Set B scenarios). Percentages of farms with 
and without any outbreak during the entire duration of simulation and percentage of 
nurseryA and finishingA farms that experienced multiple outbreaks during the 
simulation are summarized in Table 3.5 (and in Appendix Table S5 for additional Set A 
scenarios and Table S8 for Set B scenarios).  
Variations in parameters of each scenario resulted in biologically plausible changes in 
the outputs of the model. Direct contact scenarios resulted in lower epidemic sizes than 
in models with D&IC, irrespective of production type of the farm in which the outbreak 
was initiated. Scenarios involving spread only by DC between farms resulted in 
outbreaks with median percentage of infected farms consisting of 31.5% and 37% of 
total farms, while for scenarios with D&IC, median percentage of infected farms were 
42% and 49% of total farms respectively for Set A and B. By including indirect contact 
in the model, the median number of infected farms increased by 18% and 17% 
respectively for Set A and B scenarios than when only direct contact was used. 
Similarly, the median epidemic size increased by 44% (996 to 1431) and 43% (1170 to 
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1662) respectively for Set A and B scenarios when both direct and indirect contacts 
were incorporated in the model. Based on the percentage of farms infected for each 
production type, Table 3.5 (and Appendix Table S6 for additional scenarios), farrowing 
farms and farrow-to-finish farms were at least risk of becoming infected in DC 
scenarios, but infection was also spreading to farrowing farms when indirect contact was 
considered in the model. However, the proportion of infected farms was close to 1% for 
farrow-to-finish farms and did not increase above 4% for farrowing farms in either set of 
scenarios. FinishingA and finishingC farms were at the highest risk of receiving the 
infection, as more than 80% of finishing farms were infected in the DC scenarios, while 
the proportion infected increased to above 90% in the D&IC scenarios, indicating that 
these types of farms could be considered to be "super-receivers". Furthermore, nurseryC 
and finishingC farms had least impact on disease spread to other production types in the 
DC scenarios and resulted in much smaller epidemic sizes. Interestingly, with both 
direct and indirect contacts in the model not only did the epidemic size for outbreaks 
initiating from these production types increase, but the infection was also more likely to 
spread to all other production types. Models with DC reached the peak epidemic at 37 
weeks indicating a slow progression of the outbreak compared to models with both 
D&IC, which reached the peak at 27 weeks. Some proportion of both nurseryA and 
finishingA farms were subject to multiple infection during the one year simulation and 
the proportions of farms with multiple outbreaks were higher when both direct and 
indirect contact were incorporated in the model. 
The model outcome (median epidemic size) was quite sensitive to all of the input 
parameters of the direct and indirect contact transmission probability (Table 3.6). 
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However, it was not sensitive to any combination of distance distribution of pig 
movement investigated for sensitivity analysis (results not presented), suggesting that 
changes in distance distribution were negligible on the outcome of the model. For each  
input value of direct contact transmission probability in the DC baseline model, 
relatively similar proportionate decrease resulted in median epidemic size. For similar 
changes in direct contact transmission probability in the D&IC model, the resultant 
decrease in median epidemic size was smaller than with the DC model. Similarly, any 
decrease or increase in indirect contact transmission probability in the D&IC baseline 
model resulted in smaller proportionate decrease or increase in the median epidemic size 
respectively. While comparing D&IC scenarios, the outcome was more sensitive to 
changes in the value of direct contact transmission probability than to indirect contact 
transmission probability.  
3.5. Discussion 
To our knowledge, this is the first study carried out to simulate the between-farm spread 
of PRRS virus based upon the movement of infected animals in Canada. The 
incorporation of realistic contact structures between different production types in the 
Canadian swine industry was a notable, perhaps unique, aspect of this simulation study. 
The farms embedded in the model resemble the spatial distribution of swine farms 
across the province of Ontario (Ontario Pork Industry Council, 2013).  
All sets of scenarios resulted in epidemiologically plausible outcomes. Epidemic size 
was smallest for scenarios which modelled only direct contact (DC). Epidemic sizes 
were larger and time to reach the peak epidemic shorter, for D&IC scenarios due to 
faster spread of infection via direct and indirect contacts. The incorporation of direct and 
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indirect contact in the model resulted in much larger outbreak sizes than the outbreaks 
produced by direct contacts or indirect contacts separately (results not shown), 
suggesting that the incorporation of both contact types had a non-linear effect on disease 
spread. Farrowing farms were at nominal risk when only direct contact was included in 
the model, corresponding to the fact that farrowing farms rarely experience the inward 
movement of pigs from farms of other production types considered in this study. When 
transmission by indirect contact was allowed in the model, the proportion of infected 
farrowing farms increased, suggesting that irrespective of the fact that they typically 
have no direct contact with other farms, they can still become infected through the 
sharing of transport vehicles. The total epidemic size increased by 44% and the number 
of infected farms increased by 18% in the D&IC models when compared to 
corresponding DC models; an increase due primarily to the sharing of trucks between 
farms. This finding highlights the importance of proper cleaning and disinfection of 
shipment trucks, which could result in preventing around half of the outbreaks and 
around one fifth of the farms from becoming infected. 
Several contact network studies involving swine farms have demonstrated the 
hierarchical structure of the swine industry, where nursery and finishing farms must be 
considered to be highly vulnerable in terms of acquiring infection, while farrowing 
farms are the least vulnerable in terms of acquiring an infection but if infected become 
high risk farms for the on-going spread of any epidemic (Rautureau et al., 2012a; 
Büttner et al., 2013b; Dorjee et al., 2013). However, one contrasting finding from the 
present study was that when both direct and indirect contacts between farms were 
considered in the model, the hierarchical structure of the swine industry was no longer 
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such an important determinant in the spread of disease. The unidirectional spread of 
infection from one production type at the top level of hierarchy (farrowing and farrow-
to-finish farms) to production types at lower levels (nursery and finishing farms) in 
direct contact models were significantly altered once the multidirectional spread of 
infection among all production types due to indirect contact was incorporated into the 
model. Additionally, in both the DC and D&IC scenarios, the median epidemic sizes 
were highest for epidemics that were initiated in farrowing farms. These findings 
suggest that any change in disease status of a farrowing farm can have a significant 
impact on all other production types, indicating that these farms are acting as "super-
spreaders". 
We simulated indirect contact as being based only on the sharing of trucks used for the 
shipment of pigs; ignoring all other forms of indirect contact between swine farms. This 
simplification is likely to have resulted in an under-estimation of the outbreak size. One 
of the key questions the study was attempting to answer was how best to quantify the 
spread of PRRS virus due to the movement of pigs; so incorporating only indirect 
contact associated with pig movement in the model seems reasonable. The currently 
implemented indirect contact matrix could be extended to include other potential 
sources of indirect contact between farms. In the current model, we did not consider 
movement of pigs to farrowing or farrow-to-finish farms, as some of these farms are 
closed farms while other farms that do replace animals from genetic or breeding farms 
that tend to maintain comparatively higher biosecurity standards and health status. 
However, this simplification may have resulted in underestimation of the epidemic size 
if any such movement occurred, particularly from infected genetic or breeding farms. 
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The PRRS virus possesses high genetic variability and rapid mutation in circulating 
strains is a commonly reported feature of the virus (Murtaugh et al., 1998; Han et al., 
2006). Circulation of multiple strains and the emergence of a new strain to that assumed 
to have acted as the seed for an infection could cause multiple incursions on the same 
farm and have an impact on the overall dynamics of the spread of PRRS virus. The 
likely impacts of such scenarios were not evaluated in this study. Furthermore, we did 
not evaluate local or airborne spread of the virus; modes which have been reported in 
the case of PRRS virus transmission (Otake et al., 2002a). While these were considered 
to be beyond the scope of this study, the model could be further extended to incorporate 
local and/or airborne spread.  
Reliability of the outcomes produced by models is assessed through model validation. 
However, in the absence of real outbreak data together with the corresponding historical 
between-farm movement data, external validation of any model is challenging. We 
believe that this model is based on a network that represents a realistic contact structure 
between swine farms in Canada, and most of the disease related parameters have been 
derived from peer-reviewed literature. However, it should be noted that estimates of 
contact frequency were based on a relatively small data set and that these data were 
collected in 2004. Additionally, regions from which the pig movement data were 
obtained were not identified in this paper, or in the original published report (Thakur et 
al., 2014), due to confidentiality restrictions. However the report included approximately 
half of the swine-producing regions of Canada and represented both Eastern and 
Western production system within Canada. It is thus our expectation that the contact 
data used in this study will not differ markedly from the production system in Ontario. 
  
95 
 
Another study analyzing swine movement data from Ontario {Dorjee, 2013 #78} have 
reported similar contact patterns, which supports our assumption that contact data used 
in this study is reflective of the swine production system in Ontario. Nevertheless, this 
model has highlighted the relative importance of direct and indirect contact via sharing 
of trucks, where trucks were not cleaned between successive shipments, in the 
transmission of PRRS virus. There are very few simulation studies of a similar nature 
against which to compare the findings of this study. A study evaluating the probable 
spread of PRRS virus in New Zealand was simulated using the InterSpread Plus 
software (InterSpread Plus, EpiCentre, Institute of Veterinary, Animal and Biomedical 
Sciences, Massey University, Palmerston North, NZ). This provides a similar platform 
to that which is available in NAASDM. This study estimated much smaller outbreaks 
with only around 1% of farms becoming infected during the first year and 5% farms 
becoming infected over 3 years of simulated production. However, this NZ study 
included a much higher proportion of non-commercial farms (92%) which typically 
have a very low mean direct contact rate (0.035/week) compared to the contact rates 
used in the present study (which ranged between 0.01-0.51/week). Also, as the index 
case was seeded in one of these non-commercial farms, the epidemic was unlikely to 
progress at a rapid pace. Additionally, the spatial distribution of farms may have a 
bearing on the spread of infection as well as the eventual extent of an outbreak. In a 
separate study, to compare model outputs from simulations using InterSpread Plus, 
NAADSM and AusSpread (Beckett and Garner, 2007) for foot and mouth disease, it 
was shown that these three modelling platform resulted in similar outcomes, indicating 
that differences in predictions are unlikely to be due to the use of a different modelling 
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platform or likely to be influenced by the population being modelled. One field study 
that aimed to investigate the impact of spatial proximity and network membership 
among farms on PRRS virus spread in Ontario has suggested that the risk of PRRS 
spread could be higher from sharing trucks than from being in close proximity to an 
infected farm (Arruda et al., 2014). A separate phylogenetic study of PRRS virus in 
North America has also revealed similarity among PRRS virus strains between farms at 
distant locations, which likely reflects the spread of the virus via direct and indirect 
contacts (Shi et al., 2013). 
The parameter value for truck-related indirect contact transmission probability used in 
the model was largely based upon our assumptions and experts' judgement, as no 
literature could be found that attempted to quantify the probability of transmission of 
PRRS virus by indirect contact. In a transmission experiment, it was demonstrated that 
two out of five susceptible groups of pigs became infected via indirect contact with 
infected groups of pigs; however, distances between these groups of pigs was relatively 
short (Wills et al., 1997b). In similar models looking at the spread of foot and mouth 
disease virus, a transmission probability of 0.275 for vehicular contacts has been used 
(Bates et al., 2003). However, sensitivity analyses were performed to test the robustness 
of this assumption by decreasing and increasing the indirect contact transmission 
probability. These suggested that the model was not highly sensitive to either a decrease 
or increase in this parameter value.  
Two other assumptions that we made were based on experts‘ advice, due to the 
unavailability of real data for this study. These related to the distribution in the 
proportion of farms of each production type and the distance distribution associated with 
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pig movements. The outputs from Set A and Set B scenarios indicated that varying the 
proportions associated with different farm types did not have a large impact on the 
pattern of the epidemics, and that the proportions of each farm type infected in Set A 
and Set B scenarios were similar. However, there were some differences in the epidemic 
size. Similarly, the approximate distance distribution used in our model did not 
influence the model outcomes, as negligible changes in the median epidemic size were 
observed under different combinations of distance distributions in the sensitivity 
analyses.  
The assumption that when a single animal on a farm became infected, the whole farm 
was considered infected was reasonable, as it is quite unlikely that the virus become 
extinct without spreading to other animals on the farms given the virus is contagious and 
transmission studies have estimated R0 of three for the transmission of virus among 
individual pigs (Nodelijk et al., 2000; Le Potier and Rose, 2012).  However, these 
studies and some other sources of information have identified R0 values between 1.8 and 
14. One study reported the 95% CI between 2-6 (Nodelijk et al., 2000), while the other 
reported the 95% CI between 1.8-3.3. Similarly, one of the co-authors on this 
manuscript (ZP) has unpublished data that suggests that the R0 could be anywhere 
between 2.5-14. In addition, with a mean shipment size of 130 animals, as reported in 
(Thakur et al., 2014) and with higher than 80% of animal level prevalence of PRRS 
virus (Nodelijk et al., 2003), it is more likely that more than one infectious animal will 
be present in a shipment from an infectious farm, therefore suggesting a negligible 
probability of infection extinction. 
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Farms in the swine industry have preferential and permanent contact structures. 
However, in this model, contacts among farms within the specified combination of 
production types were random.  This is a limitation of the model and may have resulted 
in an over-estimation of outbreak size. However, in any modelling platform, we cannot 
totally avoid random contacts, as the members of each specific network within the 
model are likely to have contacts assigned randomly. Accounting for all possible forms 
of preferential contact structure would require the creation of several networks (contact 
groups) in the model making the model complex to simulate, and the results difficult to 
analyse or make general inferences from. Nevertheless, to minimize the effect on 
outbreak size, we used contact rates based on maximum out-degree between each pair of 
production types rather than based on the shipment frequency between pair of farms, 
which we believe have resulted in lower outbreak sizes than would be the case had 
shipment frequency been used to derive contact rates. We artificially restricted the 
locations of farms so that they were at least 0.5 km apart; in reality some farms may be 
situated closer than this, which may influence local spread of the virus. However, as we 
did not evaluate local spread of the virus in this study, the outcomes should not be 
influenced by this restriction. To evaluate the effect of using artificially generated farm 
locations on disease spread, we created three different sets of artificially generated 
farms, and found negligible differences in terms of the modelled distribution of 
outcomes based on simulations using these three sets of farm location. This suggested 
that the effect of using artificially generated farm locations had little impact on model 
outcomes.  
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Another limitation worth noting in the current study relates to the use of NAADSM. In 
that modelling framework it is not possible to select different farms in which to seed the 
infection while running multiple iterations; thus geographical proximity/remoteness of 
the initial 'source' farm may have a bearing on the extent of epidemic spread. However, 
this limitation is likely to have had limited impact on outcomes in the current study as 
the distance distribution set up allowed farms to contact others anywhere between 0.5 to 
500 km, with the most likely distance being 50 km, and most farms were reachable 
within this distance distribution. Similarly, the assumption of setting the direct contact 
transmission probability to be 1.0 may have led to an over-estimation of epidemic size, 
as for some farms with AIAO production system, the virus may fade out before the end 
of production cycle. In addition to this, we used similar indirect contact rates for 
continuous flow farms to those observed for AIAO farms, due to non-availability of data 
for continuous flow farms. However, continuous flow farms might have higher direct 
contact rates than AIAO farms, therefore, such farms may likely also have higher 
indirect contact rates which might have resulted in an underestimation of the epidemic 
size. Finally, as some AIAO farms could have multiple barns and as the barns are in 
close proximity, the virus from one infected barn could spread to other barns via local or 
aerosol spread leading to a premise with longer infectious period or being persistently 
infected (Pitkin et al., 2009). Such AIAO farms with multiple barns are likely to have 
multiple outbreaks in this study with an over-estimation of epidemic size. 
We attempted to run the baseline model until all infection was removed to determine the 
duration of an outbreak. However this condition did not arise even when the model was 
run for long time periods, indicating that with the specified contact rates and the 
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infectious duration of farms, farms in this study population will become endemic to 
PRRS once the virus is introduced, and fade-out is unlikely to occur at the population 
level of farms. To achieve complete fade-out, we speculate that either the closure of 
infectious farms or some restriction on direct and indirect contact would be required.  
While an evaluation of control strategies was beyond the scope of this study, the results 
provide pointers as to those strategies that are most likely to be helpful in controlling the 
between-farm spread of PRRS virus. Avoiding direct contact with PRRS virus infected 
farms could have a significant impact in halting the spread of the virus. Reducing 
transmission via the sharing of trucks may require additional efforts, as previous truck 
movement details may not be readily available to any given farm. Two approaches that 
should reduce transmission of PRRS virus by indirect contact would be: (i) having 
dedicated transport vehicles between specific sets of farms (this will reduce the 
frequency of indirect contact); and, (ii) adopting proper cleaning and sanitation 
protocols for transport vehicles between successive shipments (this will decrease the 
transmission probability). Owing to the longer duration of virus survivability in cold 
weather, Dee and colleagues suggested rigorous cleaning and disinfection protocols for 
PRRS virus contaminated transport vehicles (Dee et al., 2004b; Dee et al., 2005a) which 
requires scraping out, high volume rinse, application of detergent, wash, disinfection 
and finally drying the vehicles. However, recent biosecurity studies in Canada suggest a 
low level of compliance to these protocols with only around one third of transport 
vehicles used for shipment of pigs being properly cleaned between successive shipments 
(Lambert et al., 2012b); which based on the results of the present study should be an 
issue of concern for the Canadian swine industry. Failure to comply with biosecurity 
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protocols for transport vehicles is also suggested to have impacted the current ongoing 
spread of porcine epidemic diarrhoea in North America (Lowe, 2014).  
While infectious disease simulation models can produce measurable predictions, the 
strict quantitative interpretation of such model outcomes can be problematic; primarily 
due to the difficulty of incorporating all the relevant factors and accurately estimating 
the values of parameters and variables used in the model (Garnett, 2002). However, such 
models can still provide valuable qualitative insights, which can guide policy-making 
decisions. We have discussed some of the limitations of this model and have 
acknowledged the difficulty of validating the current model. However, the results of this 
model are epidemiologically plausible and have highlighted the important role that 
indirect contact via the sharing of trucks between farms can have on the between-farm 
transmission of PRRS virus.  
3.6. Conclusion 
This study provides insights into the patterns and likely extent of PRRS virus spread 
between swine farms in Ontario, Canada under several hypothetical scenarios, 
incorporating both direct and indirect contact. The current model has highlighted the 
relative importance of direct and indirect contact via sharing of trucks, where trucks 
were not cleaned between successive shipments, on between-farm transmission of PRRS 
virus. The results suggest that hypotheses regarding the vulnerability of swine farms 
related to the hierarchical structure of a typical swine production system may not hold 
true when indirect contact among production types are considered. This model was not 
intended for quantitative prediction and hence any such interpretation of the outputs 
from the model should be made with caution. Nevertheless the findings from this study 
  
102 
 
should be considered a qualitative guide to understand the pattern and magnitude of 
likely PRRS outbreaks under the scenarios explored. Further development of this model 
may be helpful in the evaluation of additional what-if scenarios related to PRRS virus 
spread and in identifying effective control strategies to prevent the spread of PRRS 
virus.  
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Table 3.1 Model parameters used for simulation of between farm spread of PRRS virus 
Parameters Value Reference 
Total Farms (N) 
  Farrow-to-finish (FF) farms 
  Farrowing (F) farms  
  AIAO Nursery Farms (NurseryA) 
  AIAO Finishing Farms (FinishingA)  
  CF Nursery Farms (NurseryC) 
  CF Finishing Farms (FinishingC) 
2552 
1012 (39.6%) 
306 (12%) 
248 (9.7%) 
494 (19.3%) 
166 (6.5%) 
326 (12.9%) 
Agriculture census-2011 
 
 
 
 
Transmission Probability  
 
1 (direct contact)* 
0.1 (indirect contact)*              
(Neumann et al., 2007) 
assumed 
Infectious Duration (week)    
  Farrow-to-finish farms 
 
Whole duration of simulation (Neumann et al., 2007) 
  Farrowing farms Whole duration of simulation 
 
(Neumann et al., 2007) 
  NurseryA Farms 
   
4.5 weeks 
 
Expert judgement
1 
  FinishingA Farms 
 
Uniform (12,15) weeks Expert judgement
1 
(Kuipers and 
Niederreiter, 2012) 
  NurseryC Farms 
   
Whole duration of simulation 
 
(Neumann et al., 2007) 
  FinishingC Farms Whole duration of simulation 
 
(Neumann et al., 2007) 
Distance of recipient units BetaPERT (0.5,50,500) Expert judgement
1 
(Vose, 2008) 
*for all six production types 
1
Two co-authors of this manuscript (DH and ZP) provided expert opinion to estimate these parameters. 
AIAO=All in all out; CF=Continuous flow. 
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Table 3.2 Description of contact structure used for simulation of between-farm spread of 
PRRS virus 
Contact Groups 
(Source - Destination) 
Mean Contact rate/week
1 
Direct Indirect 
FF - FF - - 
FF - F - 0.0007 
FF - NurseryA 0.06 0.002 
FF - FinishingA 0.17 0.004 
FF - NurseryC - 0.002 
FF - FinishingC - 0.004 
F - FF - 0.0007 
F - F 0.01 0.03 
F - NurseryA 0.51 0.01 
F - FinishingA 0.03 0.002 
F - NurseryC 1 0.01 
F - FinishingC - 0.002 
NurseryA - FF - 0.002 
NurseryA - F - 0.012 
NurseryA - NurseryA 0.03 0.03 
NurseryA - FinishingA 0.31 0.05 
NurseryA - NurseryC - 0.03 
NurseryA - FinishingC - 0.05 
FinishingA - FF - 0.004 
FinishingA - F - 0.002 
FinishingA - NurseryA 0.01 0.05 
FinishingA - FinishingA 0.21 0.16 
FinishingA - NurseryC - 0.05 
FinishingA - FinishingC - 0.16 
NurseryC - FF - 0.002 
NurseryC - F - 0.012 
NurseryC - NurseryA - 0.03 
NurseryC - FinishingA - 0.05 
NurseryC - NurseryC - 0.03 
NurseryC - FinishingC 1 0.05 
FinishingC - FF - 0.004 
FinishingC - F - 0.002 
FinishingC - NurseryA - 0.05 
FinishingC - FinishingA - 0.16 
FinishingC - NurseryC - 0.05 
FinishingC - FinishingC - 0.16 
1
mean contact rates calculated based on maximum out-degree between production types 
F=Farrowing, FF=Farrow-to-finish , NurseryA= All in all out Nursery,  NurseryC=Continuous flow 
Nursery, FinishingA= All in all out Finishing,  FinishingC=Continuous flow Finishing
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Table 3.3 Descriptions of scenarios used for simulation of between farm spread of PRRS virus
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
Same combination of parameters were used for Set B scenarios (No. 13- 18 DC and N0. 19- 24 D&IC scenarios) with the difference in distribution of proportion 
of farm types,  
a
spread of disease from one farm to another via movement of infected animals, 
b
spread of disease from one farm to another through sharing of 
trucks for shipment of pigs,  TP=Transmission Probability, DC=Direct Contact, D&IC=Direct and indirect contact, F=Farrowing, NA=NurseryA, 
FiA=FinishingA, FF=Farrow-to-finish NC= NurseryC, FiC=FinishingC 
Scenario 
Number  
Scenario 
Name  
Spread by 
Direct Contact
a
 
Spread by Indirect 
Contact
b
 
Transmission 
Probability 
Movement 
Restriction 
Initially infected 
production type  
Duration of 
simulation  
Direct 
Contact 
Indirect 
Contact 
1  DC_F  
Yes 
No 
1 
NA 
No 
Farrowing  
52 weeks  
2  DC_NA NurseryA 
3  DC_FiA FinishingA 
4  DC_FF  Farrow-to-finish 
5  DC_NC NurseryC 
6  DC_FiC FinishingC 
7  D&IC_F  
Yes 0.1 
Farrowing  
8  D&IC_NA  NurseryA 
9 D&IC_FiA FinishingA 
10 D&IC_FF Farrow-to-finish 
11 D&IC_NC NurseryC 
12 D&IC_FiC FinishingC 
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Table 3.4 Descriptive summaries of the model-generated number of farms infected with PRRS virus and time required to reach the peak 
epidemic from a simulation based on 1000 iterations of scenarios 1 and 7 (Set A scenarios) 
Scenario 
No. 
Scenario 
Name 
  
Farms Infected: Median (p95) Epidemic Size: Median (p95) Week  to 
peak 
epidemic  
(p95) 
Overall Farrowing Nursery
A 
Finishing
A 
Farrow- 
to- 
finish 
Nursery
C 
Finishing
C 
Overall Nursery
A 
Finishing
A 
 
1. DC_F 802 (892) 1(4) 75 (97) 408 (434) 0  (0) 40 (72) 280 (308) 996 
(1143) 
93 (129) 583 (677) 39 (49) 
7. D&IC_F 1061 
(1125) 
12 (21) 150 
(174) 
457 (468) 9 (15) 115 
(138) 
318 (322) 1431 
(1579) 
233 
(297) 
746 (820) 27 (43) 
DC=Direct Contact, D&IC=Direct and indirect contact, F=Farrowing,  
For median number of farms infected, farms that had multiple infections were counted only once; while for median epidemic size, farms with multiple outbreaks 
were counted multiple times. For Farrowing, Farrow-to -finish, NurseryC and FinishingC farms, the median epidemic sizes were similar to their respective 
median numbers of farms infected. NurseryA= All in all out Nursery,  NurseryC=Continuous flow Nursery, FinishingA= All in all out Finishing,  
FinishingC=Continuous flow Finishing 
p95= 95th percentile 
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Table 3.5 Summary statistics relating to multiple outbreaks of PRRS virus during the period of simulation based on 1000 iterations of 
scenarios 1 and 7 (Set A scenarios) 
Scenario 
No. 
Scenario 
Name 
Percentage of farms with the indicated number of outbreaks  
Farrowing NurseryA FinishingA Farrow-to-finish NurseryC FinishingC 
0 1 0 1 2-3 >4 0 1 2-3 0 1 0 1 0 1 
1 DC_F 99.7 0.30 69.8 24.2 6.0 0 17.4 50.8 31.8 100 0 75.9 24.1 14.1 85.9 
7 D&IC_F 96.1 3.9 39.5 35.9 23.0 1.6 7.9 40.0 52.1 99.1 0.9 30.8 69.2 2.5 97.5 
DC=Direct Contact, D&IC=Direct and indirect contact, F=Farrowing, NurseryA= All in all out Nursery,  NurseryC=Continuous flow Nursery, FinishingA= All 
in all out Finishing,  FinishingC=Continuous flow Finishing 
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Table 3.6 Sensitivity analysis of the median epidemic size of simulated PRRS virus outbreaks to direct and indirect contact transmission 
probabilities in a population of 2552 swine farms 
Scenarios Parameters ± % change in input 
parameter  
Epidemic Size: Median 
(p5-p95*)  
% change in median 
outcome compared to 
baseline  
DCTP
a 
ICTP
b 
DCTP
a
 ICTP
b 
1. DC_F  1 NA Baseline Scenario 996 (830-1143)  
DC-F with change in DC TP to 0.75  0.75 NA -25 0 649 (469-810) -34.8 
DC-F with change in DC TP to 0.5  0.5 NA -50 0 277 (195-418) -72.2 
DC-F with change in DC TP to 0.25 0.25 NA -75 0 85 (51-133) -91.5 
7. D&IC_F 1 0.1 Baseline Scenario 1431 (1297-1579)  
D&IC-F with change in DC TP to 0.75  0.75 0.1   -25 0 1140 (984-1291) -20.3 
D&IC-F with change in DC TP to 0.5  0.5 0.1   -50 0 721 (546-895) -49.6 
D&IC-F with change in DC TP to 0.25 0.25 0.1   -75 0 241 (129-391) -83.2 
7. D&IC_F 1 0.1 Baseline Scenario 1431 (1297-1579)  
D&IC-F with change in IC TP to 0.5 1 0.5 0 400 2991 (2797-3152) 109 
D&IC-F with change in IC TP to 0.25 1 0.25 0 150 2194 (2005-2370) 53.3 
D&IC-F with change in IC TP to 0.05  1 0.05 0 -50 1268 (1118-1428) -11.4 
D&IC-F with change in IC TP to 0.03 1 0.03 0 -70 1169 (968-1243) -18.3 
a
Direct Contact Transmission Probability, 
b
Indirect Conatct Transmission Probability 
*p5 = 5th percentile, p95 = 95th percentile  
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Figure 3.1 Density of pig farms in each census division of Ontario (a), and spatial distribution of swine farms of six production types 
(with artificially generated locations based on information provided in agriculture census) used in the simulation of between - farm 
spread of PRRS virus among Ontario swine herds illustrated by production type (b). Legend: Ontario Agriculture=Agricultural Land 
Parcel of Ontario, FF=Farrow-to-finish, NurseryA= All in all out Nursery,  NurseryC=Continuous flow Nursery, FinishingA= All in 
all out Finishing,  FinishingC=Continuous flow Finishing 
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Figure 3.2 Distribution of the overall epidemic size of PRRS virus simulated outbreaks  of between-farm spread  among swine herds 
of Ontario under assumptions of direct (a) and direct and indirect contacts (b) between farms for Set A scenarios. Different colors 
represent outputs from scenarios in which the epidemic was initiated from farm of the noted production type. DC=Direct Contact, 
D&IC=Direct and indirect contact, F=Farrowing, NA=NurseryA, FiA=FinishingA, FF=Farrow-to-finish NC= NurseryC, 
FiC=FinishingC 
The middle band of the box represents the 50th percentile, the bottom and top of the box represents 25th and 75th percentile and the 
end of the whiskers represent maximum and minimum within ±1.5 interquartile range of the epidemic size distribution.  
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Figure 3.3 Distribution of epidemic size of PRRS virus simulated outbreaks by swine production type among swine herds of Ontario 
under assumptions of (a) direct and (b) direct and indirect contact between farms for Set A scenarios. Different colors represent 
scenarios in which farms of the indicated production type were the initially infected premises. DC=Direct Contact, D&IC=Direct and 
indirect contact, F=Farrowing, NA=NurseryA, FiA=FinishingA, FF=Farrow-to-finish NC= NurseryC, FiC=FinishingC 
The middle band of the box represents the 50th percentile, the bottom and top of the box represents 25th and 75th percentile and the 
end of the whiskers represent maximum and minimum within ±1.5 interquartile range of the epidemic size distribution. 
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Chapter 4 Development of a network based model to simulate the between-farm 
transmission of the Porcine Reproductive and Respiratory Syndrome virus 
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4.1 Abstract 
Recent studies have suggested that contact structure within a population can 
significantly affect the outcomes of infectious disease spread models. The objective of 
this study was to develop a network based simulation model for the between-farm 
spread of porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome virus to assess the impact of 
contact structure on between-farm transmission of PRRS virus. For these farm level 
models, a hypothetical population of 500 swine farms following a multistage production 
system was used. The contact rates between farms were based on a study analyzing 
movement of pigs in Canada, while disease spread parameters were extracted from 
published literature. Eighteen distinct scenarios were designed and simulated by (1) 
varying the mode of transmission (direct versus direct and indirect contact), (2) type of 
index herd (farrowing, nursery and finishing), and (3) the presumed network structures 
among swine farms (random, scale-free and small-world). PRRS virus was virtually 
seeded in a randomly selected farm and 500 iterations of each scenario were simulated 
for 52 weeks. The median epidemic size by the end of the simulated period and 
percentage die-out for each scenario, were the key outcomes captured. Scenarios with 
scale-free network models resulted in the largest epidemic sizes, while scenarios with 
random and small-world network models resulted in smaller and similar epidemic sizes. 
Similarly, stochastic die-out percentage was least for scenarios with scale-free networks 
followed by random and small-world networks. Incorporation of indirect contact via 
sharing of trucks between farms resulted in a significant increase in the epidemic size 
for all scenarios, compared to when only direct contact was included in the model. 
Findings of the study indicated that incorporating network structures among the swine 
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farms had a considerable impact on the spread of PRRS virus, highlighting the 
importance of understanding and incorporating realistic contact structures when 
developing infectious disease spread models for similar populations. The study further 
suggested that irrespective of network structure considered, the indirect contact played a 
significant role in further spreading the infection to swineherds in the population. 
4.2. Introduction  
Porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome (PRRS) is a viral disease of swine with 
worldwide distribution which affects all swine production stages and has a major 
economic impact on the swine industry (Neumann et al., 2005; Holtkamp et al., 2007). 
PRRS is caused by an enveloped, spherical, single stranded, positive-sense RNA virus 
of family Arteriviridae (Cavanagh, 1997). The virus presents significant antigenic and 
molecular variability suggesting two distinct genotypes: Type I (European genotype) 
and Type II (North American genotype). Wide genotypic variation within each genotype 
has also been reported (Wensvoort et al., 1992; Nelson et al., 1993; Murtaugh et al., 
1995). PRRS is characterised by late-term abortions, still-births, mummified and weak 
piglets in breeding herds, increased mortality rates in piglets in addition to respiratory 
disease and poor growth performance and mortality in growing pigs (Nodelijk, 2002). 
Several mechanisms for transmission of the virus between farms have been proposed; 
the most important of which is the introduction of infected animals or semen (Yaeger et 
al., 1993; Mortensen et al., 2002). Mechanical transmission by contaminated vehicles 
and fomites, as well as local transmission by aerosols, has also been reported (Dee et al., 
2002c; Otake et al., 2002c; Dee et al., 2004d; Holtkamp et al., 2010). 
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The use of computer models to simulate the spread of infectious disease in various 
livestock industries has been increasing and is an important tool for researchers and 
policy-makers to understand the likely magnitude of probable outbreaks and to explore 
scenarios to determine the efficiency of possible control measures such as vaccination, 
movement restriction, etc. (Morris et al., 2001; Riley et al., 2003; Kiss et al., 2006a; 
Francis et al., 2010). Model outputs are supportive in emergency preparedness and in 
informed decision making (Ferguson et al., 2001; Morris et al., 2001). The 
representativeness of the simulation model and effectiveness of the plans developed 
based on model outcomes are highly dependent on the validity of underlying model 
assumptions and the accuracy of the parameters incorporated in these simulations 
(Francis et al., 2010). Most of the infectious disease spread models that use traditional 
differential equations (May, 1995; Rahmandad and Sterman, 2008) fail to account for 
the chance nature of epidemic spread (randomness/stochasticity) as well as 
heterogeneity in contact among individuals within a population (Dangerfield et al., 
2009). Incorporating such stochasticity and individual heterogeneity (variations in age, 
sex, production types, contact rates etc.) can greatly increase the complexity of models. 
Recent increases in computational power has led to the increased use of Agent-Based 
Models (ABM); these models can account for stochasticity as well as heterogeneity in 
individual attributes. In addition, ABMs can be extended to incorporate contact 
heterogeneity among individuals and various network structures that are present in the 
populations can also be modelled (Rahmandad and Sterman, 2008; Lanzas and Chen, 
2014).  
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For many infectious diseases, including PRRS, transmission occurs mainly by direct or 
indirect contact between individuals. Thus disease is spread by a network of contacts 
(movement of infectious animals) such that the probability of spread of infection is 
limited to a finite set of susceptible contacts in contrast to the assumption of mass-action 
models or homogenous compartmental models, in which every susceptible individual in 
the population has the same number of contacts and thus every individual in the 
population has similar probability of becoming infected (Keeling, 2005). Incorporating 
network structure into disease spread models allows for the computation of population 
level epidemic dynamics by capturing interactions at the individual level. Network 
graphs, the concept of which originated from graph theory, have been used to model 
contact patterns among animal holdings where animal holdings are represented as nodes 
and movement between the nodes construct the edges. Realistic contact networks of 
animal movement such as those generated by utilizing characteristics from actual 
contact can further be utilized to simulate the spread of disease via movement of animals 
(Keeling and Eames, 2005a). Several studies analyzing the movement of pigs between 
farms in different geographical regions of the world have provided insights into 
understanding network structure among swine farms and such networks have 
demonstrated the presence of both small-world and scale-free topologies (Bigras-Poulin 
et al., 2007; Rautureau et al., 2012b; Büttner et al., 2013b; Dorjee et al., 2013; Thakur et 
al., 2014). In recent years, simulation of infectious disease spread within a number of 
theoretical networks have provided insights into understanding the likely pattern of 
disease spread in populations with that particular type of contact network characteristics 
(Watts and Strogatz, 1998; Moore and Newman, 2000; Pastor-Satorras and Vespignani, 
  
120 
 
2001; Eames and Keeling, 2002; Neal, 2003; Rahmandad and Sterman, 2008; 
Rahmandad et al., 2011). Similarly, some other studies have utilized real-world 
(empirical) network structures to simulate disease spread and to evaluate the impact of 
the network characteristics of the population on likely spread of a number of infectious 
disease of humans (Eames and Keeling, 2002; Rahmandad et al., 2011) and animals 
(Kao et al., 2006; Kiss et al., 2006a; Ayyalasomayajula et al., 2008a; Kiss et al., 2008; 
Álvarez et al., 2011; Duncan et al., 2012; Tinsley et al., 2012; Dürr et al., 2013; Carne et 
al., 2014). 
To the best of our knowledge, there have not been any published simulation models that 
incorporate contact heterogeneity among swine herds or which explore the assumptions 
regarding network structures with the swine industry that seek to evaluate the between-
herd spread of PRRS virus, . Recent studies on swine movement in Canada have 
provided insight into the contact structures of the swine industry in Canada (Dorjee et 
al., 2013; Thakur et al., 2014). The swine industry in general possesses a specialized 
production system with a hierarchical structure, where pigs are moved from one 
production type to another during different stages of their growth. With the availability 
of these inputs (network structure and contact parameters), we recognized that the 
opportunity existed to create a network based model that explicitly considered 
stochasticity and individual contact structures to enhance our understanding of PRRS 
virus spread. The objective of this study were to develop a network based simulation 
model for the between-farm spread of PRRS virus to assess the impact of network 
structure on between-farm transmission of PRRS virus.  
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4.3. Materials and Methods 
4.3.1 Study Population  
A hypothetical population of 500 swine farms, that followed a specialized multistage 
production system, was generated and used for the simulations. The distribution of 
farms to each of the three production types (farrowing, nursery and finishing) are 
presented in Table 4.1. All swine farms included in this study belonged to one of three 
production types: (1) farrowing farms, which produce piglets that are delivered to 
nursery farms after weaning (at around 3 weeks of age); (2) nursery farms, where pigs 
are reared after they are weaned but before the fattening stage (approximately 3-8 
weeks); and (3) finishing farms, where pigs above 8 weeks of age are grown till market 
age. The proportion of farms in each production type were assigned based on the 
observed proportion of farms found in swine movement data from four Canadian 
provinces (Thakur et al., 2014). For the sake of simplicity, nursery and finishing farms 
were considered to have adopted all-in-all-out (AIAO) practice by site, where pigs are 
moved in or out of the premises in a batch and the premises are expected to be properly 
cleaned and disinfected and kept empty for a certain duration before a new replacement 
batch of pigs is introduced. 
4.3.2 The Network Models 
To assess the impact of network structure on between-herd transmission dynamics of 
PRRS virus, a stochastic , network-based, farm-level, state transition computer 
simulation model was developed in AnyLogic® (Version 7.0.1, XJ Technologies, 
Russia) . 
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At the beginning of each iteration, one randomly selected farm was seeded with PRRS 
virus, which in turn became infectious. The rest of the farms were susceptible to the 
virus at the beginning of the simulation. The randomly seeded farm could spread 
infection to connected farms by the shipment of pigs (direct contact) or to any random 
farm via the sharing of trucks (indirect contact). Farrowing farms became infectious 
once they received shipments from infected farrowing or finishing farms or if they 
shared trucks with any other infected farm, though with a much lower probability than 
was the case for direct contact. Once infectious, farrowing farms remained infectious 
throughout the model run following a Susceptible-Infectious (SI) state transition, as 
represented in Figure 4.1. Nursery and finishing farms were allowed to become 
infectious in similar ways, either by shipment of pigs from connected farrowing farms 
and from connected farrowing or nursery farms respectively and also through the 
sharing of trucks with any infected farm. These farms remained infectious for a certain 
duration (4.5 weeks for nursery farms and between 12-15 weeks for finishing farms) and 
then were allowed to recover for a two weeks downtime period for farms practicing 
AIAO system. After this period the farms were assumed to be susceptible, thus 
following a Susceptible-Infectious-Recovered-Susceptible (SIRS) state transition 
approach. 
4.3.3 Network Structure 
The three network structures in which spread of PRRS virus was explored in this study 
were: random, small-world and scale-free (Figure 4.2). The random network is 
considered a theoretical network. The other two network structures (small-world and 
scale-free) were selected because most of the swine movement networks studied have 
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demonstrated the presence of small-world and scale-free topologies (Nöremark et al., 
2011b; Rautureau et al., 2012a; Büttner et al., 2013b; Dorjee et al., 2013; Thakur et al., 
2014). We used the inbuilt features of AnyLogic to simulate these three types of 
networks, which were constructed based on algorithms described for each of random 
(Erdős and Rényi, 1960), small-world (Watts and Strogatz, 1998) and scale-free 
(Barabási and Albert, 1999) networks. The construction rules that were employed to 
build each of the three types of networks are summarised below.  
The random network is characterized by each node having equal number of contacts 
and, where each node has equal probability of having a contact with any other node in 
the network. This is analogous to the assumption of homogenous mixing of individuals 
in a population and will result in a network characterized by low clustering coefficient 
and high average path length, where clustering coefficient is defined as the proportion of 
closed triplets (formed by 3 farms connected by 3 undirected links) to total number of 
open (formed by 3 farms connected by 2 undirected links) and closed triplets in the 
network and average path length is defined as the average number of links along the 
shortest or geodesic paths between all possible pairs of nodes in the network (Dubé et 
al., 2009). The random network for 500 (N) farms with an average of two connections 
per farm (k) was generated by randomly selecting k*N/2 of the N(N-1)/2 possible links 
in N nodes, which yielded a Poisson distribution for the number of connections each 
farm had with a mean of 2 (Rahmandad et al., 2011). 
The small-world network, a widely used topology considered to more accurately 
represent many real-world situations, has many local and some long-distance links and 
is characterized as having relatively larger clustering coefficients and shorter average 
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path lengths than that of random networks of similar size. A small-world network may 
be constructed from a ring-lattice network by randomly rewiring a proportion of links to 
have long-range connections in the network. The probability of such long-range links, as 
described by Watts (Watts, 2003), should be around 0.05. However, with this 
probability of long-range connections given a population of 500 farms with an average 
of two connections per farm, the clustering coefficient and average path length obtained 
were similar to that of a random network. We evaluated a set of long-range connection 
probabilities that would yield approximately similar network characteristics to those 
observed in real swine movement networks. Using a probability of 0.5, the resultant 
clustering coefficient (0.02) obtained was closer to, but still smaller than, that which was 
observed in the analysis of swine movement networks in Canada (Dorjee et al., 2013; 
Thakur et al., 2014), though the average path length was greater than in the observed 
networks. The average path length for the simulated networks could not be decreased 
further to match that seen in the observed networks and so we decided to use a 
probability of 0.5 for long-range connections to simulate small-world networks, as this 
probability yielded the closest match to the observed network. 
In scale-free networks, most of the individuals have a limited number of connections 
while a few individuals are highly connected (Keeling and Eames, 2005a). Scale-free 
networks are characterized by right-skewed distribution for the number of contacts in 
the network, where the number of contacts follow a power-law distribution (Barabási et 
al., 2000).The scale-free networks were build using the preferential attachment 
algorithm (Barabási and Albert, 1999) in which the probability of linking a new node to 
existing nodes is proportional to the number of links each node already has. Preferential 
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attachment yields a power law for the probability that a node has k links with a scaling 
parameter γ, where prob (k) =αk−γ. Empirical studies typically show 2≤ γ ≤3. A fixed 
value of γ=3 was used in this simulation model based on an analysis of swine movement 
data in Canada (Dorjee et al., 2013; Thakur et al., 2014). 
Analyses of swine movements are reflective of the structure of swine industry and 
indicate directional flow from farrowing farms to nursery farms and from nursery farms 
to finishing farms with small proportions of movements between farrowing farms 
(Rautureau et al., 2012a; Dorjee et al., 2013; Thakur et al., 2014). We used similar 
approaches to connect farms of all three production types. Since it is not possible to 
specify directional linkage between individual entities in AnyLogic the directionality of 
pig movements was implemented by specifying unidirectional messaging between 
objects dependent on their class membership. For example, farrowing farms were 
allowed to general contact ‗messages‘ to nursery farms but nursery farms were not 
allowed to contact farrowing farms (Figure 4.2). Similarly, for indirect contact as well 
the flow of "messages" was directional such that any farm sharing a truck with only an 
infected farm had the chance to get infected. 
Finally, the default system for network construction in AnyLogic creates links amongst 
all farms (nodes) regardless of production type. However, in the swine industry nursery 
farms and finishing farms are not usually connected with other nursery and finishing 
farms. This restriction was imposed onto the simulated networks by customizing the 
default AnyLogic code such that it disconnected links between nursery or finishing 
farms; such links were then rewired randomly to either farrowing or finishing farms for 
nursery farms and to farrowing or nursery farms for finishing farms. After doing so, it 
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was ascertained that the characteristics (clustering coefficients, average connection and 
scaling parameter) of each of the rewired networks were preserved.  
4.3.4 Parameters 
The parameters used to build the network based AnyLogic models are summarized in 
Table 4.1.  
(a) Disease duration 
The infectious durations for nursery and finishing farms were based on the assumptions 
on duration of stay of pigs in these production types. Farms using the AIAO system of 
production are assumed to clear any infection with the turnout of each batch of pigs, by 
proper cleaning and disinfection of premises as well as allowing a minimum downtime 
period before the introduction of a new batch of pigs. However, in farrowing farms, new 
susceptible animals are continuously produced and replaced, which allows the virus 
circulate in the farm and to persist for long periods (Nodelijk et al., 2003). We assumed 
an infectious duration of one year for this type of farm, similar to that specified by 
Neumann et al. (2007). 
(b) Transmission probabilities 
The direct and indirect contact transmission probabilities and infectious duration for 
farms in each of the three production types were similar to that used in a separate 
simulation study on PRRS virus spread using the North American Animal Disease 
Spread Model (Thakur et al., 2015). A direct contact transmission probability of 1.0 was 
used, as was reported by Neumann et al. (2007). The probability that a farm could 
become infected via indirect contact was set at 0.1; an order of magnitude lower than the 
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probability associated with the movement of infected pigs, and was based on the 
authors‘ judgement and impact of this assumption was evaluated in sensitivity analysis.  
(c) Contact Rates 
Direct contact in these models was defined as the movement of at least one pig from one 
farm to another. The direct contact rates among farms of these production types were 
derived from analyses of swine movement in four Canadian provinces (Thakur et al., 
2014) and are described in a separate study (Thakur et al., 2015). Swine movement 
studies in Canada have reported a negligible proportion of movement of pigs going to 
farrowing farms (Dorjee et al., 2013; Thakur et al., 2014). However, experts that the 
authors consulted with noted that while some farrowing farms are closed herds and 
replace breeding animals only from within the farm, other farrowing operations do 
replace breeding pigs from finishing farms or from specialized breeding or genetic 
farms. To account for such replacement from external sources we assumed that some 
farrowing farms would replace gilts from finishing farms and based on experts 
suggestions, a mean direct contact rate reflecting such replacement was set to 0.25/week 
(Table 4.2). 
Indirect contact in these models was based on contacts between farms that occurred due 
to the sharing of transport vehicles between farms for the purpose of the shipment of 
pigs. The indirect contact rates were based upon the proportion of trucks sharing among 
farms of each production type and were obtained from the same study from which direct 
contact rates between farms are obtained (Thakur et al., 2014; Thakur et al., 2015). The 
mean direct and indirect contact rates between farms of each production types are 
presented in Table 4.2. 
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4.3.5 Assumptions 
In this study, we assumed that all farms were free of PRRS virus at the beginning of the 
simulation. We also assumed that the strain of PRRS virus that initiated the outbreak did 
not mutate during the course of the simulation. The within-herd dynamics of PRRS 
virus spread were ignored such that when a single animal on a farm became infected, the 
entire farm was considered infectious. We further assumed that in any outgoing 
shipment from an infectious farm at least one infected animal would be present in the 
shipment, so that when a shipment occurs from an infected farm, the probability for 
transmission of the virus was assumed to be one. For indirect contact, we included only 
the sharing of transportation vehicles between farms for shipment of incoming or 
outgoing animals and ignored all other forms of indirect contact, such as the movement 
of personnel or the sharing of other equipment. For calculation of indirect contact rate, 
when two farms already had direct contact, the sharing of trucks inherent in such a 
contact was not counted again towards indirect contact. Moreover, we assumed that such 
trucks were not adequately cleaned and disinfected between successive shipments so as 
to remove the potential of virus spread, though the transmission probability was 
considerably lower than was the case for direct contacts. Lastly, in order to assess the 
impact of the three network topologies on PRRS virus spread, farms were assumed to be 
identical in terms of farm size, breed and management practices. 
4.3.6 Scenario Analysis 
For each of the three network models, transmission of the PRRS virus by direct contact 
only as well as by both direct and indirect contacts was considered and simulated. 
Additionally, the impact of the production type of initially infected farm on the epidemic 
was also evaluated. Eighteen different scenarios were constructed based on the three 
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network types (scale-free, random and small-world); two modes of transmission of the 
virus: by direct contact only (DC scenarios) and by both direct and indirect contact 
(D&IC scenarios); and one of the three production types for the farm from which the 
epidemic started. The combination of network type, mode of disease spread and initially 
infected production type, is detailed in Table 4.3.  
4.3.7 Model Outcomes 
In each model run, the spread of PRRS virus in the population was initiated by randomly 
seeding infection at time zero in a single farm. The time unit for simulation was one 
week and the model was run for 52 weeks. A 52 week simulation duration was selected 
based on the infectious duration period for farrowing, so that the spread of the virus 
during one infectious cycle of such farms can be understood. Five hundred iterations of 
each scenario were run to generate a distribution of predicted outcomes. The 
transmission dynamics of PRRS virus for all network types under each pre-specified 
condition were summarized, compared and evaluated. After simulation of each scenario, 
the following model outputs were reported: Epidemic Size: The total number of 
infected farms during a given simulation; Die-out percentage: Percentage of total 
iterations in which the infection does not progress from the initially seeded farm to at 
least five other farms (i.e. if less than 1% of all farms became infected a ‗die-out‘ due to 
the stochastic nature of the simulation was noted); Peak week: The week in which the 
highest number of infectious farms occurred; and Peak infection: The total number of 
farms infected during that peak week. 
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4.3.8 Sensitivity Analysis 
To evaluate the sensitivity of model outcomes to some key parameters in the model, 
sensitivity analyses were performed for certain DC and D&IC scenarios by creating 
variations in a single input parameter for each of the three network types of the Model. 
Scenarios in which epidemics were seeded in farrowing farms (scenarios 1, 4, 7 :DC 
Scenarios and scenarios 10, 13, 16: D&IC Scenarios) were selected for sensitivity 
analysis, as these often represented the worst-case scenarios. For the DC scenarios of 
each network type, we evaluated the impact of altering the network parameters on the 
outcome of the model: (a) for the scale-free network: the scaling parameter was 
decreased and increased to 2 and 4 respectively; (b) for the random network: the average 
connection per farm was increased to 4 to contrast with the baseline model value of 2; 
(c) and for the small-world network: the average connection per farm was increased to 4 
than from baseline model of 2. Additionally, for the small-world network, we evaluated 
the impact of increasing and decreasing the long-range connection probability to 0.6 and 
0.4 respectively. Similarly, to evaluate our assumption regarding indirect contact 
transmission probabilities, two variations to the baseline D&IC models for each of the 
three network types were created with modified indirect contact transmission 
probabilities of 0.05 and 0.25 as compared to the baseline model value of 0.1. For all 
variations, the outputs were compared based on the proportionate change in median 
epidemic size as well as the change in die-out percentage, relative to the baseline 
models. 
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4.4. Results 
The distributions of overall epidemic sizes and the epidemic size by production type, for 
each of the scenarios, are presented in Figures 4.3 and 4.4 respectively. Descriptive 
statistics for die-out percentage, total epidemic size, epidemic size for each production 
type, peak week, and peak infection for each of the 18 simulated scenarios are 
summarized in Table 4.4. Some fraction of the iterations for most of the scenarios did 
not result in an epidemic, where the infection died out early due to the stochastic nature 
of the simulations. The highest stochastic die-out was noticed for scenarios simulated on 
random networks followed by small-world networks and least for scenarios simulated 
on scale-free networks. Generally, scenarios with farrowing farms as index herds were 
more likely to have a smaller proportion of die-out iterations for each of the three 
network types explored, while scenarios initiated from nursery farms had the highest 
die-out percentages. The proportion of die-out iterations decreased consistently by 
around 5-15 percentage points across the three network types and type of index herds 
when both direct and indirect contact was included in the model. Among the network 
based models, overall epidemic sizes were largest for simulations based on scale-free 
networks, while epidemic sizes for random and small-world networks were 
quantitatively comparable. Similar to the observations regarding stochastic die-out, 
scenarios with farrowing farms as index herds were more likely to result in larger 
epidemic sizes than scenarios initiating from other production types. However, for 
scenarios involving random and small-world networks this effect was less pronounced, 
where epidemics initiated in any of the three production types resulted in similar 
epidemic sizes. Nevertheless, with the smallest die-out percentage and with highest 
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epidemic sizes for most scenarios, epidemics initiating from farrowing farms 
represented the worst case scenario, and farrowing farms could therefore be 
characterized as a "super-spreader" class of farm. As nursery and finishing farms, were 
allowed to recover and revert back to a susceptible status and such farms could have 
multiple infections, some scenarios resulted in epidemic sizes larger than the total 
number of farms included in the model. 
Not surprisingly, in all three network types explored the DC scenarios resulted in lower 
overall epidemic sizes than was the case for D&IC scenarios. The impact of including 
indirect contact into the model was more pronounced for scenarios with random and 
small-world networks, where the median epidemic size increased by more than 100% 
(117%-248%) in all the scenarios, and by around 250% for the scenario based on a 
small-world network where the infection was initiated in farrowing farms. The 
incorporation of indirect contact into the model, also increased the epidemic size for 
scenarios based on scale-free networks but only by 20-29%. 
No noticeable differences were observed in median time to reach the peak epidemic 
(peak week) for the three network types, irrespective of the production type from which 
the epidemic was initiated or whether the scenario included indirect contact. This was 
largely due to the fact that the median peak week was not reached until the end of the 
simulation period and the epidemic was still increasing for most of the scenarios. The 
number of farms infected at the peak week were highest for scenarios based on scale-
free networks, while for scenarios with random and small-world networks prevalence of 
infectious farms at peak week were similar to each other and were much smaller than for 
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scenarios involving scale-free networks. The number of infected farms at the peak week 
of infection differed markedly between comparable DC and D&IC scenarios 
Variations in parameters associated with each scenario as part of the sensitivity analysis 
resulted in biologically plausible changes in median epidemic size and die-out 
percentage values for each of the models evaluated (Table 4.5). The modelled outcomes 
were most sensitive to an increase in the average number of connections per farm. An 
increase from 2, in the baseline model, to 4 for direct contact scenarios in both the 
random and small-world networks, resulted in an approximate increase of 4 to 5 times in 
the median epidemic size and also to a significant decrease in the proportion of 
iterations in which die-out occurred. The modelled outcomes were comparatively less 
sensitive to an increase or decrease in the value of the scaling parameter for direct 
contact scenarios in the scale-free networks. An increase in the scaling parameter from 3 
in the baseline model, to 4 and a decrease to 2, resulted in only a 10% increase and a 
20% decrease in the median epidemic sizes respectively. Similarly, modelled outcomes 
were comparatively less sensitive to changes in the long-range connection probability 
for direct contact scenarios in the small-world networks. For D&IC scenarios, the 
influence of altering the indirect contact transmission probability was evaluated. In all 
three network types it was found that results were sensitive to such changes, though this 
parameter had the least impact in models based on a scale-free topology.  
4.5 Discussion 
In this study, we developed and simulated a between-farm PRRS virus spread model by 
explicitly implementing an empirically-derived contact structure of farm to farm 
movement of pigs in Canada, in order to evaluate the impact of network structure within 
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the swine industry on the dynamics of PRRS virus spread. This model is different from 
previously published models on the spread of PRRS virus (Neumann et al., 2007), as it 
simulates the spread of PRRS virus through the incorporation of appropriate contact 
network structures that are typically found to exist among swine farms. Findings from 
this study provide insights into the importance of incorporating network structure in the 
modeling of infectious disease spread and thus highlight the value of understanding the 
contact structures within the population under consideration in any modeling exercise. 
Furthermore, the methods discussed in this paper can be applied to simulating the spread 
of other infectious diseases within swine farms via direct and indirect contact as well as 
to investigate the impact of various network characteristics of a population on disease 
spread.       
As expected, and as discussed in other studies exploring network based models (Moore 
and Newman, 2000; Pastor-Satorras and Vespignani, 2001; Keeling and Eames, 2005a; 
Rahmandad and Sterman, 2008; Rahmandad et al., 2011), both network structure and 
individual heterogeneity had a significant impact on the transmission dynamics of PRRS 
virus. Scenarios with scale-free networks resulted in the largest epidemic size; scale-free 
networks have some highly connected farms referred to as "hubs" (Dube et al., 2011) 
which quickly seeded the infection by infecting its contact farm, therefore infecting 
maximum farms and with highest prevalence of infected farms at peak week. Once the 
highly connected nursery and finishing farms have recovered, the transmission in scale-
free networks will generally tend to slow down. However, as nursery and finishing 
farms were allowed to recover in our model, these tended in time to become re-infected 
and thus led to a further increase in epidemic size. Higher clustering at the local level, in 
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the topological structure of the network of swine farms, created overlaps in contacts in 
scenarios based on a small-world network and thus limited the infection in local regions 
with limited spread to other regions in the network via long-range connections. This 
resulted in lower epidemic size and lower prevalence at the peak week than was the case 
for scenarios that adopted scale-free networks. Epidemic size and peak prevalence in 
scenarios based on random networks were similar to those for small-world networks. 
This contrasts with what has been observed in other studies, where outbreaks in random 
networks are reported to have larger or similar epidemic sizes to outbreaks based on 
scale-free networks (Keeling and Eames, 2005a; Shirley and Rushton, 2005b; 
Rahmandad and Sterman, 2008; Rahmandad et al., 2011). Random networks are 
constructed based on equal probability of connection among a subset of farms, which is 
analogous to assuming a homogenous contact structure. One key fact to help explain the 
contrast between the findings in this and other studies relates to the difference in average 
number of connections between farms. In the current study, we set this to be on average 
two farms, while in a number of other studies this ranged from four up to 10, or even 
higher (Keeling and Eames, 2005a; Shirley and Rushton, 2005b; Rahmandad and 
Sterman, 2008; Rahmandad et al., 2011). Studies have shown that the average number 
of connections is the most important predictor for the epidemic size among other 
network metrics (Rahmandad et al., 2011; Duncan et al., 2012) and our sensitivity 
analysis supported this in that an increase in the average number of connections per farm 
led to much larger epidemic sizes in the random networks. 
All sets of scenarios for the network-based models resulted in epidemiologically 
plausible outcomes. Epidemic size was smaller for scenarios that modelled only direct 
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contact (DC) when compared to equivalent scenarios that incorporated both D&IC. 
Incorporation of indirect contact via the sharing of trucks between farms significantly 
increased the epidemic sizes across all scenarios, highlighting the importance of 
including this kind of contact in any model addressing the likely spread of the PRRS 
virus. It also highlights the fact that the swine industry should be vigilant and develop 
guidelines for proper cleaning and disinfection of vehicles that are shared between 
farms. Furthermore, it was evident that the impact of including indirect contact was 
higher for all three network-based models, where this form of contact connected farms 
that were not directly connected and thus spread infection to otherwise unreachable 
farms.  
The sensitivity of the DC models to a number of network parameters, specifically to the 
average number of connection per farm in the random and small-world networks, 
indicated that the likely epidemic size would be much higher as the number of contact 
farms increased. Similarly, the high level of sensitivity around outcomes in the D&IC 
models to changes in the indirect contact transmission probability suggests that a better 
understanding of how to estimate and control this parameter is critical to disease spread. 
It can be reasonably assumed that this parameter is closely tied to the biosecurity status 
of farms, and it can be seen that a low transmission probability associated with high 
biosecurity status (say, ICTP=0.05) will lead to indirect contacts having a limited impact 
on disease spread when compared to farms with low biosecurity status (ICTP=0.25) 
where the impact of indirect contacts will be much higher. 
ABMs are computationally demanding and may add complexity to the model. The 
stochastic nature of the simulation also introduces challenges in carrying out sensitivity 
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analysis. Despite these challenges, such models are increasingly being used as 
computing resources becomes more widely available and modellers strive to create 
models that include ever increasing levels of realism (Rahmandad and Sterman, 2008). 
An ABM, in contrast to a differential equation based model, allows for each object 
modelled (animal, farm, truck, etc.) to have individual attributes and relaxes the 
assumption of homogenous mixing among individuals. Nonetheless, the use of simple 
vs. complex models is an area of on-going debate and there will always be trade-offs in 
choosing one modelling paradigm over another (Dangerfield et al., 2009). In these 
models, we only included the transmission of PRRS virus based on direct contacts via 
the movement of infected animals, and in some we added indirect contact between farms 
as a result of the sharing of trucks for the movement of animals. We ignored any other 
mechanisms (aerosol, local spread by fomites, etc.) that may be considered to be 
involved in PRRS virus spread. We believe, for farm-to-farm transmission of the virus, 
that the movement of infected pigs is the most important mechanism. Aerosol 
transmission and local spread of PRRS virus is considered to be limited within the 
geographical area of an infected farm (Mortensen et al., 2002; Holtkamp et al., 2010) 
and thus would have at most a limited role in long-range transmission. However, the 
current model can further be expanded to incorporate spatial location of farms that 
would allow to local area spread of the virus and will be helpful in evaluating the impact 
of this mode of transmission. Other forms of indirect contacts between farms were 
ignored, first due to unavailability of data to parametrize any such contacts and second 
due to the likely impact of such contact eg. sharing of personnel, equipments etc. were 
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considered to be localized within close proximity of the farms and may not influence 
transmission of the virus over long-ranges. 
We encourage readers not to make strong quantitative inferences from the findings of 
this study regarding PRRS virus spread. Inevitably, it has not been possible to 
incorporate all relevant factors governing disease spread in these models and some 
uncertainties associated with parameter estimates will exist in any model (Garnett, 
2002). One of the limitations in the current study was that the AnyLogic software did 
not allow for the small-world networks to reflect the precise characteristics of the 
observed network of swine farms. Second, for network based models, we used static 
links between farms for each iteration, while in reality connection preferences among 
farms may change over time. The network models also assign the same weight to each 
connection, while in practice the strength of connections can vary as the shipments 
between pairs of farms may involve variable number of animals. Studies have 
demonstrated that outputs can differ when dynamic connections (Vernon and Keeling, 
2009) or connections with variable weighting (Rahmandad and Sterman, 2008) are 
incorporated in network models. In the current models, we allowed finishing farms to 
ship animals to farrowing farms. However, in reality farrowing farms may not always 
receive replacement animals from finishing farms, or may do so from only a subset of 
finishing farms as well as from more specialized breeding farms. Such replacement 
stocking was not represented in the model, as no relevant contact data for such transfers 
was available. We speculate that allowing the movement of animals from finishing to 
farrowing farms might have resulted in comparatively larger epidemic sizes when the 
virus was seeded in finishing farms than when it was shed in nursery farms. Typically, 
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such stock replacement oriented farms would be expected to maintain higher levels of 
health and biosecurity, so that the extent of spread of PRRS virus to farrowing farms via 
direct contact may be more limited than what was modelled in this study.  
We used estimated rates of truck sharing between different production types to represent 
the indirect contact between farms. Studies have shown that the trucks themselves can 
act as an epidemiological unit where animals from different farms can spread the virus 
or can transmit the virus mechanically (Dee et al., 2002c; Dee et al., 2004b). Network 
study analysing truck sharing between farms have shown that truck sharing patterns 
typically follow a power-law distribution (Thakur et al., 2014), implying that the 
network of farms and trucks will exhibit a scale-free topology. Given these factors, 
representing trucks as a separate agent class and allowing them to follow an independent 
clean-infected-clean cycle with appropriate connection into the farm networks, may 
have imparted greater realism to the model though at the expense of added complexity. 
4.6. Conclusion 
The current study has demonstrated noticeable differences on the extent of spread of 
PRRS virus when a number of network structures among the swine herds are 
considered, which highlights the importance of understanding and incorporating realistic 
contact structures among the individuals of a population while developing infectious 
disease spread models. The study further revealed that irrespective of the types of 
network structures explored, indirect contact significantly played role in further 
spreading the infection to individuals in the population, which were not directly 
connected. Finally, it should be noted that we used characteristics of real contact 
structures of swine movement networks to simulate network structure in a hypothetical 
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swine population on which PRRS virus spread was explored; however, simulating the 
spread of the virus on actual farm to farm movement data may provide realistic model 
outcomes and which may differ to some extent from the findings in this study.  
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Table 4.1 Study population and transmission parameters used for simulation of network based 
models of PRRS virus spread 
Parameters Value Reference 
Total Farms (N) 
  Farrowing  farms  
  Nursery farms 
  Finishing farms  
 
500 
100 (20%) 
150 (30%) 
250 (50%) 
 
assumed 
 
 
 
Transmission Probability  
 
1 (direct contact)* 
0.1 (indirect contact)*              
(Neumann et al., 2007) 
assumed 
Infectious Duration (week)   
Farrowing farms 
Nursery Farms 
Finishing Farms 
Whole duration of simulation 
4.5 weeks 
Uniform(12,15) weeks 
(Neumann et al., 2007) 
(duration of stay) 
(duration of stay) 
Network Parameters   
Connection/farm 2 (Thakur et al., 2014) 
Scaling Parameter  3 (Thakur et al., 2014) 
Probability of long-range connection 0.5 assumed
 a
 
*for all production types 
a
The value for probability of long-range connection was set as to closely reflect the clustering coefficient 
of the network to that observed in swine movement network in Canada (Thakur et al., 2014). 
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Table 4.2 Description of direct and indirect contact rates used for simulation of network 
based models of PRRS virus spread 
Contact Groups                    Mean Contact rate/week 
 Direct Indirect 
Farrowing-Nursery 0.51 0.04 
Farrowing-Finishing 0.03 0.006 
Farrowing-Farrowing 0.01 0.11 
Nursery-Nursery - 0.1 
Nursery-Finishing 0.31 0.165 
Nursery-Farrowing - 0.04 
Finishing-Nursery - 0.165 
Finishing-Finishing - 0.55 
Finishing-Farrowing 0.25 0.006 
The contact rates were obtained from a pig movement traceability study  (Thakur et al., 2014) except for 
direct contact between Finishing-Farrowing, which was based on our assumption that a proportion of 
farrowing farms will replace gilts from finishing farms at approximately the rate noted.
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Table 4.3 Description of scenarios for simulation of network based model of PRRS virus spread 
Scenario 
Number  
Scenario Name  Network 
Type/ Model 
Initially 
infected 
production type 
Spread by 
Direct 
Contact
a 
Spread by 
Indirect 
Contact
b
  
Transmission Probability  
Direct 
Contact 
Indirect 
Contact 
1  SF_DC_F Scale-free 
 
Farrowing 
Yes 
No 
1 
NA 
2  SF_DC_N Nursery 
3  SF_DC_Fi Finishing 
4 RAN_DC_F Random 
 
Farrowing 
5  RAN_DC_N Nursery 
6 RAN_DC_Fi Finishing 
7 SW_DC_F Small-world 
 
Farrowing 
8 SW_DC_N Nursery 
9 SW_DC_Fi Finishing 
10 SF_D&IC_F 
Scale-free 
Farrowing 
Yes 0.1 
11 SF_D&IC_N Nursery 
12 SF_D&IC_Fi Finishing 
13 RAN_D&IC_F 
Random 
Farrowing 
14 RAN_D&IC_N Nursery 
15 RAN_D&IC_Fi Finishing 
16 SW_D&IC_F 
Small-world 
Farrowing 
17 SW_D&IC_N Nursery 
18  SW_D&IC_Fi Finishing 
a
spread of disease from one farm to another through movement of infected pigs 
b
spread of disease from one farm to another through sharing of trucks 
SF=Scale-free, RAN=Random, SW=Small-world, DC=Direct Contact, D&IC=Direct and indirect contact, F=Farrowing, N=Nursery, Fi=Finishing, 
  
148 
 
Table 4.4 Descriptive summaries of die-out percentage, epidemic size, time required to reach the peak epidemic and the number of farms infectious at 
peak week obtained from 500 iterations of each of 18 scenarios of simulated outbreaks of PRRS virus considering three contact network structure of 
swine herds 
Scenario Die-out 
Percentage 
Median Epidemic Size (p5-p95) Peak 
Weak  
Peak 
Infection Total Farrowing Nursery* Finishing* 
Direct Contact Scenarios 
1. SF_DC_F 0 613 (449-717) 96 (92-100) 242(163-293) 274 (189-330) 50 233 
2. SF_DC_N 89.6 443 (96-640) 93 (30-99) 124 (32-256) 199 (34-289) 52 211 
3. SF_DC_Fi 45.2 550 (269-679) 96 (74-100) 209 (87-271) 244 (107-304) 51 228 
4. RAN_DC_F 16.6 34 (6-103) 5 (1-18) 10 (0-31) 19 (0-54) 51 19 
5. RAN_DC_N 87.8 36 (13-85) 6 (1-16) 10 (4-24) 24 (6-53) 51 16 
6. RAN_DC_Fi 56.4 47 (8-102) 7 (1-20) 11 (0-29) 29 (4-57) 51 21 
7. SW_DC_F 10.6 31 (6-111) 7 (1-16) 11(0-34) 15 (2-59) 51 16 
8. SW_DC_N 86.6 41 (10-109) 6 (1-18) 11 (1-30) 22 (5-60) 51 18 
9. SW_DC_Fi 66.4 43 (7-115) 7 (1-20) 10(0-30) 23 (15-65) 51 20 
p5/p95 -5
th
 and 95
th
 percentile of the distribution of epidemic size 
*median epidemic sizes for infected nursery and finishing farms are larger than the total population of these farms included in the model, which is due to 
reinfection of some of these farms and summary statistics of reinfected farms is presented in table 5. 
Summary statistics for all model scenarios excluded iterations with stochastic die-out (iterations resulting in epidemic size less than  
 
 
 
 
 
  
149 
 
Table 4.4 (Continued) 
Scenario Die-out 
Percentage 
Median Epidemic Size (p5-p95) Peak 
Weak  
Peak 
Infection Total Farrowing Nursery* Finishing* 
Direct and Indirect Contact Scenarios 
10. SF_D&IC_F 0 747 (588-850)  98 (94-100) 298 (218-354) 347 (263-405) 50 264 
11. SF_D&IC_N 83 569 (8-775) 94 (1-100) 214 (6-307) 256 (4-373) 51 249 
12. SF_D&IC_Fi 37 660 (335-824) 97 (81-100) 256 (109-341) 306 (139-392) 51 255 
13. RAN_D&IC_F 11.4 92 (11-211) 11 (1-29) 27 (4-65) 53 (4-119) 51 39 
14. RAN_D&IC_N 76.4 86 (6-189) 12 (0-28) 26 (2-54) 50 (3-112) 51 38 
15. RAN_D&IC_Fi 45.8 102 (9-213) 13 (2-30) 30 (2-66) 60 (6-122) 51 43 
16. SW_D&IC_F 3.8 108 (14-259) 15 (1-37) 31 (4-81) 60 (6-145) 51 48 
17. SW_D&IC_N 75.6 89 (7-251) 12 (0-35) 23 (2-75) 49 (5-136) 51 39 
18. SW_D&IC_Fi 51.6 103 (10-258) 14 (1-35) 28 (12-78) 60 (7-143) 51 48 
p5/p95 -5
th
 and 95
th
 percentile of the distribution of epidemic size 
*median epidemic sizes for infected nursery and finishing farms are larger than the total population of these farms included in the model, which is due to 
reinfection of some of these farms and summary statistics of reinfected farms is presented in table 5. 
Summary statistics for all model scenarios excluded iterations with stochastic die-out (iterations resulting in epidemic size less than  
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Table 4.5 Sensitivity analysis as it affected median epidemic size and die-out percentage values in simulated PRRS virus outbreaks within the various 
network based models assuming direct and indirect contact 
Scenarios Parameters Median epidemic 
size (p5-p95)  
% ± in median 
outcome  
Die out 
Percentage M ICTP
a
 CPF
b 
LRCP
c 
Direct Contact Scenarios 
1. SF_DC_F  3 - - - 613 (449-717) - 0 
SF_DC-F with change in scaling parameter to 2  2 - - - 488 (326-596) -20 0 
SF_DC-F with change in scaling parameter to 4 4 - - - 671 (490-795) 10 0 
4.  R_DC_F - - 
- 
2 - 34 (6-103) - 16.6 
R_DC_F with change in connection per farm to 4 - - 4 - 159 (32-311) 368 2.4 
7. SW_DC_F - - 
- 
2 0.5 31 (6-111) - 10.6 
SW_DC_F with change in connection per agent to 4 - - 
- 
4 0.5 189 (21-392) 510 0.6 
SW_DC_F with change in long-range connection probability  to 0.4 - - 
- 
2 0.4 27 (7-101) -13 9.6 
SW_DC_F with change in long-range connection probability  to 0.6 - - 
- 
2 0.6 32 (7- 117) 3 8 
Direct and Indirect Contact Scenarios 
13.  SF_D&IC_F 2 0.1 - - 747 (588-850) - 0 
SF_D&IC_F with change in ICTP to 0.05 2 0.05 - - 674 (516-780) -10 0 
SF_D&IC_F with change in ICTP to 0.25 2 0.25 -  940 (764-1056) 26 0 
16. R_D&IC_F - 0.1 2 - 92 (11-211) - 11.4 
R_D&IC_F with change in ICTP to 0.05 - 0.05 2 - 62 (7-134) -33 15 
R_D&IC_F with change in ICTP to 0.25 - 0.25 2 - 324 (21-556) 252 5.8 
19. SW_D&IC_F - 0.1 2 0.5 108 (14-259) - 3.8 
SW_D&IC_F with change in ICTP to 0.05 - 0.05 2 0.5 54 (11-169) -50 6.6 
SW_D&IC_F with change in ICTP to 0.25 - 0.25 2 0.5 409 (44-653) 279 1.4 
a
Indirect Contact Transmission Probability, 
b
Connection Per Farm, 
c
Long Range Connection Probability,  p5-p95=-5
th
 and 95
th
 percentile of the distribution of 
epidemic size
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Figure 4.1 Transition of PRRS virus infection for swine herds from susceptible to 
infectious (SI) for farrowing farms (a) and from susceptible to infectious to recovered to 
susceptible (SIRS) for the two other  production types (b and c), DContact is contact via 
movement of animals between farms and IDContact is contact between farms due to 
sharing of trucks.
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Figure 4.2 Example of three distinct network types, each containing 50 nodes. From left to right: Random (with two connections per 
node), Small-world (with two connections per node and neighbor link probability of 0.95) and Scale-free (with scaling parameter 
M=3); generated using AnyLogic 7.02. 
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Figure 4.3 The distribution of the overall epidemic size of PRRS virus outbreaks obtained from simulations of between-farm spread of 
PRRS virus in a virtual population of 500 swine herds considering three different contact network structure among swine herds under 
assumptions of (a) direct and (b) direct and indirect contact between farms. Different colors represent scenarios for each of the three 
network types. Boxes with solid lines, tight dots and long dash represent epidemics initiated from farrowing farms, nursery farms and 
finishing farms respectively. 
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Figure 4.4 The distribution of epidemic size of PRRS virus outbreaks by production type of swine herds obtained from simulations of 
between-farm spread of PRRS virus in a virtual population of 500 swine herds considering three different contact network structure 
among swine herds under assumptions of (a) direct and (b) direct and indirect contact between farms. Different colors represent 
scenarios for each of the three network types. Boxes with solid lines, tight dots and long dash represent epidemics initiated from 
farrowing farms, nursery farms and finishing farms respectively. 
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Chapter 5 Bayesian analysis for modelling contamination of trucks used in the 
shipment of pigs infected with porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome 
virus 
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5.1 Abstract 
Porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome (PRRS) is a major disease in the swine 
industry. PRRS virus is primarily transmitted by direct and indirect contact between 
farms and through aerosol. Recent studies have suggested an increasing degree of truck 
sharing used for the shipment of pigs between farms. Other studies have highlighted the 
importance of trucks in the spread of PRRS virus. In the present analysis, a Bayesian 
approach was applied to quantify the likelihood that a shared truck used in the shipment 
of pigs would be infected with PRRS virus at the end of a given day, and to evaluate the 
efficacy of cleaning and washing protocols in reducing virus transmission during 
shipment. PRRS virus-infected farms from which trucks shipped pigs were deemed to 
be the source of infection. A quantitative stochastic model was built using data related to 
the prevalence of PRRS virus-positive herds, number of times a truck is typically shared 
on any given day, shipment size, animal-level PRRS prevalence and virus shedding, 
travel time between farms, and the efficacy of three different cleaning and disinfection 
procedures. The model resulted in a mean probability of 0.394 that a truck would be 
infected at the end of a day when that truck had been used by a finishing farm, without 
considering the number of previous uses of the truck or whether or not it had been 
washed and disinfected. The action of washing trucks on its own resulted in a negligible 
decrease (less than 5%) in the probability that a truck would be infective; washing and 
disinfection resulted in a moderate decrease (approximately 58%), while washing and 
disinfection, followed by drying, had the highest impact with a greater than 90% 
reduction in the probability. Findings from this study suggest that under current 
biosecurity practices, where only around one third of trucks are completely cleaned and 
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disinfected between successive shipments, and where for more than half of the 
shipments made on any given day the same truck is used by more than one farm, a 
substantial risk exists for the spread of PRRS virus as a consequence of sharing trucks.  
5.2 Introduction 
Porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome (PRRS) is a major viral disease of swine 
with devastating economic consequences to the swine industry (Neumann et al., 2005). 
All ages of pigs are susceptible to PRRS virus, with highly variable clinical 
manifestations in different age groups of infected pigs ranging from abortion, anorexia 
and pyrexia in pregnant sows to respiratory symptoms, high mortality and poor growth 
in young pigs (Nodelijk, 2002). Several direct and indirect mechanisms have been 
identified for the spread of PRRS virus from one farm to another. The direct contact 
routes  include the movement of infected animals and  the use of contaminated semen, 
while the indirect mechanisms involve fomites (Yaeger et al., 1993; Mortensen et al., 
2002; Otake et al., 2002c), and the  sharing of equipment and shipment trucks between 
farms (Otake et al., 2002b; Dee et al., 2004b). Transmission via aerosol has also been 
reported (Otake et al., 2002a; Otake et al., 2010). Additionally, some studies have 
implicated the role of insects such as mosquitoes and house flies  in mechanical 
transmission of the virus (Otake et al., 2002d; Otake et al., 2003). 
The movement of animals or the sharing of equipment, personnel, etc., through which 
susceptible animals are brought into direct or indirect contact with infected animals, can 
be instrumental in spreading infectious agents between farms (Ortiz-Pelaez et al., 2006). 
In recent years network analysis has elucidated contact patterns among animal holdings 
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in specific livestock industries (Dubé et al. 2008; Smith et al. 2012). In a number of 
recent swine movement analysis studies in Denmark and France, the importance of 
transportation vehicles as a means to spread infectious agents among farms that are 
otherwise not directly connected has been identified (Bigras-Poulin et al., 2007; 
Rautureau et al., 2012a; Smith et al., 2012). In our recent study that characterized swine 
movement in four Canadian regions (Thakur et al., 2014), we identified similar patterns  
of truck sharing between farms to those described in the UK (Smith et al., 2012), France 
(Rautureau et al., 2012a) and Denmark (Bigras-Poulin et al., 2007), with one truck on 
average being shared between four different farms. Similarly, for more than 50% of all 
shipments on any particular day, the same truck had been used in at least one additional 
shipment. As the same vehicles were used multiple times and were shared by different 
farms for the shipment of pigs, they connected farms which would otherwise have no 
direct contact. Thus any inadequate cleaning and disinfection of vehicles is likely to 
increase the risk of infectious agents being spread, as has been implicated in the recent 
spread of Porcine Epidemic Diarrhoea (PED) virus across North America (Lowe, 2014). 
Additionally, these vehicles can spread infectious agents mechanically or indirectly via 
contaminated fomites (faeces, bedding material, etc.) (Alexandersen et al., 2003).  
The role of transportation vehicles in the spread of PRRS virus to susceptible pigs has 
been demonstrated through experimental studies. Sentinel pigs became infected after 
being housed in an artificially contaminated trailer and in trailers which housed 
experimentally infected pig before the introduction of the sentinel pig (Dee et al., 
2004b). Similarly, mechanical transmission of PRRS virus via transportation during 
cold and warm weather (with limited frequency) has been documented by the same 
 159 
 
authors (Dee et al., 2002a; Dee et al., 2003). In these experiments, Dee and colleagues 
also evaluated cleaning and disinfection protocols. PRRS virus from the trailers was 
detected in all combination of cleaning and disinfection treatments, except when 
bedding removal, washing, disinfecting and drying were combined (Dee et al. 2004a). In 
a similar study to assess the sanitation protocols of commercial transport vehicles 
contaminated with PRRS virus, it was demonstrated that washing and fumigation with 
glutaraldehyde-quaternary ammonium chloride or washing and disinfection plus 
overnight drying, were the most effective treatments (Dee et al., 2004a). One recent 
study has suggested the relative importance of truck sharing in the spread of one 
particular genotype of PRRS virus among swine herds in Ontario (Kwong et al., 2013). 
The swine industry in North America has become increasingly specialized and 
integrated, with the adoption of three-site production systems which requires regular 
movement of pigs between sites (Key and McBride, 2010). Canadian swine producers 
and experts in the swine industry have been concerned about the role of shared trucks on 
farm to farm spread of PRRS virus (http://www.opic.on.ca/biosecurity-
resources/transportation). The objectives of the analyses described here were to quantify 
the likelihood that a truck used for the shipment of pigs would be infected with PRRS 
virus at the end of any given day (as well as on subsequent days), and to evaluate the 
efficacy of cleaning and disinfection protocols in eliminating the virus from these trucks 
using a Bayesian approach. The model estimates the probability that a truck will be 
infected with PRRS virus after it has been used by a number of farms on any given day 
and also provides estimates on the likelihood that the truck will still be infective on 
subsequent days. Additionally it provides insights into the likelihood that the PRRS 
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virus will be eliminated from the trucks after cleaning and disinfection protocols have 
been applied.  
5.3 Material and Methods 
A Bayesian approach was selected for this study as it allows for the combination of 
different  sources of information and the propagation of uncertainty in the model (Czado 
and Brechmann, 2014). It also allows the assumption of conditional dependence 
between nodes required by classical risk assessment to be relaxed, supporting the 
estimation of joint probability distributions at nodes that are conditionally independent, 
through the use of Bayesian networks (Albert et al., 2008). 
A schematic diagram of truck use, informed by a pilot pig traceability data in Canada 
(Thakur et al., 2014), is illustrated in Figure 5.1. A given truck may be used by two or 
more farms on any given day and may or may not be cleaned between successive 
shipments. A schematic representation of the Bayesian model is presented in Figure 5.2. 
The baseline model estimates the probability that a truck "i" is infected with PRRS virus 
at the end of Day 1, given it visited "j" farms on that day and that at least one of those 
farms was infected with PRRS virus. It additionally considers whether the truck had 
sufficient viral load to make it infective, which is determined by the travel time of the 
truck during the shipment, the size of the shipment, the animal level prevalence and the 
probability of there being shedding animals in the batch of animals shipped. The 
probability of shedding animals further depended on the production type "k" of the 
infected farm. The baseline model further incorporated one of the three cleaning and 
disinfection protocols "l" and evaluated the efficacy of these protocols in eliminating the 
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PRRS virus from contaminated trucks. This risk assessment considered the following 
nodes as influencing the probability that a truck would be contaminated with PRRS 
virus at the end of that day's work: 1) farm-level prevalence of PRRS virus, 2) number 
of farms using the same truck on any given day, 3) number of animals shipped on the 
truck, 4) animal-level prevalence of PRRS virus in the group of shipped pigs, 5) 
proportion of animals shedding the virus in the group - which in turn depends on the 
stage of growth of the pigs being shipped and the time of travel between two farms. A 
detailed description of the nodes is presented in Table 5.1, with a summary of the 
underlying assumptions and associated input values. In the absence of any prior 
knowledge we use non-informative prior distributions. Finally, we estimated the 
probability that a truck "i" would be infected with PRRS virus by multiplying the 
probability that at least one of the farms "j" that it had visited was infected with PRRS 
virus, the probability that the truck had more animals in that shipment than Minani.k and 
the probability that the travel time was more than two hours. 
Simulated Models 
Three sets of models were evaluated to estimate the likelihood that the trucks shared 
between farms for shipment of pigs were contaminated with PRRS virus. First a baseline 
model was simulated without any cleaning or disinfection protocols applied to the truck, 
which resulted in an estimation of the probability that the truck would be contaminated 
at the end of Day 1. The baseline model was then extended to incorporate decay of the 
virus over time for two different seasons, warmer months (when the ambient 
temperature is around 22
0
C) and colder months (when the ambient temperature is 
around 4
0
C or less), to assess the probability that the truck would remain contaminated 
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on subsequent days under these conditions. Finally, the baseline model was further 
developed to evaluate the efficacy of commonly used cleaning and disinfection 
protocols in eliminating the virus from trucks.  
Data Description 
Data used for this study were obtained from the literature (Dee et al., 2004a; Dee et al., 
2004b; Thakur et al., 2014) and from pilot pig traceability data from four Canadian 
regions described elsewhere (Thakur et al., 2014).  
For this study, we assumed that a truck was free of PRRS virus when it was used for the 
first time on Day 1. Further, in order to assess the perpetuation of the risk on Day 2 and 
subsequent days, we did not consider any new sources of infection for that truck, so that 
all farms visited by the truck after the first day were assumed to be clean. Based on 
experts' judgement, we assumed the farm-level prevalence of PRRS virus  to be 50% 
(F.Prev). Two supervisory commiittee members for this thesis research (DH, a Professor 
of swine health management, and ZP, an Associate Professor of Veterinary 
Epidemiology), who have extensive expertise in swine production and management 
across Canada provided inputs to estimate some of the assumed parameter values. Based 
on the F.Prev of the virus, number of farms that could be infected with PRRS virus out 
of the farms visited by the truck on any day and the probability that at least one of the 
visited farms was infected with PRRS virus was estimated. 
Truck use  
The proportion of trucks used (Tr.usei) for two, three and four or more ―j‖ farm visits on 
a given day and the proportion of trucks with more than the minimum number of 
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shipped animals (Minani ) for each of three ―k‖ production types were obtained from the 
pilot pig traceability data. 
Shipment size and travel time 
The number of infectious animals in a given shipment, and the travel time were 
estimated as described below: 
Prevalence of shedding animals on a truck 
The prevalence of shedding animals (Shed.prev.k) was adjusted by the within-farm 
prevalence of PRRS (A.Prev.k).  Expert judgement suggested that the proportion of 
animals shedding the virus (Shed.anim.k) varied according to the growth stage of the 
pigs being transported and it was suggested that 20%, 50% and 70% of weaned piglets, 
nursery pigs, and finishing pigs, respectively, would typically be shedding the virus.. 
Several studies have reported very high within-farm prevalence of PRRS virus ranging 
from 80 -100% (Dee and Joo, 1994; Maes, 1997; Nodelijk et al., 2003). For this study, 
we used an animal-level prevalence (A.Prev.k) of 80% and evaluated the impact of this 
variable on the model outcome by carrying out sensitivity analysis.  
Minimum number of shedding animals in a shipment 
PRRS virus is excreted through urine, faeces and oral fluids of infected animals in 
addition to several other bodily secretions (Wills et al., 1997c; Bierk et al., 2001), 
though the dynamics of these shedding patterns is not well documented. Therefore, it 
was difficult to quantify the amount of PRRS virus likely to be present on any given 
shipment truck. We were interested in estimating the infectious potential of the trucks 
such that the virus could be transmitted to naive animals. We therefore assessed whether 
or not the trucks would likely have sufficient viral load to infect susceptible pigs. Dee 
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and colleagues (2004b) demonstrated that the presence of two infectious pigs on a truck 
trailer for two hours was sufficient to transmit the virus to naive pigs on the subsequent 
introduction of these animals to the truck. Using these guidelines as a cut-off value, we 
categorized trucks as having sufficient infectious virus or not to transmit PRRS virus to 
naïve pigs (i.e. they must have transported at least two infectious animals and have had a 
travel time of at least two hours). 
Minimum number of animals (Minani.k) on a truck to have at least two infectious 
animals  
We used the hypergeometric distribution to estimate the minimum number of shedding 
animals needed in a shipment (Minani.k) for each production type, in order to have two 
infectious animals (Nani) on a truck that were shedding the virus. We used the 
maximum number of shipped animals (Shipsize.k), as recorded in the pilot pig traceability 
data, for each of the three production types as 'N', and the number of shedding animals, 
which was based on Shed.prev.k, as the 'm' parameter of the hypergeometric process. 
For psi, we used one, as the odds of drawing a shedding animal from the shipment was 
similar to that of drawing an animal that was not shedding the virus. 
Shipment size (Shipsize) and Minimum shipment size (Minship.k ) 
The shipment size was simulated as a uniform distribution with minimum and maximum 
number of animals as recorded in the pilot pig traceability dataset for each of the three 
production types. Based on this distribution for shipment size, the probability that a 
truck had minimum shipment size (Minship.k ) or more animals than Minani.k  was 
estimated using the step function available in OpenBUGS.  
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Infective Dose (Inf.dose) 
Finally, we estimated the probability that a truck has an infective dose of PRRS virus 
(Inf.dose) if it shipped at least Minani and had a travel time (Travel) of at least two hours. 
Additionally, since the infectious dose is related to the environmental conditions, we 
calculated the infective dose (Inf.dose) for warm and cold seasons. PRRS virus has been 
described as having  a median infectious half-life of 14.6 hours (95% CI = 12.6 - 17.2) 
in pig manure at an ambient temperature of 22
0
 C (Linhares et al., 2012). The PRRS 
virus has a comparatively longer half-life of 112.6 hours (95% CI = 103.2 - 123.8) in pig 
manure at an ambient temperature of 4
0
 C (Linhares et al., 2012). We were guided by 
this information to extend the model to incorporate viral decay in order to quantify the 
risk that trucks would still be contaminated with PRRS virus on subsequent days in 
either warm and cold months. 
For warmer months, we assumed that at least one infectious dose of virus would be 
present on trucks that have at least two infectious animals, that had been kept on the 
truck for at least two hours. So, based on viral decay with an assumed half-life of 15 
hours, for at least one infectious dose of virus to be present during the 15 hours 
subsequent to the truck being used on Day 1, would require that at least four infectious 
animals (this is analogous to having two infectious doses of virus on Day 1) were 
present on the truck, and similarly for the truck to be infectious for the next 30 hours 
that at least eight infectious animals would need to have been present. On the other 
hand, for colder months we assumed that trucks with at least two infected animals could 
be considered to be infective for around five days, as the half-life of the virus is much 
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longer (112.6 hrs at 4
0
C), and thus we did not attempt to quantify the likelihood for time 
points beyond a one week duration from which the truck initially became infected.  
Travel time  
In order to estimate the amount of virus shed during transportation, the travel time was 
first estimated and then the probability that a given shipment was longer than two or 
more hours was computed. It was assumed that the most likely travel time in Ontario, 
Canada was around two hours, which corresponds to the travel time estimated by Dee et 
al. (2004b) for swine operations in Minnesota and was likely to vary between a 
minimum of half an hour and a maximum of six hours. We used this information to 
parameterise a normal (mean, precision) distribution in OpenBUGS. First, the mean was 
computed as (min+2*mode+max)/6, and the precision was computed as 1/((max-
min)/6)^2. The obtained distribution was further truncated to avoid travel time values 
below zero. These equations provided a normal (2.43, 1.22) distribution for the travel 
time parameter. 
The probability that a given shipment lasted for at least two hours was estimated using 
the step function to the distribution of travel time. The step function, provided the 
probability of travel time equal to 1 if the travel time was more than two hours.  
Evaluation of cleaning and disinfection protocols  
The baseline model was then extended by including three cleaning and disinfection 
protocols identified to eliminate the PRRS virus from contaminated trucks. Trucks 
infected with PRRS virus require rigorous cleaning, disinfection and drying to eliminate 
the virus (Dee et al., 2004a; Dee et al., 2004b). The Canadian Swine Health Board has 
developed protocols to wash, disinfect and dry such transport vehicles 
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(http://www.swinehealth.ca/publications.php). However, from anecdotal evidence there 
appears to be a lack of consistency in the application of these standard protocols, with 
some trucks  being cleaned only by washing, while in other cases washing is followed 
by disinfection, and for some washing, disinfection and overnight drying is practiced. In 
experimental studies, Dee and colleagues (Dee et al., 2004a; Dee et al., 2004b), 
evaluated the efficacy of each of these protocols (washing, washing with disinfection, 
and washing with disinfection followed by drying for 12 hours). We used data from 
those studies (as summarised in Table 5.1) for each of the three cleaning protocols, to 
assess their effectiveness in reducing the probability that a truck used for shipment of 
pigs would remain contaminated with PRRS virus . 
Scenarios 
A total of 21 scenarios were constructed and analysed (Table 5.2). A subset of 12 of 
those scenarios did not include any cleaning and disinfection control measures, while 
the other nine scenarios evaluated the efficacy of each of the three cleaning and 
disinfection protocols. For scenarios without cleaning and disinfection protocols, we 
evaluated the risk for trucks used by two, three, or four or more farms, and also 
estimated the combined risk for a random truck for which the number of farms 
previously visited on that day was unknown. Additionally, the production type of the 
initial infected farm on which the truck was used was also included in these scenarios. 
Similarly, for scenarios with cleaning and disinfection protocols, we estimated the risk 
that a random truck would be used by any of the three production types and would be 
cleaned by the application of one of the three cleaning protocols.  
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Stochastic model 
To quantify the probability that a truck used by a number of farms on a given day would 
be infected with PRRS virus at the end of the day, a stochastic model was developed in 
OpenBUGS 3.2.2 (Lunn et al., 2009). A total of 60,000 iterations with a burn-in period 
of 3,000 were obtained after initializing the model with three chains. The convergence,  
diagnostic analyses and summary of all posterior distributions were computed in R using 
the CODA package (Plummer et al., 2006). The convergence of the MCMC model was 
assessed both visually using the history and autocorrelation plots, and formally using the 
Brooks-Gelman-Rubin diagnostic (Gelman and Rubin, 1992), which provided an 
estimate of the shrinkage or scale reduction factor for each of the nodes and scenarios. 
The distribution of the scale reduction factors (median and 97.5% upper bounds) were 
plotted to visually assess convergence. Once, the model converged, the effective sample 
size was estimated by running the model for sufficient number of iterations till the 
MCMC error became less than 5% of the posterior standard deviation for monitored 
nodes. The mean, for the scenarios described above, median, and 95% CrI (credible 
interval) for each stochastic node are reported.  
Sensitivity Analysis 
A sensitivity analysis was performed for one scenario (S.4.fi), where the truck was used 
by four or more farms, carried finishing pigs, and without application of any cleaning 
and disinfection measures. The aim was to evaluate and identify what-if scenarios that 
could lead to significant decrease or increase in the final probability. We evaluated the 
percentage change in the mean probability of infection compared to the original 
scenario. We assessed these changes using farm-level prevalence (F.Prev) of PRRS of  
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10%, 30% and 70%, animal-level prevalence (A.Prev) of 10%, 30%, 50%, and 100%, 
and animal shedding proportions (Shed.ani) of 10%, 30% 50% and 90%. Additionally, 
we evaluated the sensitivity of the model by changing Nani to 4 and 8. 
5.4 Results 
The mean probabilities of a truck remaining contaminated with PRRS virus at the end of 
Day 1, for scenarios without and with the application of various cleaning and 
disinfection measures are presented in Figure 5.3. Similarly, the mean, median and 95% 
CrI for all the parameters used in the model and for all the scenarios are summarised in 
Appendix, Table S9 and their density plots are presented in Appendix, Figure S3. The 
mean probability that a truck would be infected with PRRS virus at the end of the Day 1 
when it was used by two farms, and one of the sources of infection was a finishing farm 
was 0.352. The mean probability marginally increased with an increase in the number of 
farms that the truck had been shared with on that day. Similarly, the probability of a 
truck remaining infected did not differ much for truck use across the three different 
production types. In the case of a ‗random‘ truck (i.e. one for which the number of times 
it had been used for transportation during the first day was not known), the mean 
probability was equal across the three production types. 
When decay of the virus over time was incorporated in the model, the outputs suggested 
that the mean probability that a truck would still remain infective after 15 or 30 hours of 
use during warmer months, from a contamination acquired on Day 1 and without 
visiting any other infectious farms on subsequent days, was not much different from the 
probability on Day 1 (Table 5.3). The mean probability decreased by 0.034 and 0.035 
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(approximately 9%) in the 15 hours of truck use subsequent to Day 1, when the truck 
had been used by either a nursery or finishing farm respectively, and by 0.049 (13%) 
when it had been used by a farrowing farm. Similarly, for the next 30 hours after Day 1, 
the mean probability of infection decreased by 0.06 for nursery and by 0.075  for 
finishing and farrowing farms in comparison to Day 1. For colder months, the virus can 
remain viable for around 112 hours, so once contaminated on Day 1 the trucks were 
expected to remain contaminated for around five additional days. 
With respect to the three cleaning protocols evaluated in this study, washing on its own 
reduced the mean probability of a truck remaining infected by 0.017 (for example, the 
probability for S.fa= 0.377, decreased to 0.360 with application of washing), while 
washing with disinfection decreased the mean probability by 0.22 (approximately 60%). 
However, washing and disinfection followed by overnight drying had by far the highest 
impact, lowering the mean probability of infection by more than 90%, to around 0.03, 
irrespective of the production type for which the truck had been used (Figure 5.3). The 
distributions of probabilities associated with a truck remaining infected after the 
application of each of the three cleaning and disinfection protocols, for the scenario 
involving finishing farms, are presented in Figure 5.4. Similar distributions for scenarios 
without cleaning and disinfection protocols could not be obtained due to the 
parametrizing of nodes used in those scenarios with step function, which did not allow 
for the capture of variability in the distribution of these nodes for the scenarios 
evaluated. 
Finally, outputs from the sensitivity analyses suggested that the highest percentage 
changes were observed for large decrease in farm level or animal level prevalence of 
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PRRS virus and for a large decrease in the probability of shedding animals in the 
shipment. However, only a small increase or decrease in the mean probabilities was 
observed for smaller increase or decrease in each of the parameters evaluated (farm 
level prevalence, animal-level prevalence, and the probability of animals which were 
shedding the virus in any particular shipment (Table 5.4 and Figure 5.5). Similarly, large 
increases (2x and 4x) in the minimum number of infectious animals (Nani) required to 
contaminate the truck with PRRS virus resulted in only a small decrease in the mean 
probability of infection. 
The MCMC error was less than 5% of the posterior standard deviation for all of the 
reported scenarios and nodes, which suggested that the model had been run for a 
sufficient number of iterations, and 20,000 iterations with a burn-in period of 1,000 for 
each chain was sufficient to allow the models to converge with sufficient sample size for 
posterior inference. The convergence of the model assessed with the history plots 
(Appendix, Figure S3) suggested that chains stabilized. Additionally, the scale-reduction 
factor was less than 1.05 for all the nodes and scenarios evaluated, suggesting that the 
model converged. The shrinkage plots (Appendix Figure S4), showing the evolution of 
the scale reduction factor with an increase in the number of iterations, also suggest that 
the MCMC models had converged after around an initial 4,000 iterations, following the 
burn-in period of 1,000 iterations, for most of the nodes. Furthermore, the 
autocorrelation plots (Appendix, Figure S5) indicated that the correlation between every 
draw with its lag decreased with an increase in the number of iterations, which again 
suggested convergence of the model.  
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5.5 Discussion 
This analysis has attempted to assess the risk for contamination with PRRS virus of 
shipment trucks used for the transportation of pigs. To do so, a baseline model was first 
developed to assess the likelihood that trucks used for shipment of pigs will become 
contaminated and remain infected with PRRS virus at the end of Day 1. The baseline 
model was extended to explore a number of what-if scenarios, including variations in 
the number of times a truck was used on a day, the farm and animal level prevalence of 
PRRS virus, the size of the shipment on a truck, the probability of shedding animals in 
the shipment, and the period of travel involved. Additionally, the model was extended to 
quantify the probability that the truck would remain infected on subsequent days, once it 
became contaminated, but without visiting any other infected farms, by including decay 
of the virus over time in the model. We also attempted to evaluate the efficacy of 
commonly used cleaning and disinfection protocols in eliminating this virus from PRRS 
virus contaminated trucks. 
Based on this model, the estimated probability of a truck being infected at the end of a 
day slightly increased with an increase in the number of visits the truck made on a given 
day, however, there were not major differences in the probabilities for scenarios when 
the truck was used by either farrowing, nursery or finishing farms.  The likely 
explanation for the increased risk with an increase in the number of visits of a truck is 
that the probability that the truck will visit at least one infected farm increases with the 
number of visits. The two parameters that were different in the model among the three 
production types were shedding percentage and shipment size. The sensitivity analysis 
suggested that the model was less influenced by changes in shedding percentage, unless 
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it was a very large change, and that above a certain threshold for this parameter, the 
model behaved similarly. This fact explains why very limited differences in risk were 
observed among the three production types. Similarly, while separate shipment size 
distributions were specified for the three production types, in most cases the shipment 
size was very large and typically reached the minimum number of animals required to 
characterize the trucks as being contaminated; as such this parameter also had little 
impact in terms of overall differential risk among the three production types.  
The model suggested that only a very small proportion of trucks would eliminate the 
virus by simply washing the vehicle, while washing followed by disinfection should 
clean the virus from just over half of the trucks. Washing and disinfection, followed by 
overnight drying, had the highest impact; resulting in the removal of PRRS virus from a 
large majority of contaminated trucks. One possible explanation for the high efficacy of 
this protocol may be as follows. Washing alone can reduce the amount of debris and 
organic matter but cannot eliminate the virus, while washing followed by disinfection 
can be useful when the surfaces are free from organic matter. However, the addition to 
drying can eliminate the virus from contaminated surfaces by eliminating the residual 
virus that persists after washing and disinfection has occurred (Dee et al., 2005b). 
Findings from our study slightly contrast with those observed in the experimental 
studies (Dee et al., 2004a; Dee et al., 2004b), from which we took the data for our study. 
In the experimental study, washing had no effect at all, washing and disinfection was 
effective in around a quarter of replications, while washing, disinfection and drying 
resulted in the elimination of the virus in all replications. This small difference observed 
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in current study than from previous experimental study was due to the introduction of 
uncertainty and stochasticity into the model.  
Finally, the model suggested that, during warmer months, a slight decrease may occur in 
the probability that the trucks will be contaminated on the following day as some trucks 
may get rid of the virus on the following day simply due to the decay of the virus. 
However, most of the contaminated trucks on Day 1 will be infective for at least the 
next 30 hours. Again this finding was associated with shipment size. And as our 
characterization of trucks to be infective for the next 15 or 30 hours was based on 
double or quadruple number of shedding and infectious animals on the trucks 
respectively which we used as a proxy for infectious dose of the virus, most of the 
trucks, due to large shipment sizes, qualified to have four or eight infectious and 
shedding animals on them. In colder months, when the virus can survive much longer 
(Linhares et al., 2012), a truck will tend to remain infective for around five days once it 
has become contaminated. Cleaning and disinfection of trucks to eliminate PRRS virus 
is thus, rightly, considered crucial during winter months (Dee et al., 2002a; Dee et al., 
2005a) when the virus exhibits increased survival. However, our study suggests that it 
should not be ignored during the warmer months as the likelihood that trucks will 
remain infected for a number of days following shipment from an infected farm is 
substantial. 
We were unable to quantify the viral load on trucks due to the fact that data on the 
amount of PRRS virus that is typically shed was not available. Instead we classified 
trucks in terms of whether they were likely to have sufficient viral load to be able to 
transmit the infection, based on work by Dee and colleagues (Dee et al., 2004b), using 
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shipment size as a proxy for viral load. Shipment size was linked to PRRS viral load on 
the trucks in terms of a dose-response relationship which further affected the time that 
the truck would likely remain infected with the virus. Even with the decay of the virus 
over time, trucks that carried larger shipments from infected farms can remain infectious 
for a number of subsequent days and have sufficient viral loads to infect susceptible 
animals.  
The sensitivity analysis attempted to identify the most influential parameters on the 
probability of truck infection; particularly around those parameters whose values were 
estimated based on experts' input. However, the outputs suggested that for small 
incremental changes for the farm level prevalence of PRRS virus, for the animal level 
prevalence of the virus and the percentage of shedding animals in the shipment, the 
model outcome (mean probability for truck infection) was not greatly affected. The 
sensitivity analysis, when taken in the sense of comparing a number of what-if scenarios 
that could lead to massive drop in the probability that a truck can remain infected at the 
end of Day 1, indicated that either decreasing the farm level prevalence of the virus to 
10% or decreasing the animal level prevalence of the virus to the same level could 
decrease the probability for truck infection by more than half. These two findings may 
have practical significance towards controlling the spread of PRRS virus via shared 
transport. 
Despite making several simplifying assumptions, we believe the model has captured the 
underlying pathways leading to the contamination with PRRS virus of the trucks used in 
the transportation of pigs on Canadian farms and from which infection can be 
transmitted to susceptible pigs. However, we have only presented point estimates for the 
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probability of truck infection and could not produce a distribution around that estimate, 
due to use of the step function in the model, which resulted in a binary model outcome. 
Due to the lack of available data, the current model did not include pathways leading to 
the eventual transfer of infection from such trucks to susceptible pigs or naïve farms. 
However, the model could be further extended to elucidate such probabilities, as well as 
to estimate the indirect contact transmission probability of spreading the PRRS virus via 
the sharing of trucks. A similar approach could be utilized in understanding the risk of 
truck sharing on the spread of other swine diseases where transportation has been 
implicated as a medium for viral spread, as appears to be the case for porcine epidemic 
diarrhoea (Lowe, 2014). 
Findings from this study have value to the swine industry in Canada as they should help 
producers to make informed decision regarding the sharing of trucks among farms, as 
well as in guiding the selection of cleaning protocol for trucks. Given the current truck 
sharing patterns among swine farms in Canada, where for more than half of the 
shipments on any given day, the same truck has been used on more than one farm 
(Thakur et al., 2014), together with current biosecurity practices around truck cleaning 
in Canada, where only around one third of the trucks used for the shipment of pigs are 
cleaned after every shipment (Lambert et al., 2012b), the current model suggests that 
there is a substantial risk for spread of PRRS virus through contaminated trucks. This 
risk could be largely eliminated either by properly washing, disinfecting and drying 
trucks between successive shipments, by significantly decreasing the farm or animal 
level prevalence of the PRRS virus, or by using designated trucks for each farm in an 
attempt to minimise sharing among farms.  
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Table 5.1 List of nodes/ parameters, process models, prior distributions and observed data with source and references used to 
estimate the probability that a truck will be infected with PRRS virus at the end of a working day. 
Nodes/ Parameters Notation Definition Process 
Model 
Priors values/ 
distribution 
Reference 
Truck use Tr.use The probability that the truck is used between 
two, three or four or more farms in a single 
day 
Fixed  Two=0.5 
Three=0.18 
≥Four =0.32 
Pilot Pig 
Traceability Data 
(Thakur et al., 
2014) 
Farm Positives 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F.Pos.2 The number of farms infected with PRRS 
virus out of the two farms visited by the truck 
Binomial Beta(1,1)  Assumption of 50% 
farm level 
prevalence (F.Prev)  
of PRRS virus F.Pos.3 The number of farms infected with PRRS 
virus out of the three farms visited by the 
truck 
Binomial Beta(1,1)  
F.Pos.4 The number of farms infected with PRRS 
virus out of the four farms visited by the truck 
Binomial Beta(1,1)  
Farm Infection F.inf.2 /3 /4 
 
 
The probability that at least one of the farm 
was infected when the truck was used by two / 
three / four farms 
   
Comb.Prob The probability that at least one of the farms 
the truck visited was infected, when the 
number of farms it visited was unknown 
F.inf.2*0.49
+F.inf.3*.19
+F.inf.4*.32 
  
Animal level 
prevalence 
A.Prev.k The prevalence of PRRS in the batch of 
animals shipped 
Fixed  0.8 Experts' judgement 
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Table 5.1 (continued) 
 
Nodes/ Parameters Notation Definition Process 
Model 
Priors values/ 
distributio
n 
Reference 
Shedding animals Shed.ani.k The probability of shedding animals in a batch of 
animals shipped 
Fixed  0.2, 0.5,0.8 for farrowing, 
nursery and finishing 
farms based on 
Expert's judgement 
Shedding 
prevalence 
Shed.prev.k The probability of infectious and shedding animals in 
a batch of animals shipped 
Prev * 
Shed.ani 
   
Number of 
shedding animals 
Nanik Number of infectious and shedding animals on a 
truck to characterize it as contaminated 
2 Fixed  Dee et al's study 
Minimum number 
of animals 
Minanik The minimum number of animals required on a truck 
to have at least 2 infectious and shedding animals in 
a batch of animals shipped (based on shedding 
proportion) 
Hypergeo
metric 
 
 
 
 
  
Nani1k Number of infectious and shedding animals on a 
truck when the number of animals on the truck is 
equal to  Minani 
Hypergeo
metric 
 
   
Nani1.stepk The probability that a truck with  Minani has at least 2 
infectious and shedding animals 
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Table 5.1 (continued) 
Nodes/ Parameters Notation Definition Process 
Model 
Priors values/ 
distribution 
Reference 
Shipment size Shipsizek The distribution of shipment size for 
shipments from the three production type 
Uniform (1,622) 
(1,700) 
(1,256) 
 for farrowing, nursery 
and finishing farms 
respectively  
Pilot Pig Traceability 
Data 
Minimum Shipment 
Size 
Minship.Fa/Nu/Fi 
 
 
The probability that the truck has more 
animals than  Minani if it was coming from a 
farrowing / nursery / finishing  farm  
 
 
    
Travel time  Travel.time The distribution of travel time for trucks, 
which was obtained by assuming a normal 
distribution for travel time with min, mode 
and max values of  0.5,2,6 respectively 
Normal Normal 
(2.43,1.22) 
 Experts' judgement 
 Travel The probability that the travel time was 
more than two hours in order to qualify the 
truck to be infective 
    
Infective Dose Inf.dose The probability that the truck has an 
infective dose of virus, which depends on 
shipment size and travel time 
Travel* 
Minship 
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Table 5.1 (continued) 
N.Pr
ot=
Nu
mbe
r of 
clea
n 
truc
ks 
after 
was
h, 
was
h 
and 
disi
nfec
tion 
or 
after wash, disinfection and dry, N.W=total number of trucks washed, N.Wd=total number of trucks washed and disinfected, 
N.Wdd=total number of trucks washed, disinfected and dried
Nodes/ Parameters Notation Definition Process Model Priors values/ 
distribution 
Reference 
Truck Infection Tr.inf The probability that the truck is infected at 
the end of the day's work 
Tr.use*F.inf*Inf
.dose 
   
Truck wash 
efficacy 
W.efficacy The probability that washing clears the 
virus from the truck  
Binomial Beta (1,1) N.Prot=0 
N.Wd=10  
 
Truck wash and 
disinfection 
efficacy 
Wd.efficacy The probability that washing and 
disinfection clears the virus from the truck  
Binomial Beta (1,1) N.Prot=6 
N.Wd=20  
Truck wash, 
disinfection and dry 
efficacy 
Wdd.efficacy The probability that washing, disinfection 
and drying clears the virus from the truck  
Binomial Beta (1,1) N.Prot=10 
N.Wdd=10  
Truck Infection 
after wdd 
Tr.inf.wdd The probability that the truck is still 
infected after washing, washing and 
disinfection and washing, disinfection and 
drying 
Tr.inf*W.effica
cy 
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Table 5.2 Scenarios created to evaluate the probability that a truck will be infected 
with PRRS virus at the end of a working day. 
Name of the scenarios Truck used 
between farms 
Truck: Washed/ 
disinfected/Dried 
Truck used by  
S.2.fa 
2 
No 
Farrowing 
S.2.nu Nursery 
S.2.fi Finishing 
S.3.fa 
3 
Farrowing 
S.3.nu Nursery 
S.3.fi Finishing 
S.4.fa 
4 or more 
Farrowing 
S.4.nu Nursery 
S.4.fi Finishing 
S.fa 
Combined 
Farrowing 
S.nu Nursery 
S.fi Finishing 
S. fa.w 
Wash only 
Farrowing 
S.nu.w Nursery 
S.fi.w Finishing 
S.fa.wd 
Wash and Disinfect 
Farrowing 
S.nu.wd Nursery 
S.fi.wd Finishing 
S.fa.wdd 
Wash, Disinfect 
and Dry 
Farrowing 
S.nu.wdd Nursery 
S.fi.wdd Finishing 
S=Scenario, 2=truck used by two farms, 3=truck used by three farms, 4=truck used by 
four or more farms, combined=trucks used by either 2, 3, 4 or more farms, w=trucks 
washed, wd=trucks washed and disinfected, wdd=trucks washed, disinfected and dried, 
fa=truck used by farrowing farms, nu=truck used by nursery farms and fi=trucks used 
by finishing farms 
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Table 5.3 Probability that a truck will remain contaminated with PRRS virus in 
subsequent time periods during warmer months. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nodes/ 
Scenarios 
Mean 
probability on 
Day 1 
Mean 
probability 
for next 15 
hours after 
Day 1 
% decrease 
in mean 
probability 
from Day 1 
Mean 
probabilit
y for next 
30 hours 
after Day 
1 
% decrease 
in mean 
probability 
from Day 1 
S.fa 0.377 0.328 13.0 0.303 19.6 
S.nu 0.389 0.355 8.7 0.328 15.7 
S.fi 0.393 0.358 8.9 0.320 18.6 
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Table 5.4 Sensitivity analysis for the probability that a truck will be infected with PRRS virus at the end of a working day. 
 
Scenarios 
Notations Parameter ±% change in 
input 
parameter 
Mean 
probability 
±% change in 
mean probability 
Nani F. Prev A.Prev Shed.ani 
S.4.fi 1344 2 50 80 70 NA 0.444 Baseline scenario 
Change in Nani to 4 2344 4 50 80 70 100% 0.398 -10.4 
Change in Nani to 8 3344 8 50 80 70 200% 0.365 -17.8 
Change in farm level prevalence to 10% 1144 2 10 80  70 -80 0.162 -63.5 
Change in farm level prevalence to 30% 1244 2 30 80 70 -40 0.359 -19.1 
Change in farm level prevalence to 70% 1444 2 70 80 70 40 0.469 5.6 
Change in animal level prevalence to 10% 1314 2 50 10 70 -87.5 0.160 -64.0 
Change in animal level prevalence to 30% 1324 2 50 30 70 -62.5 0.390 -12.2 
Change in animal level prevalence to 50% 1334 2 50 50 70 -37.5 0.428 -3.6 
Change in animal level prevalence to 100% 1354 2 50 100 70 25 0.464 4.5 
Change in shedding animal (Shed.ani)  to 10% 1341 2 50 80 10 -85.7 0.181 -59.2 
Change in  shedding animal (Shed.ani)  to 30% 1342 2 50 80 30 -57 0.400 -9.9 
Change in  shedding animal (Shed.ani)  to 50% 1343 2 50 80 50 -28.6 0. 430 -3.15 
Change in  shedding animal (Shed.ani)  to 90% 1345 2 50 80 90 28.6 0.470 5.8 
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Figure 5.1 Pathways of truck sharing between farms, [A] without cleaning and disinfection, and [B] with cleaning and disinfection, 
within a one day time period. One truck may be used between two farms or more than two farms within the time period considered in 
this risk analysis exercise. 
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Figure 5.2 Schematic representation of the Bayesian Network to estimate the likelihood 
of contamination of shipment trucks with PRRS virus and to evaluate the efficacy of 
various cleaning and disinfecting protocols for removal of PRRS virus from 
contaminated trucks.  
Fixed nodes are shown in rectangles while stochastic nodes in ellipsoids. The diamond-
shaped node represent outcomes that are estimated by the model. Nodes with gray 
shading represent prior information. The model represents a trucki, that can have visitsj 
(2,3, or 4 or more) on a day and can ship animals from production typesk (farrowing, 
nursery or finishing) of swine farms and can be cleaned by using protocols (wash, wash 
and disinfect, or wash, disinfect and dry).
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Figure 5.3 Mean probabilities for contamination of trucks with PRRS virus at the end of Day 1, for several scenarios depending on the 
number of times the trucks were shared and the production type of the PRRS virus infected farm, (A) without cleaning and 
disinfection of trucks and (B) with application of one of the three cleaning protocols evaluated in the study.
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Figure 5.4 Distribution of posterior probabilities for contamination of trucks with PRRS 
virus after application of one of the three different cleaning and disinfection protocols 
(w: washing, wd: washing and disinfection and wdd: washing, disinfection and drying) 
for a truck that was used by an infected finishing (fi) farm, where the boxes represent 
inter quartile range of the distribution.
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
S.fi.w S.fi.wd S.fi.wdd
 191 
 
  
Figure 5.5 Risk plot showing sensitivity of the mean probability that a truck will be 
infected with PRRS virus to changes in key model parameter values to that of the 
baseline model (1344):  Nani (minimum number of infectious and shedding animals 
required on the truck), farm level prevalence (F.prev), animal level prevalence (A.Prev) 
of the virus and the probability of shedding animals (Shed.ani) on the truck respectively. 
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Chapter 6 General Discussion, Limitations and Future Directions 
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The main focus of the research reported in this thesis was to simulate the spread of 
PRRS virus in order to better understand the transmission dynamics of the virus as a 
result of the movement of pigs between Canadian swine herds. A key goal was to 
elucidate the relative impact of direct and indirect contacts on the spread of PRRS virus, 
or indeed other contagious diseases of swine with similar epidemiological characteristics 
to those of the PRRS virus. To accomplish this network analysis (NA) tools were used 
to determine direct (via the movement of pigs) and indirect (via the sharing of shipment 
trucks) contact patterns between Canadian swine farms, based on historical information 
that had been collected as part of a pilot traceability project in the swine industry of four 
Canadian regions. The contact rates obtained from the network analysis study were used 
to simulate a farm level model for the spread of PRRS virus via the movement of 
animals and sharing of trucks between farms. Thereafter, the extent and patterns 
involved in the spread of PRRS virus via direct (movement of animals) and indirect 
contacts (sharing of trucks) among swine farms in Ontario, Canada were explored using 
a variety of simulation models. The first simulation study utilized a spatially-explicit 
model (NAADSM) that did not consider the contact network structure among farms. 
However, previous studies had suggested that the contact network structure among 
farms can have significant impacts on the way in which disease will spread (Keeling, 
2005; Keeling and Eames, 2005b; Dangerfield et al., 2009). To this end, the network 
structure identified for swine movement in four regions of Canada was studied, which 
corresponded to small-world and scale free topologies, similar to other studies within 
Canada and from other geographical regions (Nöremark et al., 2011b; Rautureau et al., 
2012a; Büttner et al., 2013b; Dorjee et al., 2013). Based on the identified network 
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structure of swine farms the second simulation study was conducted, so that the impact 
of network structures within the swine industry on the pattern and extent of PRRS virus 
spread in a population of hypothetical Canadian swine farms could be evaluated. The 
two main simulation studies described in this thesis both highlighted the impact of 
indirect contact, via the sharing of trucks among farms, on between-farm transmission of 
PRRS virus. The final chapter assessed the likelihood that a given truck used for the 
transportation of pigs would be contaminated with PRRS virus and also evaluated the 
likelihood that these trucks would remain contaminated over the succeeding few days in 
the absence of any new source of PRRS virus contamination. The key findings from 
these studies, and their implications, are discussed in this chapter together with an 
outline of some limitations associated with these studies and considerations for future 
research. 
6.1 General Discussion 
The connections between swine farms, at least those explored in this study, appeared to 
align well with the hierarchical organization of the swine industry, in which pigs at 
different stages of growth move unidirectionally from one stage of production to the 
next. Additionally, the NA study explored the indirect contact structures that exist as a 
result of the sharing of trucks among farms, and suggested that a large number of trucks 
were being shared between farms for the shipment of pigs. Indeed, for more than half of 
the shipments on any given day, the same truck was used for more than one shipment, 
indicating that many farms that are not directly connected via the movement of animals 
are connected by this indirect path (which ultimately decreased the average number of 
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links required to reach any pair of farms in the network). This level of truck sharing 
between farms should be a concern for the swine industry in terms of the spread of a 
number of infectious agents, such as PRRS virus and Porcine Epidemic Diarrhea (PED), 
particularly if trucks are not adequately cleaned and disinfected between successive 
shipments. Furthermore, the NA study provided contact parameters for the swine 
industry in Canada, which were used in the simulations of virus spread, and these 
parameters may be helpful in parametrizing future simulations studies that model the 
likely spread of other infectious diseases within the Canadian swine industry. The 
simulations of PRRS virus spread in this thesis used maximum out-degree, the number 
of unique contacts a farm has, to estimate the mean contact rate between farms. 
Simulations involving contact rates derived from maximum out-degree are likely to 
provide more reliable estimates of epidemic size than would be the case when contact 
rates are based on shipment frequency (Dubé et al., 2008). The argument for using out-
degree, over shipment frequency, is that shipment frequency does not exclude multiple 
shipments going to the same farm and will therefore tend to over-estimate the contact 
rate between farms; ultimately resulting in larger sizes of modelled epidemics. In 
contrast, simply using out-degree will likely underestimate epidemic size (Dubé et al., 
2008). Therefore, maximum out-degree for each production type was used in the 
estimation of contact rates, on the basis that this will tend to provide a better estimate of 
contact rate than either shipment frequency or simple farm-level out-degree. 
Based on the contact rates obtained from the NA study, the spread of PRRS virus (via 
direct and indirect contact), was simulated and described in Chapters 3 and 4. In this 
thesis, two modeling approaches were considered for between-farm spread of PRRS 
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virus, namely, spatially-explicit modelling (NAADSM) and network-based modelling 
(in AnyLogic).  
The NAADSM model evaluated several hypothetical scenarios for between-farm spread 
of PRRS virus that considered direct and indirect contact between farms, together with 
the production type of the farm in which the infection was seeded. This model 
highlighted the relative importance of direct and indirect contact, as a result of the 
sharing of trucks that were assumed not to be cleaned between successive shipments, on 
between-farm transmission of PRRS virus. 
 The use of a network-based model highlighted the importance of understanding and 
incorporating realistic network structures among the individuals of a population when 
developing infectious disease spread models. The findings suggested that any outbreak 
in a scale-free network will spread rapidly and will result in the largest epidemic size, 
due to the presence of "hubs" (Dube et al., 2011) in the scale-free network. This result is 
consistent with findings from other similar studies (Rahmandad and Sterman, 2008; 
Rahmandad et al., 2011). The spread of the virus in small-world networks resulted in 
lower epidemic sizes, as farms in this type of network tend to form small groups and 
have limited contact with members of distant groups in the network. In this study, the 
epidemic size observed for spread of the virus in random networks was similar to those 
observed for small-world networks, which contrasted with reports from other studies 
where outbreaks on random networks resulted in similar epidemic sizes to those seen in 
scale-free networks (Keeling and Eames, 2005a; Shirley and Rushton, 2005b; 
Rahmandad and Sterman, 2008; Rahmandad et al., 2011). Random networks are 
characterized as having equal probability of connection among individuals in the 
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network (Erdős and Rényi, 1960). The key difference in the construction of random 
networks in this study, compared to other reported studies, was that the average number 
of connections between farms was much lower. When the average number of 
connections was increased, as part of the sensitivity analysis, this did indeed lead to 
much larger epidemic sizes. 
Both types of models discussed in this thesis simulated disease spread at farm level and 
used similar parameters. However, there are some fundamental differences between the 
two approaches. For the network-based model, the direct contact between farms was 
limited to only those farms that were connected as per the construction rules of the 
network structure specified. On the other hand, for the NAADSM model, no network 
structure was imposed, so farms were allowed to contact any other farm randomly, 
provided they were in the same contact group (for example, any farrowing farm was 
allowed to contact any other nursery farm). Additionally, for the NAADSM model in 
this thesis, the distance distribution over which farms can have contact had negligible 
impact on the disease progression which suggested location of farms may have very 
little influence on long range geographic spread of PRRS virus. This was one of the key 
reasons for the quantitatively different outputs from these models; specifically, the 
impact of indirect contact was higher in the case of the network-based model than was 
the case for the NAADSM model. Strictly, it may not be reasonable to directly compare 
outputs from models that were simulated based on different underlying principles; 
however, it can add value for the practical purpose for selecting between modeling 
platforms. It should be noted that although the outputs from these two modeling 
platforms were quantitatively different, the pattern of outbreaks remained similar across 
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the AnyLogic and NAADSM models. Outbreaks initiated within farrowing farms were 
most likely to have the highest impact on the overall epidemic size and the incorporation 
of indirect contact significantly increased the epidemic size in all models explored. 
Thus, the importance of comparatively simpler models such as NAADSM cannot be 
discounted, especially when the objective of the exercise is not to attempt to make a 
quantitative prediction but, rather, to understand the relative importance of direct and 
indirect contacts on the extent and progression of outbreaks. NAADSM is also simpler 
to set up and may be better suited for use by those with limited computer programming 
skills or in cases where detailed contract structure data are not available. 
The major focus of this thesis was to elucidate the transmission dynamics of PRRS virus 
due to the movement of pigs between Canadian swine herds. Hence, the scope of the 
simulation studies in Chapters 3 and 4 were limited to an evaluation of the relative 
impact of direct and indirect contacts between farms on the spread of PRRS virus. The 
incorporation of indirect contact, for both NAADSM and network-based models, 
resulted in much larger epidemic sizes than those produced by direct contact or indirect 
contact separately, suggesting that the incorporation of both contact types has a 
synergistic effect on disease spread. At the most fundamental level, the sharing of trucks 
could lead to connections between farms that were never directly linked via animal 
movement or that did not typically receive animals. With the incorporation of indirect 
contact, the virus could spread in a multidirectional fashion linking farms among the 
various production types. Thus, the protection provided by a farm‘s position within the 
hierarchical structure was no longer maintained. However, the impact of indirect contact 
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was less pronounced in the NAADSM models compared to models in which network 
structure was incorporated.  
Two other studies using different methodological approaches have also identified the 
role of shared trucks in the spread of PRRS virus among Ontario swine herds (Kwong et 
al., 2013; Arruda et al., 2015). These studies reinforce the findings of this thesis and 
highlight the importance of indirect contacts as a route for transmission of PRRS virus. 
Kwong et al (Kwong et al., 2013) identified that the use of the same trucks was one of 
the three most important factors in the spread of one particular genotype of PRRS virus 
within swine herds in Ontario, while Arruda et al (Arruda et al., 2015) reported that if a 
farm was a part of a truck network in which at least one other farm was infected with 
PRRS virus, the odds for being infected with the virus increased. Indeed, this study 
suggested that 45.6% of farm infections within a network of farms which used same 
trucks from the same transportation company for the shipment of pigs could be 
attributed to this mode of transmission. The swine industry in Ontario should take note 
of these findings and consider implementing interventions such as the use of designated 
trucks for infected and naive farms, plan more regular visits to assess the health status of 
farms, and ensure the regular cleaning and disinfection of trucks between shipments, in 
an attempt to limit the spread of PRRS virus via this indirect route.  
The first three research chapters of this thesis suggested that a high degree of truck 
sharing between farms in the shipment of pigs could have a significant impact on the 
between-farm spread of PRRS virus, however, some gaps in knowledge regarding the 
associated risks, motivated further study using the Bayesian Analysis of Chapter 5. The 
main focus of this study was on estimating the probability that a truck, used for the 
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shipment of pigs, would be contaminated with PRRS virus at the end of any given day. 
This work suggested that it was very likely that most of the trucks used by swine farms 
for the shipment of pigs would become contaminated with the PRRS virus, given the 
current disease infection status of PRRS virus and the truck sharing patterns typically 
seen in Canadian farms. Additionally, this study suggested that most of the trucks that 
become contaminated will remain infected for around a week, during colder months, if 
no cleaning or disinfection is applied. In warmer months due to viral decay, some of the 
trucks may get rid of the virus reasonably quickly; however, most of the trucks will 
likely remain infected for at least two more days from the time of initial contamination. 
This study further suggested that to decrease the probability for truck infection by more 
than half, either the farm-level or the animal-level prevalence of the virus needed to be 
lowered to around 10%. The study also evaluated the impact of three commonly used 
cleaning and disinfection protocols in eliminating the virus from contaminated trucks. 
The findings suggested that washing and disinfection followed by overnight drying was 
a much more effective approach than only washing, or washing with disinfection. The 
use of a Bayesian network in this study allowed for the combination of different sources 
of information and the propagation of uncertainty in the model (Czado and Brechmann, 
2014), as well as a relaxation of the assumption, adopted in most risk analysis models, 
of conditional dependence between nodes (Albert et al., 2008).  
6.2 Limitations 
The ability of a model to represent reality depends on the accuracy and completeness of 
the model and the parameters used. However, gaps in knowledge on several 
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epidemiological determinants governing disease processes present difficulties in 
producing truly predictive models (Taylor and Gate, 2003). The development of models, 
in collaboration with subject-matter experts, is instrumental in capturing some of the 
undocumented parameters and improving the reliability of the model (Taylor and Gate, 
2003). An infectious disease model is considered internally valid if the outcomes of the 
model are epidemiologically plausible for the study population considered and make 
biological sense under the parameters used to simulate the model (Dubé et al., 2007). 
The outcomes of the models for between-farm PRRS virus spread described in this 
thesis are epidemiologically justifiable. Even though the models presented in this thesis 
utilized empirical contact structures, the studies involved to extract the contact structure 
utilized limited data and were not very recent. Similarly, some of the other parameters 
were based on experts‘ suggestions. Additionally, the outputs from the simulated models 
could not be validated in the absence of outbreak data that could be linked with the 
movement of pigs. However, even in the absence of data to validate the model, disease 
spread models may still be a useful tool for epidemiologists and decision makers by 
providing insights into the mechanisms of disease spread (Taylor and Gate, 2003). 
Several published models have been useful in understanding the disease spread process 
as well as in evaluating ‗what if‘ scenarios for several pathogens, such as highly 
pathogenic avian influenza virus (Patyk et al., 2013), H1N1 influenza virus (Dorjee et al., 
2014) and FMD virus (Dubé et al., 2007; Sanson et al., 2014). 
For the NAADSM model, it should be noted that the version of the software used for 
this thesis, did not allow for the selection of different farms in which the infection could 
be seeded. However, this limitation becomes irrelevant unless local or aerosol 
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transmission is being considered, and these two transmission modes were considered to 
be beyond the scope of the current research. While aerosol transmission was not 
considered, the impact that this mode of transmission has on between-farm spread of 
PRRS virus would likely be limited, as studies have suggested that it can influence local, 
rather than long distance, spread of the virus (Le Potier et al., 1997; Goldberg et al., 
2000; Mondaca-Fernández et al., 2006; Lambert et al., 2012a). For network-based 
models, one limitation worth noting was that the software used to simulate disease 
spread did not allow for the small-world networks to reflect the precise characteristics of 
the observed network connections among swine farms. For these reasons making any 
quantitative inferences based on the outcomes of these models may require some 
caution. Instead, the findings from these studies should be considered as a qualitative 
guide to understanding the pattern and magnitude of likely PRRS virus outbreaks under 
the scenarios explored. Similarly, for the Bayesian risk model, several parameters (farm 
level prevalence, animal level prevalence and shedding animals) were based on 
assumptions. However, sensitivity analysis across a range of values for these parameters 
suggested that the model outcome was not particularly sensitive to changes in the values 
of these parameters. It should also be noted that viral load on shipment trucks could not 
be quantified, due to insufficiency of data, and that the number of infectious and 
shedding animals on the truck was used as a proxy for having sufficient viral load to 
characterize the truck as being contaminated. One other limitation of the Bayesian 
model worth noting was the loss of variability in the estimated parameters, for which 
only point estimates were reported. This was linked to the use of step functions in the 
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model for several nodes, resulting in binary outcomes rather than in a distribution of 
estimates for such nodes. 
6.3 Concluding Remarks 
The studies described in this thesis have provided insights into the pattern of contacts 
between swine farms and the impact these contacts can have on PRRS virus spread. In 
addition, the importance of including data on the sharing of trucks among farms in the 
simulation models has been highlighted, as trucks will tend to connect farms which 
would otherwise share no connection. In many intensive swine production regions in 
North America (such as in Minnesota or Ontario), ARC&E programs have been 
designed to eliminate PRRS virus infection from a particular region or geographical area 
(Corzo et al., 2010; Arruda et al., 2014). Any such program may benefit from the 
findings in this dissertation by helping regional disease control managers to better 
understand the patterns of direct and indirect contacts that swine farms may have, the 
levels of indirect contact as a result of truck sharing, and the potential impact these 
forms of contact can have on the spread of the virus in that region. Additionally, 
findings from this study regarding the high potential for shipment trucks to remain 
contaminated with PRRS virus for a number of days after they become infected has 
highlighted the importance of biosecurity measures in preventing the further spread of 
the virus from infectious farms via shared trucks. 
The swine industry in North America has been alarmed by recent outbreaks of PED 
across a wide geographical region (Stevenson et al., 2013a; Kehrli et al., 2014), with 
contaminated feed widely considered to be the source of the initial outbreak of the virus 
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(Pasick et al., 2014). Transportation trucks have been implicated, by the experts in the 
industry and in a number of initial published reports, in the subsequent spread of the 
virus across several states and provinces from the initially infected farms (Lowe, 2014). 
Findings from this study are in line with the opinion of swine experts that, given the 
high number of farms sharing trucks for the shipment of pigs, it is likely that 
transportation was the cause of the long distance spread of the PED virus outbreak in 
such a short time span. This opinion is reinforced by the fact that approximately only 
one third of such trucks are cleaned and disinfected between successive shipments 
(Lambert et al., 2012b). Future studies to evaluate the impact of such indirect contact 
between farms on the spread of the PED virus may benefit from the methods and 
approaches discussed in this dissertation. 
6.4 Future Directions 
Since animal movement networks are dynamic in nature, it is valuable to analyze 
movement data over a reasonable period of time to investigate any structural changes 
that might take place in the network. Thus, future research which had an objective to 
capture movement data linked to swine on a continuous basis, and that could be used to 
update the characteristics of swine movement networks in Canada, would be of great 
benefit to industry and policy makers. Any such study could indicate recent structural 
changes in the networks typical of swine movement and elucidate current pattern of 
truck sharing among swine farms, which may or may not be different from that which 
has been described in this thesis. Incorporation of local spread, aerosol spread and other 
forms of indirect contacts within a PRRS virus spread model were beyond the scope of 
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this dissertation. However, the inclusion of other potential modes of transmission of the 
virus within a model would provide a more detailed understanding of likely between-
farm transmission of the virus and would be helpful in evaluating the relative impact of 
each of these modes of transmission. Similarly, breeding farms were not included in the 
models described in this thesis, future studies can assess the risk of disease spread to 
other farms from breeding farms.  
In the current network-based models, trucks could not explicitly represented as agents, 
rather truck sharing between farms was represented as indirect contact between farms 
and implemented as a probabilistic link between the relevant nodes. Network-based 
models, an extension of the agent-based models, explicitly incorporate network 
structures between individuals (farms in these models) in the population (Keeling and 
Eames, 2005a; Lanzas and Chen, 2014). However, in an agent based model it would be 
possible to provide a mechanism by which trucks could be represented as additional 
agents within the model. This would allow for comparison between the outputs of two 
different models and assess the impact of adding an additional layer of complexity to the 
model. Inclusion of trucks as additional agents in the model would allow for the 
simulation of a scale-free structure for indirect contact. This would be in line with the 
outcome of the NA study which suggested that trucks shared between farms followed a 
power-law distribution and would likely result in a more pronounced effect due to 
indirect contact. It would also be beneficial to extract the links created between farms on 
a typical run of the NAADSM model, so that these could be analyzed using network 
analysis tools, to better understand the network structure being constructed inside the 
NAADSM model.  
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The Bayesian model described in this thesis did not include pathways that can lead to 
the spread of infection from contaminated trucks to naive pigs or farms, so future studies 
could extend the current model to include such pathways, which would better support 
the estimation of the indirect contact transmission probability of PRRS virus via the 
sharing of trucks. It would also be useful to find an alternative to the step function used 
in the Bayesian Network which would allow for the incorporation of variability into 
model outcomes. Finally, it should be noted that, simulation models provide insights 
into understanding complex processes and can inform decision making, but models 
themselves require sound and reliable data and cannot always be a substitute for field-
based epidemiological or experimental studies (Kao, 2002). Hence, research studies 
focused on regular epidemiological data collection and reporting play a vital role in 
supplementing findings from simulation studies, and their role in guiding the 
parametrization of simulation studies should never be discounted. For example, under 
the currently practiced area regional control and eradication (ARC&E) programs for 
PRRS virus (Corzo et al., 2010), any documentation concerning the sharing of transport 
vehicles and movement of pigs between farms, as well as the capture of data on PRRS 
virus outbreaks on farms, could greatly benefit future modeling studies; not only in 
validating the models, but also by providing updated parameters for model development. 
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Table S1Contact matrix with probabilities of swine movements between different 
production types based on total number of shipments as reported in swine movement data 
Source farms Destination farms 
Farrow to 
finish (%) 
Farrowing 
(%) 
NurseryA 
(%) 
FinishingA 
(%) 
Total 
Farrow-to-finish - 0 25 75 100 
Farrowing - 2 92 6 100 
NurseryA  - - 8 92 100 
FinishingA - - 5 95 100 
 
Table S2 Contact matrix of truck sharing between farms of different production types 
based on total number of trucks shared between more than two farms (from swine 
movement data) 
 Farrow-to-
finish (%) 
Farrowing 
(%) 
NurseryA 
(%) 
FinishingA 
(%) 
NurseryC 
(%) 
FinishingC 
(%) 
Farrow-to-finish 0 0.06 0.14 0.29 0.14 0.29 
Farrowing 0.06 2.6 0.94 0.14 0.94 0.14 
NurseryA 0.14 0.94 2.3 3.9 2.3 3.9 
FinishingA 0.29 0.14 3.9 12.8 3.9 12.8 
NurseryC 0.14 0.94 2.3 3.9 2.3 3.9 
FinishingC 0.29 0.14 3.9 12.8 3.9 12.8 
This matrix represents the percentage of trucks shared among farms of different production 
types during the entire duration of study, which is later used to calculate weekly indirect contact 
rates by dividing with the study duration. 
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Table S3 Mean Contact rate per week among different production types, calculated based 
on contact matrix and maximum out-degree (from swine movement data) of each 
production type 
Source farms Destination farms  
 Farrow to finish Farrowing NurseryA  FinishingA 
Farrow to finish 0 0 0.06 0.17 
Farrowing 0 0.01 0.51 0.03 
NurseryA  0 0 0.03 0.31 
FinishingA 0 0 0.01 0.21 
  
 
Table S4 Mean indirect contact rate per week between farms of different production 
types via sharing of trucks used for shipment 
 Farrow-to-
finish 
Farrowing NurseryA FinishingA NurseryC FinishingC 
Farrow-to-finish 0 0.0007 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.004 
Farrowing 0.0007 0.03 0.01 0.002 0.01 0.002 
NurseryA 0.002 0.012 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.05 
FinishingA 0.004 0.002 0.05 0.16 0.05 0.16 
NurseryC* 0.002 0.012 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.05 
FinishingC* 0.004 0.002 0.05 0.16 0.05 0.16 
* The mean indirect contact rates (Supplementary material, Table S4) for these farms (NurseryC 
and FinishingC) with farms of other production types were derived using the contact matrix 
presented in Table S3, where nurseryA and nurseryC farms and finshingA and finishingC farms 
had similar proportion of truck sharing with rest of the production types. Weekly contact rates 
were obtained by dividing the proportion of truck share with duration of the study (18 weeks) 
and then multiplying by maximum number of farms sharing a single truck (which represented 
the worst case scenario). 
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Table S5 Descriptive summary of the model-generated number of farms infected with PRRS virus and time required to reach the peak epidemic from 
simulation based on 1000 iterations of  scenarios (Set A additional scenarios) 
Scen
ario 
No. 
Scenario 
Name 
 
Farms Infected: Median (p95) Epidemic Size: Median (p95) Week  to 
peak 
epidemic 
(p95) 
Overall Farrowi
ng 
NurseryA FinishingA Farrow
- to- 
finish 
NurseryC Finishing
C 
Overall NurseryA FinishingA 
2  DC_NA 418 (483) 0 (0) 41 (64) 377 (419) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 490 (681) 45 (74) 444 (538) 41 (52) 
3  DC_FiA 410 (477) 0 (0) 44 (62) 366 (415) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 513 (668) 47 (71) 466 (601) 44 (52) 
4  DC_FF  428 (485) 0 (0) 48 (66) 379 (418) 1 (1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 546 (687) 53 (77) 490 (614) 45 (52) 
5  DC_NC 42 (51) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (1) 41 (50) 42 (51) 0 (0) 0 (0) 46 (52) 
6  DC_FiC 1 (1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (1) 1 (1) 0 (0) 0 (0) NA 
8  D&IC_NA  802 (983) 3 (9) 86 (124) 421 (451) 3 (8) 47 (90) 242 (301) 963 ( 1271) 107 (173) 555 (709) 37 (46) 
9 D&IC_FiA 825 (978) 3 (6) 93 (125) 418 (448) 4 (6) 53 (91) 254 (302) 1006 (1270) 114 (171) 576 (711) 39 (47) 
10 D&IC_FF 856 (1035) 4 (12) 99 (138) 423 (455) 5 (10) 61 (106) 264 (314) 1054 (1345) 126 (204) 594 (722) 41 (49) 
11 D&IC_NC 816 (974) 4 (10) 89 (123) 402 (440) 4 (6) 55 (92) 262 (303) 952 (1207) 109 (168) 515 (649) 42 (50) 
12 D&IC_FiC 174 (866) 0 (5) 12 (101) 104 (422) 0 (5) 7 (63) 51 (270) 227 (1025) 17 (122) 145 (573) 45 (52) 
DC=Direct Contact, D&IC=Direct and indirect contact, NA=NurseryA, FiA=FinishingA, FF=Farrow-to-finish NC= NurseryC, FiC=FinishingC 
For median number of farms infected, farms that had multiple infections were counted only once; while for median epidemic size, farms with multiple 
outbreaks were counted multiple times. For Farrowing, Farrow-to -finish, NurseryC and FinishingC farms, the median epidemic sizes were similar to their 
respective median numbers of farms infected. 
p95= 95th percentile  
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Table S6 Summary statistics relating to multiple outbreaks of PRRS virus during the period of simulation based on 1000 
iterations of scenarios (Set A additional scenarios) 
Scena
rio 
No. 
Scenario 
Name 
Percentage of farms with the indicated number of outbreaks  
Farrowing NurseryA FinishingA Farrow-to-finish NurseryC FinishingC 
0 1 0 1 2-3 >4 0 1 2-3 0 1 0 1 0 1 
2  DC_NA 100 0 83.5 14.5 2.0 0 23.7 53.4 22.9 100 0 100 0 100 0 
3  DC_FiA 100 0 82.3 15.9 1.8 0 25.9 53.6 20.5 100 0 100 0 100 0 
4  DC_FF  100 0 80.6 16.9 2.5 0 23.2 54.7 22.1 99.9 0.01 100 0 100 0 
5  DC_NC 100 0 100 0 0 0 100 0 0 100 0 99.4 0.06 87.4 12.6 
6  DC_FiC 100 0 100 0 0 0 100 0 0 100 0 100 0 99.7 0.03 
8  D&IC_NA  99.1 0.9 65.3 26.5 8.2 0 14.8 53.4 31.8 99.7 0.3 71.7 28.3 25.8 74.2 
9 D&IC_FiA 99.1 0.9 62.5 28.8 8.7 0 15.4 53.9 30.7 99.6 0.4 68.1 31.9 22.1 77.9 
10 D&IC_FF 98.7 1.3 60.1 29.6 9.9 0.4 14.4 53.8 31.8 99.5 0.5 63.3 36.7 19 81 
11 D&IC_NC 98.7 1.3 64.2 28.5 7.3 0 18.6 58.2 23.2 99.6 0.4 66.9 33.1 19.6 80.4 
12 D&IC_FiC 100 0 95.1 4.2 0.7 0 78.5 17.9 3.6 100 0 88.9 11.1 84.4 15.6 
DC=Direct Contact, D&IC=Direct and indirect contact, NA=NurseryA, FiA=FinishingA, FF=Farrow-to-finish NC= NurseryC, FiC=FinishingC 
 
 
 215 
 
Table S7 Descriptive summary of the predicted number of farms infected with PRRS virus and time required to reach the peak epidemic 
from simulation based on 1000 iterations of scenarios 13 and 19 (Set B scenarios) 
 
Scenari
o No. 
Scenari
o Name Farms Infected: Median (p95) Epidemic Size: Median (p95) 
Week  
to peak 
epidemi
c  
(p95)  
  
Overall 
Farrowi
ng 
NurseryA FinishingA 
Farrow
-to-
finish 
NurseryC 
Finishing
C 
Overall NurseryA FinishingA 
13. DC_F  948 (1054) 1 (4) 86 (109) 489 (522) 0 40 (74) 333 (368) 1170 (1336) 104 (139) 689 (795) 37 (49) 
19. 
D&IC_
F 
1241 (1313) 13 (22) 165 (191) 547 (568) 10 (16) 124 (147) 382 (388) 1662 (1828) 257 (325) 875 (961) 27 (45) 
DC=Direct Contact, D&IC=Direct and indirect contact, F=Farrowing 
For median number of farms infected, farms that had multiple infections were counted only once; while for median epidemic size, farms with multiple 
outbreaks were counted multiple times. For Farrowing, Farrow-to -finish, NurseryC and FinishingC farms, the median epidemic sizes were similar to their 
respective median numbers of farms infected. 
p95= 95th percentile 
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Table S8 Summary statistics relating to multiple outbreaks of PRRS virus during the period of simulation based on 1000 
iterations of scenarios 13 and 19 (Set B scenarios) 
Sce
nari
o 
No. 
Scenario 
Name 
Percentage of farms with the indicated number of outbreaks  
Farrowing NurseryA FinishingA Farrow-to-
finish 
NurseryC FinishingC 
0 1 0 1 2-3 >4 0 1 2-3 0 1 0 1 0 1 
13 DC_F 99.7 0.3 68.5 25.6 5.9 0 18.1 51.2 30.7 100 0 78.1 21.9 15.7 84.3 
19 D&IC_F 96.3 3.7 39.6 35.9 22.7 1.8 8.3 42.4 49.3 98.7 1.3 31.9 68.1 3.3 96.7 
DC=Direct Contact, D&IC=Direct and indirect contact, F=Farrowing 
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Figure S1 Distribution of the overall epidemic size of PRRS virus simulated outbreaks of between-farm spread  among swine herds of Ontario 
under assumptions of direct (a) and direct and indirect contacts (b) between farms for Set B scenarios. Different colors represent outputs from 
scenarios in which the epidemic was initiated from farm of the noted production type. DC=Direct Contact, D&IC=Direct and indirect contact, 
F=Farrowing, NA=NurseryA, FiA=FinishingA, FF=Farrow-to-finish NC= NurseryC, FiC=FinishingC. 
The middle band of the box represents 50th percentile, the bottom and top of the box represents 25th and 75th percentile and the end of the 
whiskers represent maximum and minimum within ±1.5 interquartile range of the epidemic size distribution. 
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Figure S2 Distribution of epidemic size of PRRS virus simulated outbreaks by swine production type among swine herds of Ontario under 
assumptions of (a) direct and (b) direct and indirect contact between farms for Set B scenarios. Different colors represent scenarios in which farms 
of the indicated production type were the initially infected premises. DC=Direct Contact, D&IC=Direct and indirect contact, F=Farrowing, 
NA=NurseryA, FiA=FinishingA, FF=Farrow-to-finish NC= Nurseries, FiC=FinishingC. 
The middle band of the box represents 50th percentile, the bottom and top of the box represents 25th and 75th percentile and the end of the 
whiskers represent maximum and minimum within ±1.5 interquartile range of the epidemic size distribution. 
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Table S9 Summary posterior distribution of nodes and  scenarios used in the 
Bayesian model simulated to evaluate the probability that a truck will be infected 
with PRRS virus at the end of a working day. 
Nodes Mean SD
! 
Median 95% CrI* 
F.pos.2 1.00 0.71 1 0-2 
F.pos.3 1.50 0.87 2 0-3 
F.pos.4 2.00 1.0 2 0-4 
F.inf.2  0.753 0.43 1 0-1 
F.inf.3 0.873 0.33 1 0-1 
F.inf.4 0.938 0.24 1 0-1 
Comb.prob 0.833 0.23 1 0-1 
Minani.Fa 17.15 9.05 16 4-39 
Minani.Nu 6.47 3.31 6 2-15 
Minani.Fi 4.34 2.00 4 2-9 
Minship.Fa 0.667 0.47 1 0-1 
Minship.Nu 0.688 0.46 1 0-1 
Minship.Fi 0.699 0.46 1 1-1 
Nani.Fa1 2.75 2.09 2 0-8 
Nani.Nu1 2.58 1.81 2 0-7 
Nani.Fi1 2.42 1.51 2 0-6 
Nani.Fa1.step 0.688 0.46 1 0-1 
Nani.Nu1.step 0.695 0.46 1 0-1 
Nani.Nu1.step 0.710 0.45 1 0-1 
Travel.time 2.43 0.90 2.42 0.685-4.22 
Travel 0.678 0.47 1 0-1 
W.efficacy 0.045 0.04 0.032 0.001-0.161 
Wd.efficacy 0.583 0.13 0.588 0.308-0.831 
Wdd.efficacy 0.917 0.07 0.939 0.716-0.998 
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Scenarios Mean SD
!
 Median 95% CrI* 
S.2.fa 0.338 0.47 1 0-1 
S.2.nu 0.349 0.48 1 0-1 
S.2.fi 0.352 0.48 1 0-1 
S.3.fa 0.395 0.49 1 0-1 
S.3.nu 0.407 0.49 1 0-1 
S.3.fi 0.413 0.49 1 0-1 
S.4.fa 0.425 0.49 1 0-1 
S.4.nu 0.438 0.50 1 0-1 
S.4.fi 0.444 0.50 1 0-1 
S.fa 0.377 0.44 1 0-1 
S.nu 0.389 0.44 1 0-1 
S.fi 0.394 0.44 1 0-1 
S. fa.w 0.360 0.42 0 0-0.996 
S.nu.w 0.371 0.43 0 0-0.996 
S.fi.w 0.376 0.43 0 0-0.996 
S.fa.wd 0.157 0.20 0 0-0.606 
S.nu.wd 0.162 0.20 0 0-0.608 
S.fi.wd 0.163 0.20 0 0-0.607 
S.fa.wdd 0.031 0.06 0 0-0.202 
S.nu.wdd 0.032 0.06 0 0-0.204 
S.fi.wdd 0.033 0.06 0 0-0.204 
!
Standard deviation   
*95% credible interval 
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Figure S3 History and density plots, generated with three initial chains, for all the 
parameters and scenarios simulated to estimate the probability that the truck is 
contaminated with PRRS  virus at the end of Day 1.
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Figure S4 Shrinkage (Gelman) plots of median scale reduction factor and 97.5% upper bounds, generated with three initial chains to 
evaluate evolution of scale-reduction factor with increase in number of iterations, for all the parameters and scenarios simulated to estimate 
the probability that the truck is contaminated with PRRS  virus at the end of Day 1.
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Figure S5 Autocorrelation plots for all the parameters and scenarios simulated to 
estimate the probability that the truck is contaminated with PRRS virus at the end of 
Day 1. 
     
 
 
